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Abstract  
This thesis assesses the new ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 
(ACIA) in the light of international practice. Investment protection is at the heart of this 
investment regime. Considering the ACIA as a tool of regional integration, its structure 
and contents demonstrate its ultimate objective of attracting intra-ASEAN investment 
flows for the realisation of a single market and production base under the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC). Analysis focuses on the specific elements of the ACIA and 
how they balance two contradictory interests, i.e. the protection of ASEAN investors and 
the sovereignty of ASEAN Member States to regulate investments in their territory.  
Tracking the solutions and innovations of substantial and procedural provisions 
introduced by the ACIA, it is found that the “ASEAN Way” of consensus and flexibility 
remains, even though ASEAN has become the AEC with rules and institutions. This 
general ASEAN Way is specifically reflected in the “ASEAN Way of Investment 
Protection”. Given the ASEAN-specific context, the ACIA shows a unique balance of 
States’ and investors’ interests which differs from that of international investment 
agreements of other regional integration initiatives. While the ACIA aims to protect 
ASEAN investors, it attempts to respect the sovereignty of ASEAN Member States, by 
giving more policy space to regulate for public purposes. 
From these findings, recommendations are offered to improve the ASEAN 
investment regime. The understanding of the “ASEAN Way of investment protection” may 
help interpretation and application of investment protection standards of the ACIA, as well 
as the other existing investment agreements. The ACIA may also serve as a platform for 
negotiations of future ASEAN investment agreements.   
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Part I. The ASEAN Way and the ACIA 
Chapter 1. Thesis Introduction  
 
 “As the name suggests, the ACIA is comprehensive,  
but more than that, it is also based on international best practices 
 and on a par with other international investment agreements  
in terms of its scope, rights and obligations.” 
Surin Pitsuwan,  
ASEAN Secretary-General, Jakarta, 20121 
 
 
Section 1. Research Objective: The ACIA 
1.1 The ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) claims that the ACIA, the 
new intra-ASEAN investment instrument, is comprehensive and comparable to other 
international investment agreements. This statement represents only one side of the coin. 
The ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) is not only based on 
international best practices, but also takes into account the ASEAN-specific context, or the 
“ASEAN Way”. This refers to ASEAN’s history and principles underpinning the structure 
of the organisation and the relations among the ASEAN Member States. Given this 
background, the search for the “ASEAN Way” in the ACIA certainly clarifies the ASEAN 
approach to investment protection under the auspices of the forthcoming ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC).  
This thesis names the ASEAN-specific balanced approach the “ASEAN Way of 
Investment Protection”. It borrows the term “ASEAN Way” from ASEAN terminology 
which usually refers to ASEAN Way of cooperation, meaning respect of sovereignty and 
non-interference in domestic affairs among the Member States. The term is widely 
referenced in ASEAN studies, and in international politics or social studies. The “ASEAN 
Way” is also the name of the ASEAN Anthem, which is an expression of ASEAN unity in 
diversity. This term is used in this thesis to explain the attempt to balance the protection of 
the ASEAN Member States and the ASEAN investors in the ACIA. The concept of 
“ASEAN Way” will be fully elaborated in Chapter 2. 
The ACIA is an intra-ASEAN investment agreement. It was signed by the 
Economic Ministers of the ASEAN Member States on 26th February 2009 in Cha-Am, 
                                                 
 
1 Interview by the Oxford Business Group (2012), posted online on 12th April 2013 by ASEAN Briefing. 
http://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2013/04/12/introduction-to-the-asean-comprehensive-investment-
agreement.html#sthash.onhQabVN.dpuf (Last accessed: 16 September 2015). 
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Thailand, and entered into force on 29th March 2012. The ACIA has more functions than 
just an international investment agreement (IIA). Pursuant to the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) Blueprint, the ACIA is one of the key integration tools which aim to 
establish a common market or an integrated regional economy with the free flow of trade 
in goods, services, investment, labour and freer movement of capital by the end of 2015.  
The idea of new ASEAN era, or an ASEAN Community, originates from the 1997 
“ASEAN Vision 2020”2 and the 2003 “Bali Concord II”.3 The ASEAN Community 
comprises three pillars, namely: the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); the ASEAN 
Political-Security Community; and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCS). 
ASEAN Member States agreed to prioritise the AEC because they realised that the AEC is 
the most advanced pillar in terms of integration. Besides, economic integration will help 
prepare ASEAN to integrate politically and culturally. Therefore, ASEAN Member States 
have accelerated the establishment of a common market from original 2020 goal to 2015.4  
The AEC has four goals: (1) a single market and production base; (2) a competitive 
economic region; (3) equitable economic development; and (4) integration into the global 
economy.5 Concerning the first goal, the ACIA aims to create a free and open investment 
environment through the consolidation of the two previous agreements, the ASEAN 
Investment Area (AIA) and ASEAN Investment Guarantee (IGA) agreements, into a single 
comprehensive investment agreement. The ACIA covers four corners of investment: 
protection, facilitation and cooperation, joint promotion, and progressive liberalisation. 
Apart from internal integration, the ACIA also results in external integration because the 
term “investor” under the ACIA means both ASEAN and non-ASEAN investors in the 
ASEAN States’ territory. The ACIA will enhance the attractiveness of ASEAN as a single 
investment destination.  
The ACIA has marked a shift towards stronger regionalism and institutionalisation. 
It is an engine for economic and sustainable development of the AEC as well as an 
instrument for regional governance. Given the competitive global environment for foreign 
investment flows, the ACIA is envisioned to facilitate the transformation of ASEAN into 
an investment hub that would be able to compete effectively with other emerging 
economies.  
                                                 
 
2 Adopted by the ASEAN Leaders on the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN. 
3 At the 9th ASEAN Summit in 2003. 
4 Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015, at the 12th 
ASEAN Summit, 13th January 2007, Cebu, Philippines. 
5 AEC Blueprint, Key characteristics of the AEC, p.8. The AEC Blueprint was adopted at the 13th ASEAN 
Summit on 20 November 2007 in Singapore. 
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In the AEC-building process, ASEAN has become a new actor in determining the 
practice of international investment treaty-making. ASEAN has pursued a policy of active 
negotiation of investment agreements.6 This effort is a confirmation of the “sustained high 
level of commitment from policymakers in this region for closer economic integration and 
investment protection and liberalization”.7 In order to create an attractive investment 
environment, the ASEAN Member States have incorporated new and forward-looking 
provisions. They have accepted some constraints on their sovereignty by entering into 
investment treaties that (1) impose substantive obligations to protect foreign investors and 
(2) create procedural mechanisms that permit investors to bring investor-State arbitral 
claims to enforce those obligations. 
 
1.2 The ASEAN Investment Area (AIA)  
The ASEAN region has been the largest recipient of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in Asia Pacific, relative to gross domestic product (GDP). After the entry into force 
of the ACIA in 2012, FDI flowed into ASEAN in 2013 and continued to surge, on a par 
with FDI to China for the first time since 1993.8 In 2013, ASEAN attracted 127 billion 
USD, accounting for 8% of the global FDI.9 In 2014, realised FDI was 136 billion USD, 
among which 21.5 percent of FDI came from the European Union, followed by ASEAN 
countries (17.9%), Japan (9.8%) and the US (9.6%).10 Meanwhile, ASEAN’s collective 
GDP is expected to grow to more than 6.2 trillion USD by 2023, expanding at a share of 
global GDP from 3.2 percent to 4.7 percent.11 Hence, ASEAN is a region with strong 
growth prospects, as it is becoming a preferred destination for FDI.  
Singapore has been the largest FDI recipient in ASEAN since the 1960s. In 2014,  
a number of mega-projects took place in Singapore and drove FDI inflows to a new record 
of 67 billion USD, which accounted for more than half the total FDI to the whole region 
(52.9%). Indonesia ranked second with a 16.4 percent share, followed by Thailand with 8.5 
percent. However, many FDI projects in Thailand were shelved due to political instability. 
                                                 
 
6 According to UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2013, Ten ASEAN countries had concluded 553 IIAs. 
7 UNCTAD (2008), World Investment Report: Transnational Corporations, and the Infrastructure Challenge, 
UN, New York and Geneva. 
8 ASEAN Secretariat (2014), ASEAN Investment Report 2014, FDI Trends and Development in 2013. 
9 ASEAN Secretariat (2014), ASEAN Investment Report 2013-2014: FDI Development and Regional Value 
Chains. 
10 ASEAN Secretariat (2015), Top ten sources of foreign direct investment inflows in ASEAN, Table 27, 
ASEAN Foreign Direct Investment Statistics Database as of 26 May 2015, 
http://www.asean.org/images/2015/June/FDI_tables/Table%2027.pdf (Last accessed: 7 September 2015) 
11 Chehab, C. (2014), AEC: Assessing the Regional Impact, BMI Research Asia, 23 October 2014, 
http://www.bmiresearch.com/blog/aec-assessing-the-regional-impact#sthash.1cFxUPx4.dpuf  
(Last accessed: 7 September 2015) 
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Among the ASEAN’s low-income economies, Viet Nam’s FDI inflows ranked first, 
reaching 9.2 billion USD (6.8%).12 
As mentioned above, intra-ASEAN FDI figures at approximately one-sixth (17.9%) 
of the total FDI. At the beginning of ASEAN integration, intra-ASEAN FDI was 
insignificant. It started to increase in the 1990s. Intra-ASEAN FDI was assessed in 1995 at 
approximately 4.6 billion USD and increased by five times in 2014 to 24.37 billion USD.13 
However, the extra-ASEAN sources have been consistently significant FDI sources for 
several decades. In 2012-2014, the extra-ASEAN FDI is five times more important than 
the intra-ASEAN FDI.14 
The investment flows are expected to rise higher with the full implementation of 
commitments by 2015. With an estimated combined GDP of 2.4 trillion USD and a 
combined population of about 625 million people, which is 8.8% of the world’s 
population, ASEAN is becoming a regional economic force and free trade hub of Asia.15 
The variance among ASEAN economies means certain countries already benefit more 
from the single market and production base. Singapore remains the preferred regional base 
for 80 percent of multinational companies, while the middle income countries are expected 
to profit thanks to their strong manufacturing infrastructure. The CLMV countries 
(Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) will attract more investment flows due to their 
natural resources and low-wage labour force.16 From now on, doing business in ASEAN 
will allow for economies of scale. 
The best example to illustrate potential benefits of the ASEAN Investment Area is 
the ASEAN automotive industry. The automotive industry has exhibited strong growth 
over the last few years. The industry engages multiple production bases across ASEAN,  
as the participating countries have a sound investment policy for the auto industry, 
competitive labour costs and strong engineering support. Typically, Thailand serves as the 
main assembly base, whereas Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines serve as producers 
of parts and components.17 With full implementation of the AEC, an increasing number of 
                                                 
 
12 Net Inflows of Foreign Direct Investments to the ASEAN Member States, p.50, ASEAN FDI Database, 
http://www10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2014/14222.pdf (Last accessed: 7 September 2015) 
13 ASEAN Secretariat (2006), ASEAN FDI Database 2006, Table 4.1.1 Inward intra-ASEAN direct 
investment flows 1995-2005, http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-6.pdf (Last accessed: 7 September 2015 
14 ASEAN Secretariat (2015), Table 25 FDI net inflows, intra- and extra-ASEAN, 
http://www.asean.org/images/2015/June/FDI_tables/Table%2025.pdf  
(Last accessed: 7 September 2015)  
15 ASEAN Secretariat (2014), ASEAN Investment Report 2014, p.14. 
16 OECD (2013), Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2014: Beyond the Middle-Income 
Trap, OECD Publishing, pp.8-11. 
17 ASEAN Secretariat, Invest in ASEAN: Automotives. 
http://investasean.asean.org/index.php/page/view/automotive (Last accessed: 7 September 2015) 
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investment projects will know about ASEAN and use it profitably as a single production 
base. 
The 2007 Cebu Declaration had set the realisation of the AEC at 1st January 2015. 
However, the ASEAN Member States realised that this goal was too ambitious. The AEC 
is a top-down initiative. ASEAN uses policy-led and law-led strategies, whereas the 
awareness among stakeholders (States, investors, ASEAN peoples) is low and uneven. The 
regional initiative needs to be implemented by national authorities, who require more time 
to prepare the legal and infrastructural environments. Moreover, according to the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO)’s survey, more than 50 percent of local 
enterprises, especially the CLMV countries, lack knowledge of the AEC and of the 
interests and challenges available for them in the ASEAN market.18 Therefore, the 
commencement of the AEC is postponed to 31st December 2015,19 in order to inform 
ASEAN investors of their opportunities in the Area and to allow ASEAN governments to 
prepare necessary legal frameworks according to the AEC obligations. 
Now as the new deadline approaches, the success of the AEC initiatives of an 
integrated market and production base needs to be assessed with a certain nuance, because 
the AEC remains a work in progress. This progress needs to be evaluated against the 
ASEAN background, as the success of the “ASEAN Way” of investment protection in the 
ASEAN Investment Area has been influenced by the ASEAN Way of cooperation. It is in 
no way similar to other integration initiatives.  
 
Section 2. Research Contribution: ACIA and Realisation 
of a Single Market and Production Base 
The ACIA is the key regional investment integration initiative. It is different from 
other regional investment treaties, because it does not only aim to create a freedom of 
investment in the neighbouring countries but to create part of the AEC, i.e. the single 
production base or the ASEAN Investment Area. As illustrated in section 1, increase of 
investment flows is expected with the realisation of the AEC. All investment flows among 
ASEAN Member States are covered by the ACIA regime. The ACIA has restored 
investors’ confidence after the Asian economic crisis. It also promotes intra-ASEAN 
investment flows in the ASEAN Investment Area. This will make ASEAN Member States 
                                                 
 
18 Rynhart, G., Chang, J-H. (2014), The Road to the ASEAN Economic Community 2015: The Challenges and 
Opportunities for Enterprises and Their Representative Organizations, ILO Regional Office for Asia and the 
Pacific, Geneva, ILO. Figure 4 Understanding of the impact the AEC will have on Business, p.23. 
19 The Phnom Penh Agenda for ASEAN Community Building, endorsed by the Leaders at the 20th ASEAN 
Summit in April 2012. 
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rely more on themselves and less on the extra-ASEAN investments, especially when large 
investors withdraw their investments and leave ASEAN unexpectedly.20  
Despite its four decades of existence, ASEAN has just become a subject of 
international law aiming to be a rule-based organisation with the entry into force of the 
ASEAN Charter in December 2008. Previously, ASEAN was a politico-economic 
association which had cooperated in an informal “ASEAN Way”, with totally opposite 
underlining principles. The explanation of this tension will be thoroughly discussed in 
Chapter 2.  
Most literature on ASEAN in the last century has been undertaken from economic, 
political or cultural perspectives. Due to the influence of the AEC, economic literature and 
investment flow statistics have been studied by the ASEAN Secretariat,21 the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB),22 the Asian Economic Integration Monitor (AEIM),23 the 
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA),24 the Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS),25 OECD26 and UNCTAD.27 However, despite the 
growing economic importance of the South-East Asian region, the legal literature to date 
on ASEAN investment regime is comparatively small.  
Most of legal research studies have addressed ASEAN economic integration in 
broader terms, or addressed trade and investment together.28 A series of literature has 
observed a movement of the ASEAN community-building processes through institutions 
                                                 
 
20 See detailed discussion on external relations in Chapter 2.5, and the 1997 ASEAN economic crisis in 
Chapter 4.3. 
21 www.asean.org See ASEAN Secretariat, e.g., ASEAN Economic Community Handbook for Business; 
Thinking Globally, Prospering Regionally, AEC 2015 (2014); Investing in ASEAN 2014-2015 (2014), ASEAN 
Investment Report 2012: “The Changing FDI Landscape” (2013), Jakarta.  
22 See e.g. ADB (2014), ASEAN 2030: Toward a Borderless Economic Community; ADB (2006), The 
ASEAN Economic Community: A Work in Progress (2013), edited by Severino R., Menon J.,  Shrestha O.L., 
Basu Das S.; The ASEAN Economic Community and the European Experience (2006), Working Paper Series 
on Regional Economic Integration No.1; ASEAN Economic Integration: Features, Fulfillments, Failures and 
the Future (2010) No.69; ADB (2015), Realizing an ASEAN Economic Community: Progress and Remaining 
Challenges, WP No.432. 
23 http://aric.adb.org/publications/aeim (Last accessed: 16 September 2015). 
24 ERIA (2012), Mid-Term Review of the Implementation of AEC Blueprint: Executive Summary, ERIA, 
Jakarta. 
25 See e.g. Basu, D.S. (2012) (Ed.), Achieving the ASEAN Economic Community 2015: Challenges for 
Member Countries and Businesses, Singapore ISEAS. 
26 See e.g. OECD, International investment in Southeast Asia, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-
policy/seasia.htm (Last accessed: 16 September 2015). 
27 UNCTAD (2013), “The Rise of Regionalism in International Investment Policymaking: Consolidation or 
Complexity?”, IIAs Issue Note; UNCTAD (2008), South-South Trade in Asia: the Role of Regional Trade 
Agreements.  
28 See e.g. ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration: Capannelli G. (2014), The 
ASEAN Economy in the Regional Context: Opportunities, Challenges, and Policy Options, WP No.145; 
Chaisse, J., Hamanaka, S. (2014), The Investment Version of the Asian Noodle Bowl: The Proliferation of 
International Investment Agreements, WP No.128; Plummer M.G. (2006), The ASEAN Economic Community 
and the European Experience. See also ERIA Discussion Papers: ASEAN Rising: ASEAN and AEC Beyond 
2015 (2014). Das, S.B. (2012), Achieving the ASEAN Economic Community 2015: Challenges for Member 
Countries and Businesses, ISEA, Singapore. 
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and laws,29 and ASEAN external relations.30 A few papers have studied the ASEAN 
investment Area and ASEAN countries’ investment laws, but only under the previous 
regime.31 Other papers have commented particularly on investment liberalisation of the 
ACIA, as it is more sensitive to public policy and is more concerned with the opening of 
the market.32 
States and investors are more used to the protection pillar which has been in the 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) for several decades. The IGA agreement (the previous 
ASEAN investment protection treaty) is, to some extent, similar to the BITs concluded in 
the 1990s. Regarding these BITs, studies of international investment law and international 
investment agreements (IIAs) in general by UNCTAD and UNCITRAL, as well as other 
academic studies, are abundantly available. In contrast, the ASEAN investment protection 
regime seems to draw less attention from the public than does liberalisation.  
The research in the field, thus far conducted, has not specifically addressed the 
protection pillar of the ACIA regime under the AEC in a comprehensive manner. Recently, 
some articles have studied the ACIA regime, in a limited way.33 The more detailed studies 
in the literature have focused on investment treaty language through a case study of the 
ACIA.34 Others have studied specific issues, such as dispute settlement resolution.35 
Although an increasing number of work has been devoted to investment in ASEAN, none 
pays sufficient attention to the influence of the “ASEAN Way” on the design of the intra-
                                                 
 
29 Chesterman S. (2015), From Community to Compliance?: The Evolution of Monitoring Obligations in 
ASEAN, No.2; Piris J.-C., Woon W. (2015), Towards a Rules-Based Community: An ASEAN Legal Service 
No.3; Inama S., Sim E.W. (2015), The Foundation of the ASEAN Economic Community: An Institutional and 
Legal Profile, No.5; Chia S.Y., Plummer M.G. (2015), ASEAN Economic Cooperation and Integration: 
Progress, Challenges and Future Directions, No.8, CUP, Cambridge.  
30 Cremona M., Kleimann D., Larik J., Lee R., Vennesson P. (2015), ASEAN’s External Agreements: Law, 
Practice and the Quest for Collective Action, No.4; Kuijper P.J., Kuijper J.H., Morris-Sharma N.Y., From 
Treaty-Making to Treaty-Breaking: Models for ASEAN External Trade Agreements, No.6; Nguitragool P., 
Rűland J. (2015), ASEAN as an Actor in International Fora: Reality, Potential and Constraints (No. 7), 
CUP, Cambridge. 
31 Thanadsillapakul L.(2004), ASEAN Bilateral Investment Agreements 
http://asialaw.tripod.com/articles/aseanbit3.html; The Investment Regime in ASEAN Countries 
www.thailawforum.com/articles/lawaninvestment.html; Open Regionalism and Deeper Integration: The 
Implementation of ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) and ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). 
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/index.php?news=28152 (Last accessed: 18 September 2015). 
32 ERIA Discussion Paper: Intal, S. (2015). AEC Blueprint Implementation Performance and Challenges: 
Investment Liberalization (No. 2015-32); Nurridzki, N. (2015), Learning from the ASEAN+1 Model and the 
ACIA, No.2015-19. 
33 Tevini, A.G. (2013), “Regional Investment Protection and Liberalization within the ASEAN”, in 
Hofmann, Schill, Tams (eds.), Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements: From Recalibration to 
Reintegration, Nomos, pp.335-354. 
34 Yen T.H. (2014), The Interpretation of Investment Treaties, International Litigation in Practice Series, 
Brill, Leiden. 
35 Wongkaew T. (2014), “A Resilient Boat Sailing in Stormy Seas: ASEAN Investment Agreements and the 
Current ISDS Regime”, the special issue on the Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a 
Roadmap, edited for Transnational Dispute Management, Vol.11, issue 1, chapter 3. 
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ASEAN investment regime, especially in relation to the balance of interests between 
ASEAN Member States and ASEAN investors. 
Therefore, a study on intra-ASEAN investment protection under the newest intra-
ASEAN investment agreement is needed. The ACIA should be analysed in the light of new 
economic circumstances and new requirements, especially the rule-based principle of the 
ASEAN Charter. Analysis of the ACIA is expected to give modern answers in order that 
ASEAN Member States and potential ASEAN investors are enabled to deal with the 
coming AEC.  
The purpose of this thesis is to address this gap in academic literature. It explores 
the new aspect of the ASEAN investment legal framework. This thesis addresses one of 
the four corners of the ACIA: the protection of ASEAN investment, mainly in the post-
establishment phase. This thesis is the first of its kind to use the “ASEAN Way” to 
systematically analyse investment treaty practice under the new ASEAN investment 
regime. It studies the sources, scope, substantive rights and procedural rights in dispute 
settlement mechanism. Its findings contribute to the mapping of the ASEAN investment 
regime in the broader context of the AEC integration, and international investment 
protection standards.  
The ACIA is the only instrument which redraws the intra-ASEAN investment map. 
The ASEAN Investment Area in the Post-2015 AEC Era will be a battlefield of investment 
flows. Three main stakeholders are mentioned. Firstly, ASEAN investors need to 
understand the ACIA and so be enabled to claim their rights. The understanding of the 
ACIA guides how they will craft their strategies in South-East Asia. That said, this thesis is 
not intended to be an ACIA guidebook for businesses and investors like that issued by the 
ASEAN Secretariat.35F36 Secondly, the national authorities, who exercise sovereign powers, 
must comply with ACIA obligations and understand their remaining role in controlling or 
regulating the entry and the stay of foreign investment in their territory. National 
authorities include the judiciary interpreting the ACIA in concrete cases, legislators who 
transpose international obligations into national laws, and policy-makers who will decide 
to modify the ASEAN investment regime or negotiate future agreements which include 
investment chapters. Thirdly, as investment projects have greater impact on the economy 
and society both at national and regional levels, ASEAN people should be aware of the 
ACIA regime and its consequences.  
To summarise, given the broad policy implications that intra-ASEAN investment 
flows have on the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) and the realisation of the AEC, this 
                                                 
 
36 ASEAN Secretariat (2013), ACIA: A Guidebook for Businesses and Investors, Jakarta.  
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thesis is undertaken with a view to improving mutual understanding and outcomes of the 
agreement. It explores key themes of the practice of investment protection and regulation 
under the ACIA. It explains the concepts of the ACIA and tracks its innovations, by 
assessing their developments in the light of the current international practices. It aims to 
clarify the selected ACIA rights and obligations in order to elaborate an “ASEAN Way” of 
investment protection regime. In this sense, understanding of the ACIA can serve as a 
platform for future investment treaties negotiations, also beyond ASEAN. 
 
Section 3. Research Questions: Balance of Investment 
Protection and State Regulatory Space under the ACIA 
The balance of protection between the State’s interests and investors’ interests has 
been a core debate in international investment law.37 In order to discover whether the 
“ASEAN Way” of investment protection is a balanced approach, a general understanding 
regarding the shifting power in the investment agreement practices is imperative. The 
general development of the IIAs is addressed in Chapter 2. This development concerns not 
only the content of the investment agreements but also their style and structure.  
 The ASEAN investment treaty has been transformed from an old-fashioned 
investment treaty, with vague and undefined standards, into a modern investment 
agreement which gives more detailed rights and obligations. The vagueness of the 
standards in the previous regime would allow for several possibilities of interpretation. 
Arbitral tribunals sometimes interpret the standards in a broad manner in order to protect 
the investor’s interests (in dubio pro investore), at the expense of State interests. For 
example, in SGS v. Philippines, the Tribunal found that:  
The object and purpose of the BIT supports an effective interpretation of 
Article X(2). The BIT is a treaty for the promotion and reciprocal protection of 
investments. According to the preamble it is intended “to create and maintain 
favourable conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in 
the territory of the other”. It is legitimate to resolve uncertainties in its 
interpretation so as to favour the protection of covered investments.38 
The pro-investor approach has increasingly become more questionable. NAFTA 
has offered a model which increased “policy space” for the host States. This model could 
                                                 
 
37 Bungenberg, M., “Towards a More Balanced International Investment Law 2.0?”,  in Herrmann, C., 
Simma, B., Streinz, R. (Eds.)(2015), Trade Policy between Law, Diplomacy and Scholarship: Liber 
Amicorum in Memoriam, European Yearbook of International Economic Law, Special Issue, Springer 
International Publishing, Switzerland, pp.22-23. 
38 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance v. Philippines, ICSID Case No.ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
29 January 2004, para.116. 
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be appealing to a wide range of countries, because at present both developing and 
developed countries play the role of investor and host State.39 The interests of the host 
State also need to be protected. Consequently, the trend of best practice has also changed 
into a more balanced approach. Due to its precision, the interpretation and application of 
modern investment agreements are more certain than in past BITs. At the conclusion of the 
agreements, States can opt for the narrow approach by including indications or guidelines 
for interpretation. Therefore, the trend of international investment law in the 21st century 
calls for a hybrid approach which recognises both investors’ and States’ interests in a 
sustainable way. 
Tribunals are increasingly recognising that while the investment protection is a 
significant policy objective, it should be weighed against the regulatory interests of host 
States. For instance, in the Saluka v. Czech Republic case, the tribunal stated: 
The protection of foreign investments is not the sole aim of the Treaty, but 
rather a necessary element alongside the overall aim of encouraging foreign 
investment and extending and intensifying the parties’ economic relations. That 
in turn calls for a ‘balanced approach’ to the interpretation of the Treaty’s 
substantive provisions for the protection of investments, since an interpretation 
which exaggerates the protection to be accorded to foreign investments may 
serve to dissuade host States from admitting foreign investments and so 
undermine the overall aim of extending and intensifying the parties’ mutual 
economic relations. 39F40                
The ACIA negotiators agreed with this hybrid approach. They stated that “although 
the OECD failed to conclude the MAI due to its imbalanced objective by focusing too 
much on the investor’s/ MNCs’ point of view, the lessons learnt from the MAI would be 
useful for negotiators as reference in drafting the ACIA, particularly, the importance to 
take into consideration the views from various stakeholders”. 40F41  
The ACIA drafters drew from the OECD’s experience as regards the need to 
maintain a balanced objective. They recognised that the rights of investment protection and 
promotion are important, however, these rights are not absolute. The economic welfare 
goal should be weighed against a variety of non-economic welfare goals, such as national 
security, environmental protection, health and safety regulations, protection of human 
rights and labour, and wealth redistribution through taxation. 41F42 The “regulatory space” of 
                                                 
 
39 UNCTAD Stat (2014), Inward and outward foreign direct investment flows, Annual, 1970-2013,   
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=88 (Last accessed: 21 September 
2015) 
40 Saluka v. Czech, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, para.300 
41 Report of the 2nd WG-ACIA, 29-31 January 2008, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, para.15. 
42 See Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID Case No.ARB/01/1, Final Award, 12 October 2005, para.52. 
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ASEAN Member States is justified especially at the beginning of the integration process of 
the AEC, which is the transitional period of the ASEAN legal regime. 
In exceptional circumstances, the ASEAN Member States would need more policy 
and regulatory space to deal with problems. The ACIA provides exceptional defences in its 
article 17 (General Exceptions) and 18 (Security Exceptions) allowing ASEAN Member 
States to adopt or enforce measures necessary to maintain public order or to protect 
essential security interests. In addition to these two common exceptions, the ACIA also 
provides specific economic exceptions in article 16, allowing the States to temporarily 
control transfers of money.43  
In ordinary circumstances, ASEAN Member States also need to regulate 
investments in their territory. The relationship between investment protection and State 
sovereignty is inversely proportional. The more the States can change regulations, the less 
investors can be assured of the stability of their situation. In other words, the broader the 
protection granted to foreign investors, the narrower the sovereignty retained by States.  
The question is how the ACIA balances these two legitimate, but sometimes opposite, 
goals: the preservation of legitimate regulatory space of the ASEAN Member States and 
the protection of legitimate interests of the ASEAN investors. 
This thesis argues that the ACIA has introduced a balanced approach to the practice 
of the intra-ASEAN investment agreement. The ACIA has used several techniques also 
available in other IIAs. In general, the BITs of colonised or developing countries tend to 
adopt models or approaches of developed countries virtually without modification. Given 
the different background of ASEAN and the Western countries, ASEAN investment 
agreement is different from that of the EU or NAFTA. This thesis argues that the ACIA is 
not just a common “copy-paste” investment agreement. 
This thesis illustrates that the ACIA has specificities which are different from 
international practices. These specificities are pertinent and practical options to solve some 
ASEAN-specific problems. They also take account of cultural sensitivities and regional 
preferences in order to justify ASEAN choices or legitimise some weaknesses of the 
ASEAN investment regime and policies. In brief, this thesis assesses the ACIA regime and 
locates it among the existing and upcoming investment practices. It recommends 
investment law reforms at domestic level and legal harmonisation at regional level which 
could foster better policy design for the preparation and implementation of investment 
protection.  
                                                 
 
43 See detailed discussion in chapter 4.3 Transfers. 
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This thesis uses the “ASEAN Way” to justify the choices of the ASEAN Member 
States in the process of making, application and interpretation of the ACIA. The change of 
ASEAN investment regime over time is a result of the change of the “ASEAN Way” from 
an Association of informal cooperation to a rules-based and institutions-based Community. 
This thesis proposes that the re-conceptualisation of the “ASEAN Way” affects the balance 
of power in the ASEAN investment treaty practice. The ASEAN Member States concluded 
the ACIA with ASEAN-specific needs in order to achieve a “normative-pragmatic” 
balance.44 This resulted in the ACIA’s attempt to simultaneously uphold high standards of 
investment protection and legitimatise ASEAN Member States’ power to control or 
regulate investments within their respective territories. 
In order to discover the “ASEAN Way of Investment Protection”, each chapter of 
this thesis is organised into two parts. The first part traces the general investment 
agreement practices appearing in the ACIA. The second part tracks the ASEAN-specific 
elements which have rarely been found in the other treaties or have been newly invented 
by the ACIA. An explanation on how this thesis distinguishes general and specific 
practices is further given in an “issues note to substantive chapters”.45   
 
Section 4. Research Methodology  
            In order to find the specific characteristics of the intra-ASEAN investment 
protection regime and to further conclude whether the ACIA is a balanced system for 
investors and States, systematic research on the content of the substantive and procedural 
provisions has been undertaken. The “architecture” of the ACIA has been assessed 
primarily in the light of international practices, such as BITs, economic treaties with 
investment chapter, and decisions of arbitral tribunals related to these issues, as well as 
speeches, minutes, reports, preparatory works. In addition, the guidelines of the 
international organisations, such as UNCTAD, OECD, IMF, have provided extremely rich 
materials for the analysis. For the secondary sources, this thesis utilises books, journals, 
articles, news, and academic commentaries. These sources are complemented by numbers 
of conferences, trainings, summer courses and visits to national and ASEAN legal centres. 
The ACIA was written in an almost complete absence of litigation, so “ASEAN 
jurisprudence” is not a key factor for the development of ASEAN investment law.  
As a result, this thesis employs two main complementary research methodologies to 
                                                 
 
44 Somjee, A.H., Somjee G. (1993), Development Success in Asia-Pacific, New York, St. Martin’s Press, p.3. 
45 See pp.52-56. 
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achieve its objectives: doctrinal research and comparative research. As it remains debatable 
whether IIAs really help to attract investment flows, this thesis analyses the ACIA 
irrespective of any empirical research on whether a positive causal relationship between 
IIAs and FDI is established.46 Besides, the thesis leaves national implementation of the 
ACIA by the ASEAN Member States for further research. The scope of this thesis is 
limited to the international responsibility of the ASEAN Member States in the case of 
breaches of international obligations towards protected investors. 
 
4.1 Doctrinal Research 
Doctrinal methodology is employed to analyse the rights and obligations of 
ASEAN investors and ASEAN Member States under the ACIA. It helps clarify the 
application and interpretation of the essential investment protection principles, and the 
implications of particular ASEAN approaches and terms. It also assists in delimiting and 
facilitating the role of arbitral tribunals. 
Modern international investment law is very new, and most of its rules diverge 
from international law in general. However, in the absence of treaty regulation,  
lex generalis would apply. 46F47 Tribunals may fill gaps in the text of the ACIA by reference 
to the general rules of interpretation pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT). 47F48 “One must therefore consider each of the three main elements in treaty 
interpretation – the text, its context and the object and purpose of the treaty”. 48F49 According 
to the ACIA Preamble, the object and purpose of the ACIA consists of promoting and 
protecting foreign investments by ensuring the stability and predictability of their 
investment activities and their investment-related rights. Contrarily, the ACIA’s 
interpretation takes into account the legitimate exercise of ASEAN Member States’ 
regulatory power. This inclusive approach is particularly helpful when ACIA texts are 
found unclear or appear to justify different interpretations.  
In addition, interpretation of the ACIA takes into account footnotes and annexes to 
the ACIA. Due to the evolving nature of investment flow and the diversity of existing 
                                                 
 
46 See e.g. UNCTAD (2014), The Impact of IIAs on FDI: an Overview of Empirical Studies 1998–2014, IIAs 
Issues Note, September 2014; Sauvant, K.P., Sachs, L.E. (eds.)(2009), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign 
Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows, Oxford, 
OUP. 
47 Dolzer, R., Stevens, M. (1995), BITs, The Hague, Boston, London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.  
48 VTLC, article 31General rule of interpretation. See also International Law Association, G.B., Sub-
Committee on Investment Law, (2010), The Determination of the Nationality of Investors under Investment 
Protection Treaties. 
49 Aust, A. (2000), Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge, New York, CUP, p.187. See also Aust, A. 
(2013), Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 3rd ed., Cambridge, New York, CUP, Chapter 13 Interpretation, 
pp.205-226. 
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approaches, the ACIA uses recent methods of providing more precision: additional 
information, qualifications or clarification of statements made in the text. These materials 
are related to, but not appropriate for, inclusion in the text itself.50 For short explanatory 
notes, the ACIA adds footnotes to articles with provisions needing to be explained. These 
explanatory memorandums are found under both definitional (e.g. the definition of desired 
investments) and substantive provisions (e.g. in the case of MFN clause, the footnote 
records the common intention of ASEAN Member States on the limitation of the MFN 
effects). For particularly complicated or technical issues, the ACIA has created two 
annexes: Annex 1 Approval in writing, and Annex 2 Expropriation and Compensation. 
These explanatory notes form an integral part of the ACIA,51 and are extensively used in 
this thesis in the interpretation of the ACIA. This explanatory technique gives assurance 
that the ACIA is coherently implemented which, in turn, limits the discretion of arbitral 
tribunals in applying the text. 
 
4.2 Comparative Research 
As there has been no case under the ACIA, research on the ACIA requires external 
sources to assess the position of the ASEAN Member States. It is noted that “while no de 
jure doctrine of precedent exists in investment arbitration, a de facto doctrine has in fact 
been building for some time.”52 Nowadays, the BITs are evidenced as a “virtual 
network”.53 Other international investment agreements and cases could be seen as a “soft 
precedent” or “de facto precedent”.54 The interpretation of the ACIA can use the method of 
“interpretative externality”55 of other treaty practices. This method can largely be used for 
the examination of each specific element in order to see how norms are similar or different 
from one jurisdiction to another, and how such norms can be borrowed or transplanted to 
the ACIA. With regard to international arbitration, the “judicial borrowing”56 method is 
particularly useful in clarifying or interpreting some investment principles. This thesis 
                                                 
 
50 VII. Explanatory footnotes, UN Editorial Manual Online, (Last accessed: 18 September 2015) 
http://dd.dgacm.org/editorialmanual/ed-guidelines/footnotes/footnotes_index.htm  
51 ACIA article 45, Annexes, Schedules and Future Instruments 
52 McLachlan, C., Shore, L., Weiniger, M. (2007), International Investment Arbitration: Substantive 
Principles, NY, OUP, p.18. See also Bjorklund, A. (2008), International Treaty Arbitration Decision as 
Jurisprudence Constante, UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No.158. 
53 Montt, S. (2012), State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration, Global Constitutional and 
Administrative Law in the BIT Generation, Hart Publishing, USA, p.83-124. 
54 Idem, p.113. 
55 Idem. 
56 Watson, A. (1994), “Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law” in Glendon M.A., Gordon M.,  
Osakwe C., Comparative Legal Traditions, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 2nd ed.; Vadi, V. (2013), Public 
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demonstrates that the ASEAN Member States do not just recognise international practices 
in an unproblematic way, but have already scrutinised the available options before 
transplanting the model. Remarkably, some solutions in the ACIA are not found elsewhere. 
This shows that the ACIA is a truly engaging treaty-making process which results in a 
unique regional investment agreement.  
This thesis surveys leading investment agreements, such as NAFTA, US Model 
BIT, EU investment agreements, MERCOSUR, COMESA, CAFTA, other agreements 
concluded by the ASEAN Member States bilaterally and plurilaterally (the investment 
chapter in the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA), 
ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement (AKIA), ASEAN-China Investment Agreement 
(ACHIA)), and newly and on-going-negotiated treaties (CETA, TTIP, TTP, SADC, 
Singapore-EU), as well as decisions rendered under these agreements.  
 
Section 5. Thesis Structure  
This thesis investigates the protection regime in the post-establishment phase, i.e. 
once the investment is admitted into the ASEAN Investment Area. The protection pillar is 
at the heart of the investment regime. In many respects, the protection rights and 
obligations are susceptible to legal analysis, whereas the liberalisation pillar depends more 
on national policy and schedules of commitment, and the promotion and facilitation pillars 
are not legally binding. However, this thesis addresses liberalisation to the extent that  
it provides useful analysis of the protection regime, especially of the definition of 
investments and investors, and MFN and national treatment clauses. Meanwhile, the 
promotion and facilitation pillars, which are subsidiary to protection and liberalisation, are 
addressed as complementary tools for the realisation of ASEAN economic integration.  
After this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 addresses the ASEAN background and 
context against which the ACIA was conceived, in order to facilitate analysis of the ACIA 
provisions in the following chapters. The background chapter provides the history of the 
ASEAN investment regime after World War II until the conclusion of the ACIA under the 
auspices of the AEC. This chapter highlights the principle of the “ASEAN Way” which 
has underlined the ASEAN structure and has created the tension between the protection of 
investment and the regulatory power of the ASEAN Member States in the ACIA. This 
chapter also reviews ASEAN Members States’ active participation in the proliferation of 
international trade and investment agreements, and shows that the ACIA is part of the 
whole network of international investment treaties. 
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Chapter 3 addresses potential beneficiaries of the ACIA. It defines the terms 
“investment” and “investor”, and sets the requirements of “covered investments”. Only 
“covered investments” of a certain range of individuals and legal entities, categorised as 
“ASEAN investors”, will profit from the privileges of protection and liberalisation 
accorded by the ACIA dealt with in Chapters 4 and 5, and can invoke dispute settlement 
mechanism in Chapter 6.  
Following the chapter on the scope of the ACIA, the next two chapters scrutinise 
the substantive provisions of the ACIA with the question of balance of investor-State 
interests. Chapter 4 discusses three absolute rights and obligations under the ACIA which 
contain ASEAN specific elements – unlawful expropriation, fair and equitable treatment 
and right to transfers. Chapter 5 discusses two eminent non-discriminatory rights, i.e. MFN 
and national treatment. This research on substantive rights allows investors to know which 
protections (and to what extent) are provided for against the State’s risks under the ACIA 
regime.  
In case a claim is alleged against an ASEAN Member State, the ACIA has provided 
for a comprehensive dispute settlement mechanism (DSM), both investor-State and State-
State dispute settlements. Chapter 6 analyses necessary conditions of eligibility of 
investors to submit claims before international arbitration, which, in turn, defines the 
boundaries of ASEAN Member States’ exposure to possible investor-State claims. The 
chapter explores the DSM forum available for the disputing parties, and addresses the 
flaws in the ACIA which could be improved. It also suggests that the ACIA’s State-State 
mechanism is designed in accordance with the objective of the realisation of ASEAN 
Community Order. 
Finally, in the light of the findings thus far in this thesis, Chapter 7 summarises and 
offers a re-conceptualisation of the distinguishing characteristics of ASEAN, or of the 
“ASEAN Way”, which appears in the investment protection under the ACIA regime. This 
leads to the overall assessment whether the ACIA strikes a better balance of conflicting 
interests between investors and States. This chapter reiterates the propositions or available 
options which have been made in the previous chapters for the improvement of the intra-
ASEAN investment regime. Finally, the chapter observes that ASEAN pursues a law-
driven policy or integration through law. This means that, in theory, the ACIA would 
create an investment-friendly environment which could eventually increase investment 
flows in the ASEAN Investment Area. In reality, the establishment of the deeper economic 
integration is not an easy task. Several questions are left open regarding the effectiveness 
of the ACIA and its implementation at national level. At the turn of the AEC Era, the 
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search for “ASEAN best practice”, in the context of ASEAN Regionalism, will have an 
important role to play in fostering the ASEAN single market and production base.  
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Chapter 2. Mapping ASEAN Investment Normative 
Context 
 Finally, it is common knowledge that co- operation  
and ultimately integration serve the interests of all 
– something that individual efforts can never achieve. 
 
Thanat Khoman 
Ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand,  
One of the ASEAN Founding Fathers, Bangkok, August 1967 56F57 
 
 The ASEAN Economic Community is the realisation of the end-goal  
of economic integration as outlined in the ASEAN Vision 2020, to create  
a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN economic region  
in which there is a free flow of goods, services, investment and a freer flow of 
capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty  
and socio-economic disparities in year 2020. 
  
Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, Bali, October 2003 
 
This chapter provides an introduction to the ASEAN investment regime and 
observes the treaty-making practice of ASEAN Member States in the context of ASEAN 
economic integration. The ASEAN investment regime has developed along with the 
development of ASEAN from an international association to the ASEAN Economic 
Community, with strengthened legal institutions and objectives, to stand among the leading 
international economic players. The content of ASEAN investment agreements has been 
shaped by the political, economic and legal contexts in which they have been negotiated. 
The modern history of the ASEAN investment agreements began in the Post-Colonial 
Era.57F58 This thesis classifies investment instruments of ASEAN Member States into three 
categories: first, international investment agreements (IIAs) concluded between an ASEAN 
Member State and a third State, usually a Western State, or extra-ASEAN-BITs; second, 
IIAs concluded between two ASEAN Member States, or intra-ASEAN BITs; and third, 
IIAs concluded collectively by all ASEAN Member States. 
                                                 
 
57 Khoman, T. (1992), “ASEAN Conception and Evolution”, The ASEAN Reader, ISEAS, Singapore. 
Reprinted: http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-conception-and-evolution-by-thanat-khoman (Last 
accessed: 17 August 2015).  
58 According to Vandevelde, international investment agreements are classified in three Eras: the Colonial 
Era (late 18th Century to World War II), the Post-Colonial Era (the end of the War to the end of the Cold War 
in 1990s), and the Global Era (from 1990s onwards). See Vandevelde, K.J. (2005), A Brief History of IIAs, 
University of California, Davis, Vol.12, pp.158-194. 
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Due to Western influence, most BITs of the first category, concluded after the 
decolonisation period, have based their model on the “Dutch gold standard” BITs.58F59  
In the 1970s, ASEAN’s progress in trade and investment were manifestly influenced by 
interaction with external factors.59F60 ASEAN Member States have relied more on bilateral 
extra-ASEAN relations than the internal ones. ASEAN Member States had not concluded 
any BIT among themselves. They had no interest in each other because they possessed the 
same natural resources and same kind of skills and labour. So they turned to outsiders, who 
could transfer high technology, skilled knowledge and expertise to them. More than 25 
BITs were concluded between an individual ASEAN State and a Third Party. 60F61 Most of 
those were with European countries, especially Germany, Denmark, Norway, the 
Netherlands, and the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU). While the extra-
ASEAN investment flows and the number of extra-ASEAN BITs largely increased, 
ASEAN Member States started very late to conclude BITs among themselves. It was only 
in 1990 that the first intra-ASEAN BITs were signed between Laos-Thailand, and 
Malaysia-Vietnam. 
The majority of these followed a relatively restrictive approach to market access, in 
conformity with the absence in customary international law of any obligation of the host 
State to allow the entry of investors and aliens. 61F62 The content and structure of these extra-
ASEAN or intra-ASEAN BITs are common to the “Post-Colonial” BITs. They were 
concluded with short provisions in plain language and do not give details on standards of 
protection. They offer the best protection to investors owing to their broad scope of 
application, or extensive definitions of “investment” and “investor”. They also provide for 
a strong substantive protection: inter alia, unqualified most-favoured nations (MFN), 
national treatment (NT), fair and equitable treatment (FET); broad umbrella clause; full 
compensation for direct and indirect expropriation; no exceptions for certain sectors; no 
filter mechanisms; broad choice of investor-State (ISDS) mechanisms; and free choice of 
arbitrators.62F63 
This chapter focuses only on the third category of IIAs concluded among ASEAN 
Member States. It traces the evolution of legal instruments relating to regional investment 
                                                 
 
59 The first extra-ASEAN BIT was concluded between Germany and Malaysia in 1960, just one year after the 
world’s first BIT between Germany and Pakistan.  
60 Ortuoste, M.C. (2008), Internal and External Institutional Dynamics in Member-states and ASEAN: 
Tracing Creation, Change and Reciprocal Influences, Proquest, Arizona State University, pp.63-69. 
61 See the UNCTAD Data Base. http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org  
62 UNCTAD (2004), Key Terms and Concepts in IIAs: A Glossary, UNCTAD Series on Issues in IIAs, p.15. 
63 See the notion of “Dutch Gold Standard” in Lavranos, N. (2013), The New EU Investment Treaties: 
Convergence towards the NAFTA Model as the New Plurilateral Model BIT Text?, European University 
Institute (EUI), WP 29 March 2013, p.2. 
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integration, along with the development of the concept of the “ASEAN Way” in the 
ASEAN investment regime. Section 1 addresses the origin of ASEAN as an 
intergovernmental organisation in the 1970s, and the “ASEAN Way” of pursuing regional 
matters. The notion of the “ASEAN Way” underlines all ASEAN cooperation and 
integration initiatives, including investment.  
Section 2 deals with the beginning of political cooperation among ASEAN Member 
States, when economic cooperation was less evident. For the first quarter century, there 
were several attempts to establish intra-ASEAN schemes, which are considered as the first 
generation of the ASEAN investment agreements. This section continues to explain how 
ASEAN Member States responded to the situation in the 1990s, after the Cold War had 
ended, when their attitude changed towards economic regionalism. ASEAN started to 
conclude the second generation of ASEAN investment instruments, and created the 
“ASEAN Investment Area” (AIA).  
Section 3 highlights ASEAN’s identity in the 21st Century, in which ASEAN has 
reached its middle age and is becoming the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). The 
constitution and legal structures of the AEC have intensely modified the classic “ASEAN 
Way” from “consensus” to contemporary “rule-based” organisation. This change clearly 
impacts on forms and contents of investment agreements. In order to create deeper ASEAN 
economic integration, ASEAN has finalised the third version of ASEAN investment 
agreement, i.e. the ACIA, a “comprehensive” framework of protection and liberalisation. 
Section 4 observes the discrepancies between the intention for deeper integration 
and the actual un-readiness of the ASEAN Member States, which reflect the tension of 
interests in the ACIA. In law, the consolidation of two major pillars of investment into a 
single document sets high objectives and emphasises the significance of the ACIA as part 
of the AEC-building process. In fact, ASEAN takes into account the ASEAN Way of non-
interference and the development gaps between the ASEAN-6 and the four newcomers: 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV). The implications of this tension are 
two-fold: (1) ASEAN Member States need to retain their regulatory power over the 
liberalisation and admission of investments into their territory; and (2) a principle of 
“special and differential treatment” grants a transitional period to CLMV.  
Lastly, section 5 observes that the discrepancies examined in section 4 have 
external implications. In parallel to the ACIA, individual ASEAN States have concluded a 
number of investment agreements with different economic partners. Having adopted 
“Open Regionalism”, the ASEAN Member States simultaneously rely on various channels 
of investment integration at multi-track and multi-speed. The question arises as to the value 
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of the intra-ASEAN regime: can the ACIA stand firm in a wave of investment agreements 
negotiated daily with better standards of treatment? This question emphasises the 
importance of the thesis which investigates the ACIA to find its appropriate interpretation 
and application, and to make recommendations for its improvement. 
  
30 
 
 
Section 1. ASEAN Way: Origin of ASEAN Investment 
Regime 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an inter-governmental 
organisation, formed on 8th August 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. Its original motivation was to reduce the political and military 
threat of countries outside the agreement in the Cold War period. ASEAN’s background 
does not resemble any integration initiative, it can be compared neither to the most 
advanced example of the European Union, nor to the strong economic integration of the 
NAFTA, although South America and African countries do have more distant influences. 
The uniqueness at the very heart of ASEAN is its great diversity, probably more so 
than any other grouping in the world.64 This economic, political, cultural and linguistic 
diversity was accentuated by colonial era experiences.65 The political structures of the 
Member States are divergent, and from time to time unstable. ASEAN includes one top 
wealthy nation, Singapore, whereas Laos is the world’s poorest land-locked State.  
It includes Indonesia, the world’s fourth most populous nation, and Brunei, whose 
population is less than half a million.66 These socio-economic indicators highlight several 
distinctive features of ASEAN, and they have important implications for how ASEAN 
operates.67 This section analyses key features of the ASEAN process. 
ASEAN cooperation is based on the principles of the “ASEAN Way”.68 The term 
“ASEAN Way” is used by ASEAN Member States to describe a regional method of 
multilateralism, which functions in a networking-style of regionalism.69 Amitav Acharya 
has defined the “ASEAN Way” as “soft regionalism” and “flexible consensus”.70 Acharya 
explains that the term refers to a distinctive approach to dispute-settlement and regional 
                                                 
 
64 Chia, S.Y. (2010), Trade and Investment Policies and Regional Economic Integration in East Asia, ADBI 
WP No.210. (Last accessed: 17 August 2015) 
http://adbi.adb.org/working-paper/2010/04/05/3652.trade.investment.policies.east.asia/  
65 Many achieved political independence only in recent decades and are still in the process of nation-building. 
See Church, P. (2009), A Short History of South East Asia, 5th Ed., Singapore, John Willey and Sons. (Last 
accessed: 17 August 2015) 
http://aero-comlab.stanford.edu/jameson/world_history/A_Short_History_of_South_East_Asia1.pdf  
66 World Bank (2013), United States Census Bureau. http://data.worldbank.org/country/  
67 Hill, H., Menon, J. (2012), “ASEAN Economic Integration: Driven by Markets, Bureaucrats or Both?”, in 
Kreinin, M.E., Plummer, M.G. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Commercial Policy, p.358. 
68 See the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). 
69 Severino, R. (2006). Southeast Asia in search of an ASEAN community: insights from the former ASEAN 
Secretary-General, Singapore, ISEAS; Acharya, A. (2012), Foundations of Collective Action in Asia: Theory 
and Practice of Regional Cooperation, ADBI WP No.344.; Acharya, A. (2014), “Foundations of Collective 
Action in Asia: Theory and Practice of Regional Cooperation”, in Capannelli, G., Kawai, M., The Political 
Economy of Asian Regionalism, London, ADB Institute, p.29. 
70 Acharya, A. (1997). “Ideas, identity, and institution-building: From the ‘ASEAN way’ to the ‘Asia-Pacific 
way’?”, The Pacific Review, Vol.10, Issue 3, pp.319-346. 
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cooperation developed since 1967 by ASEAN Member States with a view to ensuring 
regional peace and stability.  
The “ASEAN way” consists of a code of conduct for inter-state behaviour as 
well as a decision-making process based on consultations and consensus. The 
code of conduct incorporates a set of well-known principles, e.g. non-
interference in the domestic affairs of each other, non-use of force, pacific 
settlement of disputes, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
member states, that can be found in the Charter of the United Nations as well 
as regional political and security organizations elsewhere in the world. To this 
extent, the “ASEAN way” is not an unusual construct. But where it can claim a 
certain amount of uniqueness is the manner in which these norms are 
operationalized into a framework of regional interaction. In this respect, the 
“ASEAN way” is not so much about the substance or structure of multilateral 
interactions, but a claim about the process through which such interactions are 
carried out. This approach involves a high degree of discreetness, informality, 
pragmatism, expediency, consensus-building, and non-confrontational 
bargaining styles which are often contrasted with the adversarial posturing and 
legalistic decision-making procedures in Western multilateral negotiations.71  
The most important feature associated with the “ASEAN Way” is the preference for 
personal contact, informality and absence of strong institutions. The “ASEAN Way” can 
be construed as a decision-making and a dispute settlement process. As a decision-making 
process, the “ASEAN Way” of informality creates a comfort zone among the States and 
allows room for national bargaining. Without strong institutions, consensus is a common 
decision-making method. In the ASEAN context, the notion of the “ASEAN Way” is 
traced to a particular style of decision-making within Javanese village society in Indonesia, 
according to which “consensus or musjawarah is a way by which a village leader makes 
important decisions affecting social life in the village”. 71F72 As H. Faith observes, 
“musjawarah means that ‘a leader should not act arbitrarily or impose his will, but rather 
make gentle suggestions of the path a community should follow, being careful always to 
consult all other participants fully and to take their views and feelings into consideration 
before delivering his synthesis conclusions”. 72F73 In a consensus-building process, 
consultation or mufakat is a condition precedent, which is considered another important 
component of the “ASEAN Way”.  
As a dispute settlement mechanism, the “ASEAN way” involves a commitment to 
carry on with consultation, however, without any specific timeline or modality for 
achieving a desired outcome. As Lee Kuan Yew observes, “[f]or Asians, it’s not in our 
                                                 
 
71 Idem, pp.328-329. 
72 Idem, p.330. 
73 Faith, H. (1962), The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University 
Press, quoted in A. Acharya, (1997), p.330. 
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nature to want to disagree with people publicly”.74 While ASEAN Member States can 
debate and disagree on a particular position behind closed doors, they refrain from 
divulging their intra-mural differences in public, especially to outsiders. According to J.N. 
Mak, the ASEAN dialogue process is “unstructured, with no clear format for decision-
making or implementation” and “often lacks a formal agenda, issues are negotiated on an 
ad hoc basis as and when they arise”.75 Acharya concludes that “ASEAN multilateralism is 
process-oriented, rather than product-oriented.”76 In other words, the “ASEAN Way” 
requires an obligation of conduct, rather than an obligation of result.  
ASEAN regionalism has developed differently from “European-type” 
regionalism.77 The most significant difference between the two organisations is the scope 
of power and competence which the organisation has vis-à-vis its Member States. The 
European Union is a supranational organisation which overarches all States Parties and the 
Member States are obliged to follow European Union Law. In contrast, ASEAN diplomacy 
and cooperation have been characterised by caution, pragmatism and a consensus-based 
approach, which results in lowest-common-denominator decision-making. The relationship 
of ASEAN Member States is governed by international law. The implementation of the 
ASEAN obligations depends on whether a Member State is Monist or Dualist.78 For forty 
years, ASEAN leaders have deliberately avoided creating a strong supra-national regional 
permanent institution, the ASEAN Secretariat has been expressly underpowered, serving 
more as a diplomatic facilitator and administrator rather than a strong EU-type agency.  
The modality of ASEAN cooperation has been very loose and flexible, based on the 
ideas of non-interference of domestic affairs, respect for national sovereignty, non-use of 
force and non-confrontation, and has been characterised by informality, minimal 
institutionalisation, and avoidance of any legal commitment.79 The supreme authority is 
the ASEAN Summit of national leaders. They make decisions at the summit, which are 
intended to represent a “consensus” among the ASEAN Nations. The nature of these 
“decisions” resembles merely political resolutions or recommendations, not legally-
                                                 
 
74 Lee Kuan Yew, Asian Wall Street Journal, 24 June 1994, Vol.1, p.6, quoted in A. Acharya, (1997), p.331. 
75 Mak, J. N. (1995) “The ASEAN process (“way”) of multilateral cooperation and cooperative security: the 
road to a regional arms register?'”, paper presented to the MIMA-SIPRI Workshop on an ASEAN Arms 
Register: Developing Transparency, Kuala Lumpur, 2-3 October, quoted in A. Acharya, (1997), p.329. 
76 Acharya, A. (1997), p.329. 
77 Chia, S. Y. (2010), p.4.  
78 Most of ASEAN Member States are dualists, while Indonesia, Myanmar, Brunei systems are unclassified 
because the relationship of international law and domestic law is very blurred and their methods of 
incorporation/ transformation are suspicious. No clue is found either in the constitution or statutory laws. 
Besides, some legal systems are newly established, like the ones with non-statutory laws traditions (Laos), or 
of Military law traditions (Myanmar).  
79 Hill, H., Menon, J. (2010), ASEAN Economic Integration: Features, Fulfllments, Failures and the Future, 
ADB WP No.69, p.10.  
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binding formulations with enforcement. These characteristics constitute both strengths and 
weaknesses: they explain ASEAN’s durability, but they limit its effectiveness and capacity 
for strong and decisive action.80 The ASEAN consensus approach remains hostage to the 
imperative of national interests of the ASEAN Member States, which explains the slow 
integration of ASEAN over half a century. In order to survive in the 21st century, ASEAN 
Member States realise that they need to integrate in a more substantial way, to be a rules-
based organisation, and to have strong institutions. ASEAN must surpass its own “ASEAN 
Way”.   
 
Section 2. ASEAN Investment in the Rise of the New 
Economic Regionalism 
ASEAN Declaration article 2(1) states the first aim and purpose of the Association, 
i.e. “to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the 
region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to 
strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian 
Nations”.81 Despite the economic objective mentioned in the ASEAN founding instrument, 
the economic potential of ASEAN was previously latent, as ASEAN focused only on 
security issues. In the late 1970s, ASEAN attempted to enhance its economic cooperation 
by using the political cooperation platform for investors to trade and invest in a peaceful 
environment.82 Nonetheless, ASEAN investment schemes were not fruitful. It was only in 
the 1990s that ASEAN could substantially boost its intra-ASEAN FDI by creating an 
“ASEAN Investment Area”.  
 
2.1 Early Attempts of the ASEAN Investment Integration 
With investment legal frameworks for ASEAN Industrial Cooperation, ASEAN 
pushed forward the notions of joint industrial projects and reciprocity among the parties 
involved.83 Nevertheless, none of these programs had any significant impact on regional 
economic relations, given the lack of flexibility of the ASEAN governments and lack of 
                                                 
 
80 Idem, p.2. 
81 ASEAN Declaration, adopted by the Foreign Ministers at the 1st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok, 
Thailand on 8 August 1967.  
82 ASEAN economic cooperation started after the publication of “Kansu-Robinson” Report (1972), 
conducted by the United Nations (since 1969). 
83 These projects comprised: the ASEAN Preferential Trading Agreement (APTA), the ASEAN Industrial 
Projects (AIPs), the ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC), and the ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures 
(AIJVs). 
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support by the private sector.84 ASEAN was in a period of trial-and-error searching for 
more legally robust frameworks of investment integration.  
The true precursor of the ASEAN investment regime is the 1983 ASEAN Industrial 
Cooperation (AICO) Scheme, which should be considered as the first generation of the 
ASEAN investment regime. It set the requirement of an “ASEAN-based company”, 
encouraging technology-based investments. It still provided consultation as a mechanism 
of dispute settlement. In this sense, the AICO scheme was an early indication of how the 
administration of further ASEAN economic integration was likely to proceed.  
Despite this success, some drawbacks remained, such as the inconsistent or 
contradictory criteria for the approval process and slow implementation. For the first 
quarter of its existence, ASEAN was not particularly successful in terms of an economic 
integration. The intra-ASEAN arrangements covered only about five percent of regional 
economy by the end of the 1980’s. For this problem, the “ASEAN Way” of consensus and 
flexibility is not just an abstract notion, but has proven useful in fostering ASEAN 
economic cooperation. It was applied to addressing the problem of hesitancy and 
indifference among ASEAN Members States toward the ASEAN industrial joint ventures 
and tariff reductions.85 The efforts at intra-regional economic cooperation had provided a 
foundation for ASEAN’s initiatives towards an outward looking and more open 
regionalism in the subsequent years. 
After the slow progress in the early decades, several incidents justified the new 
wave of ASEAN Regionalism as Economic Liberalism, especially changes in the regional 
and global commercial architecture.86 By the 1990s, the Cold War had ended, globalisation 
had advanced, and the European Single Market and NAFTA were formed. ASEAN was in 
between the two giant emerging markets, China and India, which were attracting large FDI 
inflows, particularly in key sectors such as electronics and labour-intensive manufacturing 
industries.87 Later on, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 was another significant 
coercion.88 Concurrently with the economic crisis, ASEAN had further expanded its 
                                                 
 
84 UNCTAD (1991), Review of the Economic Integration Experience of ALADI, ASEAN, CACM and 
ECOWAS, UNCTAD/ECDC/217, p.10; Cuyvers, L., Pupphavesa, W. (1996), From ASEAN to AFTA, CAS 
Discussion paper No.6, Centre for ASEAN Studies, RUCA, p.5.  
85 Acharya A. (1997), p.331.  
86 World Bank (2004), Global Economic Prospects 2005: Regionalism, Trade and Development. 
Washington, D.C. World Bank; ADB (2008), Emerging Asian Regionalism A Partnership for Shared 
Prosperity, ADB; Heydon, K., Woolcock, S. (2009), The Rise of Bilateralism Comparing American, 
European and Asian Approached to Preferential Trade Agreements, Tokyo, UNUP. 
87 Dahlman, C.J., Aubert, J.E. (2012), China and the Knowledge Economy: Seizing the 21st century, WBI 
Development Studies, World Bank Publications, Washington, p.16. 
88 ASEAN Economic Crisis had consequences on the specific provisions of the ACIA, i.e. balance-of-
payment exceptions. See Chapter 4.3 Transfers. 
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membership to include the last four countries, to complete ten ASEAN countries.89 These 
newcomers were Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, also known as the “CLMV” 
countries. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, the poorest countries in Southeast Asia, are 
henceforth part of the “ASEAN Way of consensus”.90 The expansion of membership has 
resulted in political, economic and social disparities between the old (ASEAN-6) and the 
new Member States (CLMV), which have become one of the biggest challenges for 
ASEAN integration.  
This situation pressured ASEAN to accelerate the ASEAN internal integration 
process. ASEAN sought to attract foreign investment by creating an investment-favourable 
environment.91 Only through a regional association could ASEAN member States see their 
weak voices amplified and their political and economic leverage strengthened. The time 
could not have been more opportune for a concerted effort to shift from its original 
“ASEAN way” of preventive diplomacy to the constructive diplomacy of community 
building to cope with increasing economic competition.92 
 
2.2 Precursors of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Regime: 
the IGA and the AIA  
The regional investment integration was indeed motivated by the different 
economic rationale targeting the level of import-substituting industrialisation.93 ASEAN 
countries with their small markets realised that they could moderate the cost of 
industrialisation by attaining economies of scale through opening preferential markets with 
one another.94 Hence, they decided to boost the situation of ASEAN investments by 
concluding two agreements: one for investment protection, the other for investment 
liberalisation. These agreements may be classified as the second generation of ASEAN 
investment agreements. Both the IGA and the AIA Agreements applied to all direct 
                                                 
 
89 Severino, R. C. (2007), “The ASEAN Developmental Divide and the Initiative for ASEAN Integration”, 
ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol.24, No.1 (2007), pp.35-44. 
90 The 11th ASEAN country may be Timor-Leste. It has been applying for membership of ASEAN since 
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for Mutual Benefits, Statement by the Secretary-General of ASEAN welcoming Cambodia as the 10th 
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investments, but they exclude portfolio investment and matters relating to investment 
covered by other ASEAN liberalisation agreements. 
The 1987 ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, 
commonly known as the ASEAN Investment Guarantee Agreement (IGA), primarily 
covered protection against expropriation, guaranteeing repatriation of capitals and profits. 
It provided for arbitration as dispute settlement mechanism between investors and States. 
The IGA was subsequently amended to include more modern provisions, i.e. simplification 
of investment procedures and approval process, transparency and predictability, as well as 
provisions on accession of new members. 94F95  
A decade later, in 1998, the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment 
Area (AIA) was signed with the accession of Cambodia, extending the AIA across all ten 
ASEAN countries. The purpose of the ASEAN investment regime had extended to 
liberalisation. ASEAN decided to allow the freer flow of investments. The most significant 
initiative of the AIA was the introduction of the concept of “ASEAN investor” and the 
preferential treatment afforded to ASEAN investors for a fixed period of time. This 
treatment took the form of access to particular industrial sectors, namely, manufacturing, 
agriculture, fishery, forestry, mining and quarrying, and services incidental to those five 
sectors. 95F96 The AIA Agreement aimed to extend national treatment to ASEAN investors by 
2010 and to all other investors by 2020, on reciprocal basis. The AIA did not provide for 
arbitration. Despite this effort, the intra-ASEAN investment flows increased only slightly, 
the ASEAN Member States’ economic policy remained leaning towards attracting inward 
FDI mainly from external industrialised countries.  
In the meantime, ASEAN Member States preferred encouraging and creating 
favourable conditions for intra-ASEAN investments by concluding BITs. From 1990-2008, 
the ASEAN Member States signed 28 intra-ASEAN BITs, only 18 of which have entered 
into force. 96F97 Brunei has no BIT with any ASEAN member. Indonesia and Viet Nam have 
the most BITs (8), followed by Laos and Cambodia (7). 97F98 The latest BITs were signed in 
2008, before the conclusion of the ACIA, between Cambodia-Laos, and Myanmar-
Thailand. These statistics show that some States have concluded BITs with almost every 
ASEAN Member State. These bilateral relations may be seen either as an attempt to create 
a closer network between two ASEAN countries, or as a response to an unsuccessful 
                                                 
 
95 Protocol to amend the IGA, signed in 1996, Jakarta, entered into force on 6th January 2006.  
96 Protocol to amend the AIA, signed by the AIA Council in Ha Noi, on 14th September 2001, not in force.  
97 Update the statistics http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org 
98 Indonesia (8), Vietnam (8), Cambodia (7), Laos (7), Thailand (6), Philippines (5), Myanmar (5), Singapore 
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regional investment programme. Most of these BITs have accorded both unconditional 
national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment to investors of another party. They 
also provided arbitration for dispute settlements. 
In addition, as the “ASEAN Way” of dispute resolution did not promote the 
adjudicatory channels which would result in legally-binding decisions, there has been only 
one case under the IGA/AIA regime, while there are no statistics on the cases being 
brought under the intra-ASEAN BITs. Yaung Chi Oo vs. Myanmar case,99 the only 
investment dispute under the IGA, was provocative on several issues, e.g. scope of 
coverage, MFN treatment and dispute settlement mechanism. This case illustrates the 
problem of coordination of the IGA and the AIA. For the new millennium, ASEAN needed 
to design a new ASEAN investment regime which could correct the weak points of these 
parallel investment regimes, i.e. a consolidation of these two separate investment regimes 
in the ACIA.  
The ASEAN Member States had shown the willingness to be more rule-oriented in 
creating regional regime, the ASEAN Investment Area. However, these IGA/AIA regimes 
seemed to be overlapping. Simultaneously, the ASEAN Member States were reluctant and 
desired to remain consensual, as well as to preserve their policy space, by way of 
bilaterally granting preferential investment treatment to particular ASEAN Member States. 
To summarise, while the IGA and the AIA are relevant in the creation of the ASEAN 
Investment Area, they were mere precursors of the ACIA. Under the ASEAN Economic 
Community Era, the ACIA is the decisive step of ASEAN investment integration.     
 
Section 3. Investment regime under the ASEAN 
Economic Community 
In the 21st century, the new “ASEAN Way” has set the scene for a contemporary 
ASEAN investment regime. In order to achieve the community-building process, the 2007 
ASEAN Charter99F100 provides for the legal personality of ASEAN,100F101 and strengthens the 
institutional framework, especially the ASEAN Secretariat. 101F102 The Charter also requires 
ASEAN Member States to adhere “to multilateral trade rules and ASEAN’s rules-based 
regimes”. ASEAN has been working on rules-creating and rule-enforcing processes with 
                                                 
 
99 Yaung Chi Oo v. Myanmar, ASEAN I.D. Case No.ARB/01/1, Award 31 March 2003; Gaillard, E. (2004), 
“Yaung Chi Oo Trading v. Myanmar: The First ASEAN Investment Arbitral Award”, Transnational Dispute 
Management, Vol.1, Issue 2, May 2004. 
100 Entered into force on 15th December 2008. 
101 ASEAN Charter article 3. 
102 Concerning the ASEAN investment regime, the Secretariat-General will have an expanded role in dispute 
settlement mechanism. See Chapter 6 DSM. 
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the establishment of institutions and dispute settlement mechanisms. The shadow of the 
“ASEAN Way” from the 1970s seems to be disappearing. However, despite its seemingly 
ambitious transformation, the AEC has much more limited objectives.103 According to 
Balassa’s theory of economic integration,104 the AEC is a “common market”, not yet a 
“customs union” which requires coordination and harmonisation of external tariffs and 
macroeconomic policies of Member States.105  
Once the AEC is realised, ASEAN will be characterised by free movement of 
goods, services, and investments as well as freer flow of capital and skills. ASEAN has 
adopted a policy roadmap in 2007, also known as “AEC Blueprint”.106 The AEC Blueprint 
mandates a conclusion of a set of “AEC-related agreements” which support the realisation 
of the AEC.107 The ACIA is the key legal framework for the intra-ASEAN investment 
integration, which replaced the IGA and the AIA. With harmonised trade and investment 
regimes, ASEAN will become more attractive as a rules-based organisation and as a single 
investment destination. ASEAN Member States have committed to maximise opportunities 
for mutually beneficial regional integration. In creating a new investment regime, the 
ACIA has provided a transitional period between past (IGA/AIA) and new (ACIA) 
agreements. However, the problem of consistency remains between the existing BITs and 
the ACIA.   
 
3.1 A Consolidated Regime under the ACIA 
ASEAN Member States realised that the IGA/AIA investment regime was 
inadequate to meet broader and more concrete AEC objectives. Two fundamental reasons 
may be given: legal and economic. Firstly, as mentioned supra, the liberalisation pillar 
under the AIA and the protection pillar under the IGA had an overlapping scope of 
application, and they were not well-coordinated, as there was no provision for explanation 
of the connection between the two treaties. Secondly, the IGA and the AIA were drafted in 
the context before the Asian Economic Crisis, while now the economic landscape has 
                                                 
 
103 Chia, S.Y. (2010), p.7.  
104 Balassa, B.A. (1961), Towards a Theory of Economic Integration, Kyklos, Vol.14, Issue 1, Greenwood 
Press, pp.1-17. 
105 The “economic union” is envisaged as being on the negotiation table of the post-2015 agenda. 
106 Together with the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) Strategic Framework and IAI Work Plan Phase 
II (2009-2015), they form the Roadmap for and ASEAN Community 2009-2015. 
107 The building blocks are the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), ASEAN Framework 
Agreement on Services (AFAS), ACIA, ASEAN Agreement on Movement of Natural Persons (AAMNP), 
and Mutual Recognition Arrangements on Services (MRAs). 
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changed considerably, in that IIAs play more important roles in regional or mega-regional 
economic integration. 107F108 
Therefore, the 2007 AEC Blueprint called for a review of the IGA/AIA with the 
objective of realising an ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), “which 
is forward-looking, with improved features and provisions, comparable to international 
best practices in order to increase intra-ASEAN investments and to enhance ASEAN’s 
competitiveness in attracting inward investments into ASEAN”. 108F109 The ACIA was signed 
in February 2009. The Agreement was scheduled to enter into force by the end of that year. 
However, with the internal process of each member States to ratify international 
agreements, the ACIA, together with its Schedule (Reservation Lists), took effect on 29th 
March 2012, three years after its conclusion.  
As a consolidated agreement, the ACIA covers four corners of investment: (1) 
enhanced protection for investors of all Member States and their investments, (2) 
facilitation and cooperation to create favourable conditions for investment, (3) joint 
promotion of the region as an integrated investment area, and (4) progressive liberalisation. 
Innovatively, the ACIA has improved the elements of transparency and predictability in 
investment rules and procedures. By virtue of the “no back-tracking of commitments” 
obligation, 109F110 the lowest threshold of the ACIA is the existing commitment made under the 
IGA/AIA regime.  
In accordance with the objectives of a rule-based organisation, ACIA article 42 
reinforces the institutional aspect of the AEC. It provides a mechanism of “treaty 
management”. The Coordinating Committee on Investment (CCI)110F111 and the ASEAN 
Investment Area (AIA) Council 111F112 mainly provide policy guidance, oversee, coordinate 
and review the implementation of the ACIA. The AIA Council may also recommend to the 
ASEAN Economic Ministers any amendments to the Agreement.  
Regarding the continuity of the previous and new regimes, ACIA article 47 
provides that the IGA/AIA Agreements are terminated upon the entry into force of the 
ACIA. A three-year transitional period option applies to investors whose investments fall 
within the ambit of the previous regimes. In case the investor chose the IGA or the AIA 
                                                 
 
108 See more in section 5. 
109 ACIA Preamble. 
110 ACIA article 2(e), Guiding Principles. 
111 The CCI was established at the inaugural meeting of the AIA Council in October 1998. It is composed of 
senior officials responsible for investment, and other officials from other government agencies, and supports 
the AIA Council in carrying out its functions.  
112 The AIA Council is the Ministerial body under the ASEAN Economic Ministers, composing of Ministers 
from the ten Member States responsible for investment and the Secretary-General of ASEAN.  
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Agreement, as the case may be, one would apply in its entirety. By the end of March 2015, 
this transitional period was over. There is no record of the choice of investors regarding the 
transitional provision.   
3.2 Question of Inconsistency between existing BITs and the 
ACIA 
While the question of inconsistency between the IGA/AIA and the ACIA has been 
solved by the transitional provision provided in the ACIA, the question of inconsistency 
regarding the continuous validity of the BITs between ASEAN Member States remains 
unanswered. In theory, the overlap between the ACIA and these BITs may render the 
ACIA less effective and cause “legal uncertainty” in the ASEAN Investment Area. Not 
only do the ASEAN Member States have no obligation to terminate these BITs, they also 
retain internal and external sovereign powers, including the competence to conclude new 
BITs. The situation raises issues similar to that faced by the European Union (EU), but 
there is no equivalent to the detailed European debates about the matter.113  
            For ASEAN, while the legal setting appears complicated in theory, the question of 
potential inconsistencies may, in practice, be ignored. Firstly, the important issues usually 
arise at the dispute settlement stage, and from the statistics, no case has been filed under 
these intra-ASEAN BITs. Secondly, neither “ASEAN Law” nor an “ASEAN Court” exists, 
so no one will judge the issue of inconsistency between regional obligations and bilateral 
obligations. Thirdly, the BITs do not primarily serve as instruments of investment 
protection; they are actually the expression of closer links between two ASEAN countries, 
especially in areas of border development and infrastructure. Fourthly, and contrary to 
what could be expected in term of regional solidarity, the ACIA encourages deeper 
                                                 
 
113 TFEU article 351 (ex-article 307 TEC).  See Towards a Comprehensive European International 
Investment Policy, 7 July 2010, com(2010) 343 final, 4, (Last accessed: 18 August 2015) 
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/july/tradoc_146307.pdf; Council of  the EU, Conclusions on a 
comprehensive European international investment policy, 3041st Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, 
Luxembourg, 25 October 2010 (Last accessed: 18 August 2015) 
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Resolution of 6 April 2011 on the Future European International Investment Policy, (2010/2203 (ini)), 
Official Journal C296E, 2 October 2012. (Last accessed: 18 August 2015) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2011-0141&language=EN  
For detailed discussion: Shan W., Zhang S. (2010), “The Treaty of Lisbon: Half Way toward a Common 
Investment Policy”; EJIL, Vol.21, Issue 4, pp.1049-1073; Reinisch, A. (2014), The EU on the Investment 
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(Invisible) EU Model BIT: An Introduction, JWIT, 07/2014, Special Issue, Vol. 15, Issue 3-4, pp.375-378; 
Hoffmeister, F., Ünüvar, G. (2013), “From bits and Pieces towards European Investment Agreements” in 
Bungenberg,M., Reinisch, A., Tietje, C. (eds.), EU and Investment Agreements: Open Questions and 
Remaining Challenges, Nomos, Hart Publishing, p.57-86. 
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integration between ASEAN Member States by means of sub-regional arrangements.114 
This legal permission breaks ground for the multi-track integration within ASEAN, which, 
again, confirms the reincarnation of the “ASEAN Way” of economic cooperation. 
Nevertheless, some plausible solutions are proposed to solve this legal conflict. 
ASEAN Member States have several options by mutual consent of the parties. First, 
straightforwardly, they may terminate BITs by a termination agreement or an exchange of 
verbal notes. More discretely, as BITs usually enter into force for a period of ten years, the 
ASEAN Member States may take no action to renew expiring BITs. Once BITs exist no 
longer, the ACIA, which has no expiry date, will naturally apply to intra-ASEAN 
investments. Notwithstanding this, by virtue of the transitional period after the date of 
termination of the BITs, existing investments will still benefit from the BITs protection. 
ASEAN Member States may also put effort into renegotiating existing BITs in order to 
bring incompatible provisions in line with the ACIA. This option is, however, 
unreasonable because it would render the BITs futile as they would contain exactly the 
same content as the ACIA.  
Recently, Indonesia has been the only ASEAN country which has explicitly 
expressed its intention to terminate and renegotiate the “old” BITs.115 However, as 
ASEAN currently focuses more on network-creation than network-termination, the life of 
the intra-ASEAN BITs is not in jeopardy. Arguably, the multi-speed integration and 
flexibility approach will emphatically subsist in the ASEAN philosophy. ASEAN 
uniqueness will make ASEAN struggle between the past and the future, both internally and 
externally. 
 
Section 4. Internal Tension between the Past and the 
Future 
ASEAN Member States have a strong will to push forward the AEC in the hope of 
finally reducing the development gap among them. Ten ASEAN countries desire more 
investment flows within the region: the CLMV countries need technology and capital, 
while the ASEAN-6 countries have become aware of these unexploited countries and 
desire to be the “first mover” to benefit from the resources.116 The ACIA sets ambitious 
                                                 
 
114 ACIA article 6(3). See Chapter 5.1 on MFN. 
115 See Netherlands Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia. 
http://indonesia.nlembassy.org/organization/departments/economic-affairs/termination-bilateral-investment-
treaty.html (Last accessed: 20 September 2015).   
116 For example, the Myanmar-Thailand BIT, signed in 2008, entered into force on 6th June 2012. As a 
neighbour State, Thailand naturally recognised the first-handed opportunity in the newly-opened State and 
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objectives of investment liberalisation and protection, but not every ASEAN Member State 
is ready to open the market and to extend the benefits of the ACIA to a new horizon. This 
contradiction reflects a fundamental principle of ASEAN: “flexibility”. Apart from the 
protection provisions which are discussed later in this thesis, the principle of “flexibility” 
appears in sub-principles of (1) “progressive liberalisation” and (2) “special and 
differential treatment”. The challenge remains of achieving a balance between maximising 
the gains from ACIA investments and addressing the need to face greater social and 
economic problems brought by the new regime. Under this tension, it is observed that the 
traditional “ASEAN Way” is still surviving in the intra-ASEAN relations. 
 
4.1 Liberalisation Regime: New Horizon? 
Investment liberalisation is a growing element in regional trade and investment 
agreements. The AEC Blueprint has set three objectives for liberalisation: (a) progressive 
reduction or elimination of investment restrictions and impediments; (b) free and open 
investment regime with minimal investment restriction; and (c) harmonisation of 
investment measures. In doing that, the main question is how to structure the ACIA in 
order to preserve the regulatory powers of individual States over the admission and 
operation of foreign investment, and simultaneously to open up the market to attract 
investment flows. Liberalisation extends the scope of protection of the ACIA, because 
some designated sectors benefit also from the protection of the pre-establishment phase, on 
top of the post-establishment one.  
The ACIA adopts the GATS “hybrid” model,117 where specific commitments on 
market access and national treatment are made in a positive list of sectors (ACIA article 
3(3)), but where limitations to these commitments are presented in a negative list (ACIA 
article 9). Based on this principle of “progressive liberalisation”, also known as the 
“GATS-plus” agreement,118 only the sectors positively inscribed in specific commitment 
of a Member State are liberalised.119 Unlike the “one-shot” liberalisation pursuant to the 
NAFTA model,120 there is no automatic liberalisation under the ACIA. The GATS-
                                                                                                                                                    
 
then revealed its special interests in many contracts on road constructions, deep sea port, power grid, natural 
gas and industrial estate. 
117 OECD (2008), International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations, p.275. 
118 It contains a higher number of sectors and sub-sectors compared to those made under the GATS. 
119 UNCTAD (2000), IIAs: Flexibility for Development, New York, Geneva, UN, pp.60-64; UNCTAD 
(2002), Admission and Establishment, New York, Geneva, UN, p.47; UNCTAD (2006), Preserving 
Flexibility in IIAs: the Use of Reservations, UNCTAD Series International Investment Policies Development, 
New York, Geneva, UN, pp.17-35. 
120 OECD (2008), “The Interaction between Investment and Services Chapters in Selected Regional Trade 
Agreements”, Chapter 4, in International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking 
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inspired approach grants ASEAN Member States certain flexibility, as they can select for 
liberalisation only the sectors which are beneficial and sufficiently strong.  
Compared to NAFTA model, the level of investment liberalisation of the ACIA 
appears to be disadvantageous in terms of the number of liberalised sectors and the degree 
of transparency and predictability. The ACIA maintains the same list of five sectors which 
had been liberalised under the AIA regime − manufacturing, agriculture, fisheries, forestry 
and mining − as well as the services incidental to these sectors. The admission of 
investment of other sectors, and the application of all other measures to investment, remain 
subject to national laws and regulations of State parties. However, the ACIA leaves an 
opportunity to open any other sectors, as may be agreed upon by all Member States in the 
future, through a review mechanism by the AIA Council.121  
The ACIA provides the enabling legal framework for Member States to 
“progressively” improve market access and non-discrimination obligations to investors of 
ASEAN Member States. It provides for both MFN and national treatment with a more 
expansive obligation of prohibition of performance requirement, envisaged under the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs).122 Despite the ambitious 
objective of liberalisation, the ACIA recognises the development gap of the ASEAN 
Member States. The technique of “reservations” is key to balance flexibility of national 
authorities with regional obligations, either for sectors deemed important from a longer-
term developmental perspective or for sectors where particular regulatory or policy 
sensitivities arise. Essentially based on a positive list of specific commitments, ASEAN 
employs a negative list approach to schedule non-conforming measures. ACIA article 9(2) 
allows each Member State to submit its reservation list to the ASEAN Secretariat for 
endorsement by the AIA Council.123 This list forms part of the ACIA.124 
On the list of non-conforming measures, the ASEAN Member States may maintain 
some measures in contradiction with National Treatment (Articles 5) and/or Senior 
Management and Board of Directors (Article 8) obligations. Additionally, each Member 
State reserves the right to make future reservations on measures that do not conform to 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
Innovations, A Companion Volume to International Investment Perspectives, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
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121 ACIA article 3(3)(g). 
122 ACIA article 7(1). The TRIMs Agreement prohibits measures that are inconsistent with States’ 
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these two articles on new and emerging sectors, or on existing sectors which are 
unregulated at the time of submission of the reservation lists.125 Like other developing 
countries,126 ASEAN Member States have lodged a long list of reservations, because most 
of them are encountering new regulatory contingencies with more limited resources and 
expertise. As a consequence, reservations contained in the ACIA may turn out to be 
unproductive or even counterproductive to the objective of liberalisation. However, the 
fact that the ACIA automatically extends the MFN treatment to all Members, at least, 
shows the sincerity of ASEAN Member States to open the ASEAN Investment Area with a 
comparable liberalisation level to that provided for third parties. 
Despite this flexibility and regulatory autonomy, ASEAN Member States are 
obliged to gradually phase out their reservations in order to achieve the full liberalisation 
which is the end goal of economic integration under the AEC.127 Having realised the lack 
of transparency of the Reservations,128 the ASEAN Secretariat further recommended that 
the ASEAN Member States simplify and clarify their schedules of commitments. As a 
result, ASEAN Member States have recently concluded a Protocol to amend the ACIA, 
setting up the “Procedures for Amendment or Modification of Reservations” in the 
additional “Annex 3”.129 Annex 3 helps ASEAN investors to predict the impending 
opened-up sectors or subsectors, and to prepare for the host States’ restrictive measures in 
a more systematic manner. 
 
4.2 Special and Differential Treatment for Newer ASEAN Member 
States 
By adopting the principle of “progressive liberalisation”, ASEAN Member States 
have already gained a transitional period to implement this regional liberalisation 
programme, to reform and establish new regulatory frameworks for the liberalised sectors. 
However, the development gap, shown in as average per capita GDP, economic growth, 
and basic infrastructure, between ASEAN-6 and CLMV is a fundamental problem.  
The CLMV countries are promising intra-ASEAN investment destinations. They 
have recently opened up their once centrally planned economies to trade, FDI and the 
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global market. In addition, these countries were not affected by the Asian Economic Crisis 
in 1997 as they had not yet opened their market. They also showed resilience to the global 
crisis of 2008-2009, due to their export growth, tourism, agricultural products and 
hydropower. Their trade and investment linkages within ASEAN have strengthened their 
economies.  
However, although Cambodia, Lao and Vietnam have achieved strong economic 
growth rates and significant progress in poverty reduction in the past 20 years, they remain 
among the poorest countries in Southeast Asia.130 Myanmar is at a different stage 
altogether. Myanmar is only now following up tentative political freedoms with economic 
liberalisation, even though it has been a WTO member since 1 January 1995. The CLMV 
countries are undergoing an inter-sectoral shift from agriculture to manufacturing, while 
the incidental services have an intermediate role and, so far, investment flows have 
stagnated, reflecting the relatively poor investment climate.131 As the ASEAN economic 
integration greatly affects small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) in the CLMV 
markets, it would affect the social and political situation and may lead to greater opposition 
towards trade and investment integration.132 Given the development gap, the challenge of 
ASEAN integration is how to realise the AEC and the ASEAN Investment Area so that 
ASEAN Member States and ASEAN investors will maximise and share benefits in 
creating an ASEAN economic of scale.  
A gradual approach is needed in order that the CLVM countries overcome poverty 
and income disparities in their economic transition. In accordance with the objective of the 
AEC to create a region of “equitable economic development”, the ACIA sets out the 
“special and differential treatment for the newer ASEAN Member States” in the Preamble, 
articles 1 (Objective) and 2 (Guiding Principles). This principle has also been found in 
some treaties.133  
In contrast to the usual objectives of BITs, even though the Preamble of the ACIA 
states that it aims “to increase intra-ASEAN investments and to enhance ASEAN’s 
competitiveness in attracting inward investments into ASEAN”, it is also “recognising the 
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different levels of development within ASEAN especially the least developed Member 
States which require some flexibility including special and differential treatment as 
ASEAN moves towards a more integrated and interdependent future”. ACIA article 23(c) 
is further “recognising that commitments by each newer ASEAN Member State may be 
made in accordance with its individual stage of development.”134  
Under the ACIA, the CLMV countries are granted delays in the application of 
certain investment integration measures, both in protection and liberalisation regimes. As 
expectations on the part of the investor are correlated with the investment environment in 
the host country, the conditions in the host State should play a part in the analysis of 
whether a standard has been breached. Tribunals should take into account the level of 
development of the ASEAN host State when it searches for the interpretative guidance of 
the ACIA’s provisions. This approach illustrates that the ACIA attempts to balance the 
interests of the developing States and the ASEAN investors. 
Along with the interpretative guidelines, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) 
and Narrowing the Development Gap (NDG)135 are raising the capacity of the newer 
members to integrate their economies in the ASEAN mainstream. Increasing investment 
flows in ASEAN through protection and liberalisation should promote the development of 
a sound and modern legal and hard infrastructure. With the AEC, it is hoped that CLMV 
will succeed in escaping the least developed countries (LDCs) category, becoming more 
competitive, and will finally be ready to open itself to the world. 
 
Section 5. External Investment Relations: ASEAN Open 
Regionalism  
The ASEAN economy has been relying on external relations, while the intra-
ASEAN economy has made a modest contribution to the increase of FDI.136 Since the 
1990s, ASEAN diversity and the changing global economic environment has generated a 
unique ASEAN model of regionalism, which is dynamic, outward-looking, multi-track, 
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and multi-speed, known as “Open Regionalism”. This approach underscores the 
importance of strengthening trade, investment, and capital flows within the region while 
maintaining strong ties with, and remaining open to, the rest of the world.”137   
The ASEAN Charter requires each ASEAN Member State “to maintain the 
centrality and proactive role of ASEAN as the primary driving force in its relations and 
cooperation with its external partners in a regional architecture that is open, transparent and 
inclusive.”138 ASEAN currently works towards “ASEAN Centrality” and “ASEAN 
Connectivity”139 especially in its negotiations for free trade areas (FTAs) and 
comprehensive economic partnership (CEPs) agreements, which also cover investment 
issues. With the mixed rhythm of “ASEAN Plus” and “ASEAN Minus” formulas, the steps 
of ASEAN Member States are dissimilar in their schedules with respect to the choice of 
their major internal parameters and their diverse partners. Some interesting examples can 
be given regarding these formulas.   
“ASEAN Plus” refers to the economic agreements between the ten ASEAN 
Member States plus one or more third States. For example, ASEAN and the EU started 
negotiation on the ASEAN-EU FTA in 2007.140 ASEAN as a whole represents the EU’s 
third largest trading partner outside Europe, after the US and China. This FTA deal appears 
very appealing, given voluminous and dynamic region-to-region markets. Regrettably, the 
interregional strategy was temporarily abandoned in 2009 because of ASEAN/EU 
differences in expectations, objectives and interests. Presumably, ASEAN will resume 
collective negotiations upon the realisation of the AEC,141 and the ASEAN-EU FTA may 
be the first inter-regional model for ASEAN. Currently, the trend is towards integration in 
Asia-Pacific.  
ASEAN has concluded six “ASEAN Plus” FTAs (with Australia, China, India, 
Japan, Korea and New Zealand). ASEAN desires to upgrade these FTAs into one mega-
FTA, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).142 The RCEP has the 
potential to transform ASEAN into an integrated market of half of the world’s 
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population.143 The RCEP will be, in the first quarter of the 21st century, a gigantic stepping 
stone to achieving the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area.144 “Mega-Regionalism” is becoming 
a major feature of ASEAN trade and investment strategies.145     
In the midst of long and exhaustive negotiations for the “ASEAN Plus” agreements, 
ASEAN Member States are impatiently searching for an international playing field. The 
parallel trend is “ASEAN Minus”,146 meaning bilateral or plurilateral FTAs between two 
or more ASEAN Member States, or some ASEAN Member States and third countries. 
Malaysia,147 Vietnam148 and Thailand have individually negotiated FTAs with the EU. The 
latest success of such negotiation is the EU-Singapore FTA in 2013.149 In addition, given 
the renewed interest of the United States and its partners from South America and 
Australia, it is possible that only five ASEAN Member States (Brunei, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand) are likely to adhere to the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP).150 Some ASEAN Member States have also interests in East Asia.151 In total, since 
1960 more than 390 BITs have been concluded between ASEAN Member States and Third 
Parties.  
The application of the “ASEAN Way” is particularly appropriate and practical 
where circumstances require some flexibility for conducting regional inter-State relations.  
As Lee Kuan Yew observed, at a time when ASEAN consisted of only five original 
Member States, “[w]hen four agree [to a certain scheme] and one does not, this can still be 
considered as consensus and the five-minus-one scheme can benefit the participating four 
without damaging the remaining one”.152 Even though the “ASEAN Way” has been 
                                                 
 
143 With the combined GDP of about US$21.2 trillion, or about 30% of global GDP, about 3.4 billion people. 
144 Petri, P.A., Ali, A.-R. (2014), “Can RCEP and the TPP be pathways to FTAAP?”, State of the Region, 
Chapter 2, Pacific Economic Cooperation Council. 
http://www.pecc.org/state-of-the-region-report-2014/265-state-of-the-region/2014-2015/595-chapter-2-can-
rcep-and-the-tpp-be-path-ways-to-ftaap (Last accessed: 18 August 2015). 
145 Das, B.S. (2012), RCEP: Going Beyond ASEAN+1 FTAs, ISEAS Perspective; Baldwin R. (2014) 
“Multilaralising 21st Century Regionalism”, Global Forum on Trade Reconciling Regionalism and 
Multilateralism in a Post-Bali World, p.29. http://www.oecd.org/tad/events/OECD-gft-2014-
multilateralising-21st-century-regionalism-baldwin-paper.pdf (Last accessed: 18 August 2015). 
146 With a desire to expedite liberalisation of trade in services within ASEAN, the AEM during their Retreat 
on 6 July 2002 in Genting Highlands, Malaysia, called for a “10 Minus X Principle” to be applied in services 
negotiation. 
147 The Malaysia-EU FTA (MEUFTA) negotiations were officially launched in October 2010. 
148 The Vietnam-EU FTA (VEFTA) negotiations were started in June 2012. 
149 The final negotiations for an FTA between Singapore and the EU were completed in December 2012, and 
initialled on 20 September 2013. 
150 TTP is proposed as regional FTA, currently being negotiated by twelve countries throughout the Asia-
Pacific region, namely, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. 
151 An investment agreement (APTA) was signed between Laos and Bangladesh, China, Korea, Sri Lanka, in 
2009. Not yet in force. 
152 Cited in Irvine, R., 1982, “The formative years of ASEAN: 1967-1975”, in Broinowski, A. (ed.) 
Understanding ASEAN, New York, St.Martin’s Press, cited in A. Acharya (1997). 
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modernised, ASEAN Member States keep applying consensus and flexibility as a way of 
moving forward with regional cooperation schemes. This emphasises the fact that ASEAN 
Member States desire to preserve their policy space and the exercise of their investment 
competence. On this matter, ASEAN countries seem to adopt a policy of “thinking 
multilaterally but acting bilaterally”,153 while they should have adopted a policy of 
thinking globally and practicing prosperity regionally.154 “Non-ASEAN” practice is no 
longer an “exclusive non-ASEAN” approach, but one that should be compatible with 
ASEAN goals. 
The recent proliferation of trade and investment agreements has concocted the most 
chaotic landscape in the history of ASEAN treaty practice. The “ASEAN Way” of 
integration “à géométrie variable” and “Open Regionalism” result in multi-layer 
integration, or the complication of the “living noodle bowl”.155 This approach has 
amplified the gains from global and regional liberalisation; however it reflects a detached 
position of ASEAN Member States which would weaken the voice of ASEAN as a whole. 
In fact, the question of how they can manage the relationships among their partners is a 
delicate one. The objective of this survey of the ASEAN external relations is to underline 
that the “Open Regionalism” approach raises several questions, especially regarding the 
value of the intra-ASEAN regime. Extra-ASEAN relations may outweigh the intra-
ASEAN relations, and ASEAN Member States may eventually turn blind to the intra-
ASEAN investment flows, and the ACIA may lose its standing among this deliberately 
complicated network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
153 Shafie, M.G. (1982), Malaysia: International Relations, Kuala Lumpur: Creative Enterprises, pp.161-162. 
154 ASEAN Secretariat (2014), Thinking Globally, Prospering Regionally, AEC 2015, Jakarta. 
155 ADB (2013), Asian Free Trade Agreements: Untangling the Noodle Bowl, www.abd.org; Kawai, M., 
Wignaraja, G. (2013), “The Future of the World Trading System: Asian Perspectives”, ADBI-Graduate 
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Conclusion to Part I 
This Chapter has provided an introduction to the ASEAN legal landscape in which 
the ACIA is situated. Since the 1990s, countries in Southeast Asia have made impressive 
progress in regional economic integration and cooperation. This is the first, deepest and 
most comprehensive process of institutional integration in the eastern hemisphere. For 
more than 40 years, ASEAN has run the traditional “ASEAN Way” of cooperation, i.e. by 
consensus, non-legal binding decisions, and absence of institutions.  
ASEAN is an intergovernmental organisation. Previously, although meetings held 
between ministers and government officials of Member States resulted in joint statements 
and joint press releases, they did not lead to firm decisions with enforcement or to real 
actions. An unwillingness to cede national sovereignty, wide disparities in economic 
development, social structures, and political systems, so combined, led to consultations and 
consensus in the “ASEAN way”, rather than to solutions or formulations of specific 
policies agreed upon. It appeared that ASEAN Member States cautiously tried to avoid any 
legal commitment to their other members, and preferred to remain in cooperation only at a 
certain level.  
Most of legally binding agreements that ASEAN concluded were economic in 
nature. Investment schemes were one form of early ASEAN cooperation. Nonetheless, the 
first and the second generations of agreements under the ASEAN investment regime had 
only played a “minor and secondary role”156 in attracting intra-ASEAN direct investment. 
In response to the economic reality in the 21st Century, ASEAN is transforming to be an 
ASEAN Economic Community based on a single market. By virtue of the ASEAN 
Charter, ASEAN has now become a well-established international entity, equipped with 
rules and institutions, which makes ASEAN stable, credible and effective. The “ASEAN 
Way” is undergoing a transformation. ASEAN believes that the success of a rules-based 
economic regime will gradually extend to other pillars of the ASEAN Community. In this 
“pre-AEC Era”, the ASEAN Member States are enthusiastically forming a new “ASEAN 
Way” of trade and investment. The tension between tradition and novelty of the “ASEAN 
Way” is reflected in the discussion on the ACIA throughout the thesis.  
                                                 
 
156 See UNCTAD (1998), BIT in the Mid-1990s, p.177. 
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The ACIA, considered the third generation of ASEAN investment agreement, is 
one of the key ASEAN economic integration instruments, and consolidates previous 
protection and liberalisation agreements into a single document. Under the ACIA, ASEAN 
should attract higher levels of foreign investments, and increase awareness of investment 
opportunities within ASEAN.157 Nevertheless, the ACIA was concluded with a view to 
balance the goal of a single market and production base with the goals of equitable 
development and integration in the global economy. ASEAN Member States have made an 
internal effort to include CLMV into the regional force, by granting them more flexibility 
and special treatments. ASEAN Member States also take into account external factors 
which may determine the shape of the coming era. As a consequence, ASEAN will become 
a unique player with more tactics and strategies, both within and outside ASEAN. 
The only case since the creation of the intra-ASEAN regime hints that ASEAN 
keeps the same “ASEAN Way” of doing business. ASEAN investors may rather avoid  
a rules-based, legally-bound mechanism, because they prefer a non-adjudicatory 
mechanism, combined with the fact that they do not yet believe in the ASEAN mechanism. 
Although ASEAN Member States may acknowledge the existence of the ACIA 
mechanism, they may not desire to complicate matters and may choose to solve problems 
amicably. Whatever the reason may be, the ACIA has undeniably contributed to the 
protection of ASEAN foreign investment, even without formal recourse to this Agreement.  
  
                                                 
 
157 ADB (2012), ASEAN Economic Integration Monitor, July 2012, pp.54-56. 
http://aric.adb.org/pdf/aeim/AEIM_2012July_CoverHighlights.pdf (Last accessed: 18 August 2015) 
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Issues Note to Substantive Chapters 
The main objective of this thesis is to assess the ACIA in the light of general 
practice of rulemaking for international investment agreements (IIAs). After the thesis 
introduction and background of the ASEAN Way and the ACIA in Part I, this thesis 
contains three substantive chapters (chapters 3 to 5) and one procedural chapter (chapter 6) 
which focus on in-depth analysis of the ACIA approach related to substantive and 
procedural ACIA provisions. This thesis seeks to situate the making of the ACIA 
provisions in the general IIAs landscape. It traces and explains new issues within the ACIA 
which have also emerged in recent IIAs negotiations. To begin with, this thesis does not 
use a specific category of IIA (bilateral, regional or multilateral investment agreements) as 
a comparator to the ACIA.158 For reasons of convenience, this thesis compares the ACIA 
with a large sample of IIAs, in the interests of having a benchmark against which the 
ACIA can be assessed.  
This thesis uses a summa divisio approach to categorising existing IIAs practices: 
general practice and specific practice. In order to identify the trend in the normative 
developments of the elements addressed in the ACIA, chapters 3 to 6 are organised into 
two parts. They first describe areas where the ACIA follows “general practices”, and 
second, they examine “specific features” the ACIA has developed in its text. This division 
between general practice and specific features not only facilitates the assessment of the 
ACIA approach, but also demonstrates the normative evolution of the ASEAN Way of 
investment protection from the previous IGA/AIA regime to the ACIA regime.  
For over forty years, ASEAN Member States have used ASEAN investment 
agreements as an instrument for protecting international investment and ensuring a more 
predictable and fair treatment for ASEAN investors. Since the early 1990s, the number of 
ASEAN BITs has increased significantly. However, a considerable degree of conformity 
has been found in terms of their main contents, which corresponds to the “Dutch gold 
standard”159 or the traditional approach focusing on investment protection. Hence, “general 
practices” in this thesis refer to basic substantive or procedural provisions which can be 
commonly found in the BITs concluded between 1960s and 1990s, also known as 
                                                 
 
158 In this thesis, the term “BITs” refers to traditional bilateral investment treaties, whereas the “IIAs” refers 
to all international investment agreements (e.g. BITs, regional trade agreements (RTAs), economic 
partnership agreements (EPAs), multilateral agreements).  
159 See p.27. 
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“traditional BITs”. This approach remains mainstream investment law. Most BITs have a 
similar basic structure and content.160  
The ACIA is a new generation of ASEAN investment agreements. While the ACIA 
has core standards which are common to every IIA, it is moving towards a more detailed-
specified approach. Since 2000, IIAs have become more complex and cover a broader set 
of issues and more areas of host State activities in a more complex and detailed manner;161 
for instance, the US Model BIT162 or the Canadian Foreign Investment Protection and 
Promotion Model Agreement (FIPA).163 Therefore, “specific features” in this thesis refer 
to emerging elements and techniques used in modern and newly-negotiated IIAs. These 
IIAs have more elaborated provisions, as they opt for a rule-enhanced approach.  
Specific features found in these new treaties differ from one to another, depending 
on how specific contracting States intend to clarify a treaty’s standards. States may leave 
undefined standards to arbitral tribunals who have traditionally been vested with 
interpretative power. Some specific details found in the ACIA may be found in other new 
generation agreements. Some details which are unusual in, or differ from, other modern 
IIAs practices are “ASEAN-specific” features, as they respond to specific concerns of 
ASEAN Member States and the realisation of the AEC. Compared to traditional BITs, 
these specific features add value to the ASEAN investment law practice.  
Traditional IIAs only deal with protection of investments and investors. They 
establish binding obligations only with regard to the post-establishment phase and leave 
the contracting parties with discretion concerning the admission and establishment of 
foreign investors. Following the new trend, the ACIA covers four corners of foreign 
investment flows: protection, liberalisation, promotion and facilitation. The ACIA has 
brought liberalisation and protection together. Within the investment protection corner, the 
ACIA applies investment protection for both pre- and post-establishment phases of 
investments through the granting of national treatment and most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
treatment, subject to reservations and exceptions.  
                                                 
 
160 See generally UNCTAD (2007), BITs in 1995-2006:  Trends in Investment Rulemaking, Geneva, New 
York, United Nations. 
161 See UNCTAD (2015), Transformation of the IIA Regime, Note by the secretariat 17 Dec 2014, 
TD/B/C.II/EM.4/2, Trade and Development Board Investment, Enterprise and Development Commission 
Expert Meeting on the Transformation of the International Investment Agreement Regime: The Path Ahead, 
Geneva, 25-27 February 2015, Item 3 of the provisional agenda.  
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ciiem4d2_en.pdf (Last accessed: 4 September 2015) 
162 Alvarez, J.E. (2010), “Comparision U.S. Model BIT (1984) and U.S. Model BIT (2004)”, Transnational 
Dispute Management, Vol.7 (online journal). 
163 These IIAs have undergone a major transformation in 2004 and have become models for several major 
economies of the world. Model BIT, Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesperson, Washington, DC, 20 April 
2012. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/188199.htm (Last accessed: 7 September 2015) 
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In this connection, traditional BITs have not attempted to clarify the scope of 
national treatment and MFN any further. The ACIA has specified the scope and conditions 
of national treatment and MFN. In particular, the ACIA has confirmed ASEAN-specific 
exceptions, which existed in the previous regime, i.e. sub-regional MFN exceptions. 
Furthermore, while the MFN application to ISDS has been largely debated − as most BITs 
do not spell out on this issue − the ACIA specifically excludes the application of MFN 
treatment from the scope of the ISDS. These features have not frequently been found 
elsewhere.      
The ACIA has significantly introduced normative innovations to the practice of 
ASEAN investment rulemaking. While the IGA previously had simple and plain definition 
of investment and investor, the ACIA clarifies their scope in details. The ACIA uses 
techniques for narrowing the scope of definition of investment. Nevertheless, the ACIA is 
more liberal compared to traditional BITs as it includes unusual elements into the 
definition of investment: portfolio investments and foreign-owned ASEAN-based (FOAB) 
investments. These particular elements serve the objectives of ASEAN capital market 
liberalisation under the AEC. The ACIA has inserted specific provisions to define the term 
“control” and has created a mechanism of “denial-of-benefits” for ASEAN Member States 
to deny investors and investments which they do not intend to grant the ACIA protection. 
Apart from MFN and national treatment mentioned above, the ACIA provides other 
significant standards of protection: fair and equitable treatment (FET), full protection and 
security, repatriation of capital and earnings, expropriation and compensation, subrogation 
and ISDS. These core standards are commonly found in IIAs. After a survey, this thesis 
has selected four crucial and distinctive standards of the ACIA to be scrutinised: FET, 
transfers, expropriation and compensation, and ISDS. Full protection and security and 
subrogation provisions are left out of the scope of this thesis, as they are less specific to the 
ACIA, but common to all IIAs. Furthermore, this thesis analyses State-to-State dispute 
settlement mechanism, on top of the ISDS, in order to complete the assessment of the 
ASEAN Way of investment protection. 
The ACIA defines the meaning and key elements of these four obligations.  
First, while most BITs include the FET standard, only a small number of them clarify its 
meaning. Attempts to identify elements of the normative content of FET have been 
relatively recent and are not uniform. Differing from various approaches in use, the ACIA 
has proposed explicit provisions narrowing down the reading of the FET standard.  
Second, most BITs show a remarkable convergence concerning legal conditions for 
expropriation. Their provisions may differ on the degree of specificity regarding the 
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calculation and payment of compensation. Nonetheless, the majority of these traditional 
BITs do not explicitly deal with the newly emerging issue of regulatory takings. The ACIA 
confirms the expropriation and compensation standard for investment protection. 
Meanwhile, it has followed a more detailed approach and has specifically added “Annex 2 
Expropriation and Compensation”.  
Third, traditional BITs include a provision on transfer of monies, which guarantees 
foreign investors the right to freely transfer investment-related funds. Differences exist 
regarding the coverage of transfer provisions (inbound and outbound transfers) and the 
kinds of transfers protected (any kind of transfer or only those explicitly mentioned). In 
some modern IIAs, exceptions are mainly used to ensure compliance with specific laws 
(e.g. on bankruptcy, criminal offence, taxation). A specific exception clause dealing with a 
balance-of-payments crisis is unlikely to be explicitly included. Compared to traditional 
BITs, the ACIA is remarkably liberalised, as it allows for both direct investments and 
portfolio investments, and both inbound and outbound transfers. However, given the Asian 
economic crisis that ASEAN Member States experienced in the late 1990s, the ACIA 
provides not only common exceptions for certain application of national laws, but also 
specific exceptions in case of balance-of-payments crisis. The provisions on balance-of-
payments exceptions, which have been written in an elaborated manner, evidence ASEAN 
Member States’ concerns, especially States in the process of economic development.    
Fourth, the ACIA has undertaken to regulate ISDS in greater detail, whereas 
traditional BITs have sketched out only the main features of ISDS and have relied on 
specific arbitration conventions. The ACIA provides scope of the ISDS application, which 
generally limits access for investors to bring a claim before ISDS. Particularly, the ACIA 
has improved the transparency and predictability of the ISDS mechanism by providing 
more guidance to the disputing parties concerning the conduct of arbitration, and also 
orients other rules of adjudication mechanisms. Compared to traditional BITs, the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the ACIA is more politicised because of an explicit inclusion of 
State-to-State dispute settlement.  
While a small number of newly negotiated IIAs contain a clause discouraging  
the lowering of environmental or core labour standards in order to attract foreign 
investment, the ACIA remains in the mainstream of investment agreements in that it has no 
additional chapters on sustainability, environment, or labour. This omission shows that the 
ACIA leaves these issues in the realm of ASEAN Member States. Meanwhile, the ACIA 
introduces other specific provisions. In contrast with traditional BITs which do not 
establish legally binding obligations but only a “best efforts” commitment of host States, 
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the ACIA has explicit provisions on special formalities and disclosure of information,164 
transparency,165 entry, temporary stay and work of investors and key personnel.166 These 
provisions are, however, not specifically treated in this thesis. 
The more detailed approach in the ACIA focuses on a careful balance between 
promoting the ASEAN Investment Area (by providing strong and standardised investment 
protection and creating a stable and predictable business climate), and preserving 
regulatory flexibility or policy space for ASEAN host States to pursue their economic 
development policies. Although the ACIA asserts investment protection, it directly points 
out that investment protection should not be pursued at the expense of other essential 
public interests. Particularly, the ACIA includes, inter alia, general exceptions, security 
exceptions and balance-of-payments exceptions. Contrary to traditional BITs, the ACIA 
does not contain an umbrella clause. 
On the last note, the distinction between “general practices” and “special features” 
of the ACIA rules, which runs through the analysis of this thesis, may not always be an 
obvious approach; one may categorise IIAs elements differently. Besides, these specific 
features are increasingly common in newly-negotiated agreements. However, this 
distinction serves as a practical tool which gives a particular perspective on the ASEAN 
Way of investment protection. The constructive assessment of this thesis may give final 
answers to whether the ACIA approach leads towards a rebalancing of investment treaties 
and ISDS. As a consequence, ASEAN host States should be aware of the fact that they 
have to pay a price for more “regulatory flexibility”. Similarly, ASEAN investors are 
advised to take these normative developments into account and adjust their investment 
strategy in the ASEAN Investment Area accordingly. 
 
  
                                                 
 
164 ACIA article 20. 
165 ACIA article 21. 
166 ACIA article 22. 
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Part II. Investments and Investors 
Chapter 3. Definition of Investments and Investors 
In order to create a liberal, facilitative, transparent and competitive investment 
environment within ASEAN, ASEAN Member States adhere to the benefits of “investors 
and their investments based in ASEAN”.167 ACIA article 4 defines the terms “investment” 
and “investor”, and sets requirements of “covered investments”. In practice, investment 
agreements differ substantially in terms of the extent to which they cover.  
Only “covered investments” by a certain range of individuals and legal entities, 
categorised as “ASEAN investors”, profit from the privileges of protection and 
liberalisation accorded by the ACIA. By these definitions, the ACIA defines the 
boundaries of ASEAN Member States’ exposure to possible investor-State claims.168 The 
jurisdiction of the tribunal and the outcome of the awards depend on interpretation of the 
ACIA, whether a particular transaction or asset qualifies as a protected investment and 
whether a claimant qualifies as a protected investor. A person or an enterprise falling 
outside the scope of application is not considered a beneficiary of the ACIA. 
The ACIA attempts to establish a more liberal and transparent investment 
environment in order to create a competitive ASEAN Investment Area.169 The definitions 
of the terms “investment” and “investor” have a crucial role in the regionalisation and 
internationalisation of economic activities for deeper economic integration. The ACIA 
grants immediate benefits to ASEAN investors and ASEAN-based foreign investors, 
because ASEAN Member States encourage investment flows into ASEAN from both 
ASEAN and non-ASEAN sources. The ACIA follows basically the trend of the most used 
definitions, i.e. the broad asset-based definition of “investment” and nationality-based 
definition of “investor”. 
Given the fact that most ASEAN Member States are developing countries, they 
should admit investments which contribute to national and regional development and reject 
harmful ones. The ACIA shows that ASEAN Member States take a precautionary 
approach in accepting investments into the ASEAN Investment Area. Even though an 
investment made is covered by the definitions, the ACIA specifically allows ASEAN 
Member States to exercise their power to select only beneficial investments, by denying 
investments without substantial business operations. 
                                                 
 
167 ACIA article 2(c), Guiding Principles. 
168 ACIA article 28-41, Section B.  
169 ACIA article 1 Objectives. 
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This chapter analyses definitions and conditions of admission of investment 
(section 3.1) and investor (section 3.2). It examines whether, and to what extent, the ACIA 
approach is in common with the general trend of IIAs practice; and which elements of 
these definitions are ASEAN-specific. The ACIA approach of scope and definitions 
reflects the “ASEAN Way” of investment integration. This chapter opens the way for 
discussion of the whole range of substantive and procedural rights enshrined in the ACIA 
in the subsequent chapters.  
 
Section 3.1 Investment  
 The ACIA follows a detailed approach of the IIAs practice. ACIA article 4(c) not 
only defines the term “investment” but also provides for a long list of investments. Its 
footnote 2 sets a requirement for positive characteristics of an investment, while footnote 3 
sets negative criteria for what cannot be considered an investment. 
ACIA article 4(c): “investment” means every kind of asset, owned or 
controlled, by an investor, including but not limited to the following: 
i) movable and immovable property and other property rights such as  
mortgages, liens or pledges; 
ii) shares, stocks, bonds and debentures and any other forms of participation in 
a juridical person and rights or interest derived therefrom; 
iii) intellectual property rights which are conferred pursuant to the laws and 
regulations of each Member State; 
iv) claims to money or to any contractual performance related to a business and 
having financial value;  
v) rights under contracts, including turnkey, construction, management, 
production or revenue-sharing contracts; and 
vi) business concessions required to conduct economic activities and having 
financial value conferred by law or under a contract, including any concessions 
to search, cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources. 
The term “investment” also includes amounts yielded by investments, in 
particular, profits, interest, capital gains, dividend, royalties and fees. Any 
alteration of the form in which assets are invested or reinvested shall not affect 
their classification as investment; 
 
ACIA Footnote 2: “Where an asset lacks the characteristics of an investment, 
that asset is not an investment regardless of the form it may take. The 
characteristics of an investment include the commitment of capital, the 
expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.” 
 
ACIA Footnote 3: “For greater certainty, investment does not mean claims to 
money that arise solely from: 
(a) commercial contracts for sale of goods or services; or 
(b) the extension of credit in connection with such commercial contracts.” 
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3.1.1 Definition of “Investment”  
Similar to most BITs, the ACIA adopts a broad approach to “investment”, which 
provides comprehensive, rules-based protection and guarantees high standards of treatment 
for all categories of foreign investment, thereby encouraging regional investment flows, 
while creating more efficient regional capital markets. However, the term “investment” 
pursuant to the ACIA has an unusual broad coverage, meaning both direct and portfolio 
investments. 
3.1.1.1 General Characteristics of “Investment”  
Generally, foreign investment involves the transfer of tangible or intangible assets 
from one country to another for the purpose of their use in that country to generate wealth 
under total or partial control of the owner of the assets. 169F170 Under ACIA article 4(c), the 
term “investment” refers to “every kind of asset, owned or controlled, by an investor”. 170F171 
This phrase is followed by an illustrative but usually non-exhaustive list of assets. The 
broad and open-ended asset-based definition focuses on the maximisation of investment 
protection. 171F172 In spite of some obscurity of what constitutes “investment”, it is at least 
certain that these categories are expressly included within the definition. 172F173 This approach 
allows ASEAN investments to evolve constantly in form and in substance, especially for 
ASEAN emerging markets. The last paragraph of article 4(c) allows investors to 
restructure the form and reinvest their investments. 173F174 While the ACIA does not impose 
any specific condition for reinvestment, a reinvestment remains covered only if it covers 
the same substance and is established in accordance with the conditions placed on the 
original investment.174F175  
The ACIA “investment” includes a narrower concept of “commercial presence” or 
an “enterprise-based” approach, i.e. services incidental to investments. 175F176 ACIA provisions 
apply to any measure affecting the supply of a service by a service provider of a Member 
State through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member State, regardless 
of whether or not such a service sector is scheduled in the Member States’ schedule of 
                                                 
 
170 Sornarajah, M. (2010), The International Law on Foreign Investment, p.7. 
171 See Salacuse, J.W. (2010), The Law of International Investment Treaties, Oxford, OUP, p.160. 
172 UNCTAD, (2011), Scope and Definition, UNCTAD Series on Issues in IIAs II, New York, Geneva, UN, 
pp.24-27. 
173 Siemens v Argentina, ICSID Case No.ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004, para.137. 
174 For example, AANZFTA article 2 Chapter 11 Investment Section A. In contrast, no similar provision is 
found in the NAFTA Agreement, and in the 1994 Protocol of Colonia of MERCOSUR.  
175 ACIA article 4(c). 
176 GATS article XXVIII(d)(g).  
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commitments made under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS).177  
However, ACIA provisions apply only to the extent that such a commercial presence 
relates to an investment and obligations under the ACIA. 
While the ACIA has a broad definition of investment, it also uses an additional or 
explanatory technique for narrowing the scope of the definition. Footnote 3 to article 
4(c)(iv) excludes claims to money arising solely from commercial contracts for sale of 
goods or services, because they are usually considered trades, and not investments. 
Moreover, footnote 2 to article 4(c) provides a non-exhaustive list of general 
characteristics of an investment, which includes 1) commitment of capital, 2) expectation 
of gain or profit, or 3) assumption of risk.  
“Where an asset lacks the characteristics of an investment, that asset is not an 
investment regardless of the form it may take”.178 A tribunal must question whether that 
asset has characteristics of an investment. The ACIA criteria correspond to the 
indispensable criteria in the “Salini Test”.179 According to the Salini case, the 
indispensable criteria are “contributions, a certain duration of performance of the contract, 
and a participation in the risks of the transaction”. After considering a treaty’s preamble, 
“one may add the contribution to the economic development of the host State of the 
investment as an added condition”,180 such as, public interest, or some transfer of know-
how.  
Nevertheless, the “Salini Test” itself is fairly controversial: “the existence of a 
contribution to the economic development of the host State as an essential – although not 
sufficient – characteristic or unquestionable criterion of the investment, does not mean that 
this contribution must always be sizable or successful”.181 The concept of economic 
development is “extremely broad but also variable depending on the case”.182 Tribunals 
have often located this test in ICSID Convention article 25, and not in specific BITs, or 
have a generic reference to some of the literature on the Salini criteria.183  
The fact that the ACIA has a non-exhaustive list characteristic of investment leaves 
a space for a tribunal to interpret the term “investment”. The ACIA does not explicitly 
mention the duration of a project, as the ACIA specifically includes portfolio investments, 
                                                 
 
177 ACIA article 3(5). Usually the liberalisation of services are covered by the AFAS. See also p.148. 
178 Footnote 2 to article 4(c) 
179 Salini v. Morocco, ICSID Case No.ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001, paras.52-57.  
180 Idem. 
181 Patrick Mitchell v. Congo, ICSID Case No.ARB/99/7, Decision on Annulment, 1 Nov 2006, para.33. 
182 Idem. 
183 Schreuer, C.H. et al. (2009), The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, CUP, 2nd ed., Article 25, paras.153-
174. 
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which may not stay in the Area as long as direct investments. Regarding economic 
development criteria,184 it is explicit in the ACIA Preamble that the very purpose of 
foreign investment flows is for the “dynamic development of ASEAN economies”.185 
Providing that an investment fulfils the conditions of “covered investment”, discussed 
infra, such investment has responded to the goal of economic development.  
3.1.1.2 Inclusion of Innovative Element: Portfolio Investments 
The term “investment” under the ACIA refers to both direct and indirect 
investments. Direct investment is the principal category of investment protected under the 
ACIA. 185F186 Like other modern investment agreements, ACIA article 4(c) specifically 
recognises movable and immovable property and other property rights, including the 
contractual ones. It also includes amounts yielded by investments, in particular, profits, 
interest, capital gains, dividend, royalties and fees. For illustration, direct investment 
signifies a transfer of physical property such as equipment, or a physical property that is 
bought or constructed such as plantations or manufacturing plants. 186F187 Direct investment 
may supply additional contributions such as know-how, technology, management, and 
marketing. A direct investor must control a significant degree of influence over, and have a 
lasting relationship with the investment. 187F188  
The objectives of direct investment are different from those of portfolio or indirect 
investment, in which investors do not generally expect to influence the management of the 
enterprise.188F189 Portfolio investment is normally represented by a movement of money for 
the purpose of buying shares in a company formed and functioning in another country. The 
advantage of portfolio investment is the free circulation of instruments such as shares and 
stocks; or promissory notes and bonds, which may or may not be linked with companies. 189F190        
The ACIA element of portfolio investment is innovative, compared to earlier 
ASEAN investment agreements. It was formerly excluded from the scope of the IGA/AIA 
regime. Portfolio investment has recently appeared in the definition of investment in some 
                                                 
 
184 See discussion in Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No.ARB/05/10, para.143. 
185 ACIA Preamble. 
186 “Direct investment is a category of cross-border investment associated with a resident in one economy 
having control or a significant degree of influence on the management of an enterprise that is resident in 
another economy. As well as the equity that gives rise to control or influence, direct investment also includes 
investment associated with that relationship, including investment in indirectly influenced or controlled 
enterprises, investment in fellow enterprises, debt, and reverse investment.” See OECD (2009), Benchmark 
Definition of FDI, 4th Ed.; IMF (2009), Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, 
6th Ed.  
187 Sornarajah, M. (2010), The International Law on Foreign Investment, pp.8-9. 
188 UNCTAD, (2011), Scope and Definition, p.10 
189 Idem, pp.29-30, 66-67. 
190 Sornarajah, M. (2010), The International Law on Foreign Investment, p.227. 
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cutting-edged treaties, for instance, the 2012 US Model BIT, EUSFTA, and CETA. 
Previously, portfolio investment was not commonly protected by customary international 
law,191 nor was it usually covered in the BITs, because such investment was attended by 
ordinary commercial risks where the investor ought to have been aware of the associated 
risk. Some tribunals have taken into account the evolution of the nature of investment and 
include portfolio investments in the definition of investment.192 
ACIA article 4 has expanded the concept of investment by categorically including 
portfolios under its coverage, both for protection and liberalisation. The ACIA refused to 
adopt a compromised hybrid approach suggested for developing countries, where different 
definitions may be used for different stages of investment: a narrow approach for market 
access and investment liberalisation (pre-establishment) covers only FDI, and a broad 
approach covers a wide range of assets for protection of investment once it is established 
locally (post-establishment).193  
The ACIA definition of investment includes shares, stocks, bonds and debentures 
and any other forms of participation in a juridical person and rights or interest derived 
therefrom. The objective behind reinforcing the definitional provisions of the ACIA is to 
ensure that treaty protection is given to a wide variety of portfolio investment associated 
with ASEAN investment. Encouraging portfolio investment will create “conducive 
investment environment”194 for investors and enhance the freer flow of capital, in line with 
the AEC Blueprint which also aims to strengthen ASEAN capital market development and 
integration. The ACIA also covers disputes arising out of portfolio investments. Before 
this, such investment disputes were not covered under the former investment regime; 
examples are the Malaysia-Singapore Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) dispute in the late 
1990’s195 and the Thailand-Singapore dispute over the purchase of the Shin Corporation in 
2006.196   
                                                 
 
191 The customary international law protected merely physical property of the foreign investor and other 
assets directly invested through principles of diplomatic protection and State responsibility. See Sornarajah, 
M. (2010), The International Law on Foreign Investment, p.8 
192 For example, Siemens v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004, 
para.137. 
193 For the position of developing countries, see Report (2002) of the Working Group on the Relationship 
between Trade and Investment to the General Council, WTO, WT/WGTI/6, 9 December 2002, p.21. For the 
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between Trade and Investment, Report on the Meeting Held on 3-5 July 2002: Note by the Secretariat, 
WT/WGTI/M/18. 
194 ACIA Preamble. 
195 Malaysia imposed capital controls in 1998. It informed foreign investors that they would be unable to 
redeem their local shares for a year. The accounts of investors in Singapore’s CLOB, an offshore market for 
Malaysian shares, were frozen altogether, and their claims declared invalid. For more details, see Narine, S. 
(2002) Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp.165-166; 
Haggard, S. (2000), The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis, Washington, Institute for 
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However, given the example of the financial crisis of the late 1990s, the inclusion 
of portfolio investments by ASEAN Member States is very risky. On the one hand, short-
term speculative capital is potentially destabilising, as it can be easily withdrawn and may 
cause capital volatility in the event of economic turbulence. On the other hand, the 
financial structure and institution of ASEAN Member States are not sufficiently reliable. 
Therefore, while the ACIA guarantees the free transfer of funds, including portfolio 
investments, a balance-of-payment exception clause is set as a safeguard in ACIA article 16.197  
 
3.1.2 Definition of “Covered Investment” 
Even if the definitions of “investment” in the ACIA are broadly defined, only 
investments which comply with the three requirements set forth in article 4(a) are 
“covered” and may benefit from the ACIA privileges.  
“covered investment” means, with respect to a Member State, an investment in 
its territory of an investor of any other Member State in existence as of the date 
of entry into force of this Agreement or established, acquired or expanded 
thereafter, and has been admitted according to its laws, regulations, and 
national policies, and where applicable, specifically approved in writing by the 
competent authority of a Member State;198 [Emphasis added.] 
While the requirements regarding territory, time, and legality of investment, are usually 
found in current IIAs practice, a requirement of approval in writing attaching to legality of 
investment and ACIA Annex 1 are specifically included in response to particular ASEAN 
questions under previous regime. 
 
3.1.2.1 General Requirements 
The ACIA specifies the limits of its application to investment which is made only 
within the territory of the contracting parties and in existence at the date of entry into force 
of the ACIA. Regarding the territorial requirement, neither does the ACIA have a separate 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
International Economics, pp.79-83; Jin, N.K. (2003), “Regional Financial Integration in Southeast Asia”, in 
Freeman, N.J. (ed.), Financing Southeast Asia’s Economic Development, Singapore, ISEAS, pp.287-288. 
196 Singapore State investor Temasek Holdings Pvt Ltd and Surin Upatkoon bought the 96 percent of the ex-
Prime Minister Shinawatra family’s shares in Shin Corp, holding through a vehicle known as Kularb Kaew 
and Cedar Holdings. The change of this portfolio of telecoms investments ownership triggered accusations of 
insider trading and tax evasion under Thai laws. For more details, see Ng, W. (2010), “The Evolution of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds: Singapore’s Temasek Holdings”, Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 
(JFRC), Vol.18, Issue 1, pp.6-14; Lhaopadchan, S. (2010), “The Politics of Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Investment: the Case of Temasek and Shin Corp.”, JFRC, Vol.18, Issue 1, pp.15-22; Goldstein, A., 
Pananond, P. (2008) “Singapore Inc. Goes Shopping Abroad: Profits and Pitfalls”, Journal of Contemporary 
Asia, Vol.38, Issue 3, pp.417-438. 
197 See detailed discussion in Chapter 4.3 Transfers.  
198 ACIA article 4(a). 
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provision of “territory” like in the MAI Agreement,199 nor does the ASEAN Charter 
provide a meaning of this particular term.200 The term “territory” under the ACIA may 
well be understood in accordance with the concept of territory in customary international 
law.201 The territory requirement is primarily to secure benefits brought by foreign 
investments to ASEAN host States and ASEAN people.  
For the temporal requirement, the ACIA applies to any existing investment 
qualified within the scope of application at the date of its entry into force, such investments 
enjoy rights to and benefits from the ACIA protections. However, the “claims arising out 
of events which occurred, or claims which have been raised prior to the entry into force of 
this Agreement”202 are excluded from investor-State arbitration provided by the ACIA, 
because ASEAN Member States desire to preclude investors from forum shopping among 
different legal regimes, and to ensure that disputes arising previous to the ACIA’s 
enforcement are adjudicated in according to the original treaty, under which the investment 
was initially made. 
Lastly, the admission “according to laws, regulations, and national policies” of the 
host States is commonplace in BITs practice. This requirement refers to any law and 
regulation of general application in a particular country at the time of investment. 
Regarding the legality of investment, the ACIA has added a requirement of “approval in 
writing”, “where applicable”, in its text. This requirement is not usually found elsewhere, 
and needs to be clarified regarding its origin and application, in the following section. 
 
3.1.2.2 Specific Requirement: Approval in Writing, Where Applicable 
Approval in writing is an additional requirement of the host States’ screening test 
for the admission of investments, in addition to the “accordance with law” requirement. 
The government screening process is an exercise of State’s discretion to receive desirable 
investments. This exercise reflects a long-cherished principle of sovereignty and non-
interference in domestic affairs enshrined in the “ASEAN Way”. Hence, it is not surprising 
that the ACIA links the admission procedures of foreign investments to domestic laws and 
regulations of ASEAN host countries, and that ASEAN investments may be subject to any 
                                                 
 
199 Under the title “Geographical Scope of Application”, MAI Draft consolidated Text. 
200 The term “territorial” appears in the ASEAN Charter as fundamental principle of “territorial integrity” in 
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form of approval requested by the host State, as it deems proper.203 The legality of 
investment, in particular national approval requirements, is interpreted in relation to the 
determination of the validity of investment, and not the definition of investment. Stated 
differently, while the national laws of ASEAN Member States considerably influence the 
definition of “covered investment”, they will not intervene with the definition of 
“investment” which is already settled under the ACIA. 
The objective of both national law compliance and the admission criteria of 
ASEAN Member States is to screen out the entry of “harmful” foreign investments as 
much as to ensure that foreign investments flowing in the ASEAN Investment Area 
contribute to the host countries’ development scheme. This, in turn, requires ASEAN 
Member States’ good faith and transparency by setting clear domestic laws and regulations 
on ASEAN investments. Hence, Annex 1 on “Approval in Writing” is established to 
balance with the State’s regulatory power to set specific admission rules. 
Annex 1 establishes rules of application, notification, reasoning of the denial of 
approval, opportunity of submitting a new application, and connection via respective 
national institutions. Foreign investors are presumed to have complied with local law 
requirements and their investments must be legally constituted or assume a certain legal 
form under the laws of host State. Moreover, the host State may require an ASEAN 
investor to satisfy special formalities and to provide information for informational or 
statistical purposes, notwithstanding national treatment or most-favoured-nation treatment 
standards.204   
This requirement of approval in writing is not universal in the IIAs practice. The 
ACIA goes beyond the general rule for a foreign investment to enjoy treaty protection. The 
ACIA may cover only investments which have been specifically approved in writing by 
the competent authority of a Member State. An ASEAN host State may deprive an 
investment of its protection, where the investment project has been declined by the host 
State’s authority, as if such investment has never been constituted a “covered investment”. 
                                                 
 
203 For example, pursuant to the regulation MFA/0704/1/2546, investments admitted in accordance with 
relevant laws and regulations have to be “specifically approved in writing” to enjoy treaty protection, known 
as the Certificate of Approval for Protection (CAP). Investments admitted under Foreign Business Act B.E. 
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and Protection of Investments between the Government of the Kingdom of Thai1land and Foreign 
Governments. http://www.mfa.go.th/business/contents/files/cooperation-20120412-163557-790680.pdf (Last 
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The insertion of a particular phrase “where applicable” in ACIA article 4(a) is the 
correction of the difficult application of the specific approval in writing, previously 
required in the IGA. IGA article II covered only investments “which are specifically 
approved in writing and registered by the host country”.205 The IGA was rigid, requiring 
evidence of both approval in writing and national registration. However, in the 1990s, apart 
from Singapore, none of the ASEAN Member States had a specific approval procedure. 
“There is also nothing in the practice of the ASEAN States Parties to the Agreement that 
might substantiate such an additional requirement”.206 The question was raised whether an 
investment would be protected, in the absence of specific procedure.  
In the Yaung Chi Oo (YCO) v. Myanmar case,207 the tribunal recognised that “the 
conditions for a direct foreign investment to receive the more favourable protection 
envisaged in Article VI(1) of the 1987 ASEAN Agreement include specific approval in 
writing and registration for the purposes of the Agreement.” Myanmar refused to give 
protection to YCO. It argued that article VI(1) required approval specifically “for the 
purposes of this Agreement”, but “at no stage did the Claimant seek or receive approval of 
its investment for the purposes of the 1987 Agreement”.208 Besides, the Agreement does 
not oblige Myanmar to set up such a special procedure.209 
Nonetheless, the tribunal rejected the argument of the Myanmar authority and 
found that lawful investments in a host State would be treated as “approved” unless that 
host State published specific prerequisites. In effect, they must have been “specifically 
approved in writing and registered by the host country and upon such conditions as it 
deems fit for purposes of this Agreement subsequent to its entry into force.”210 “In the 
Tribunal’s view, if a State Party to the 1987 ASEAN Agreement unequivocally and 
without reservation approves in writing a foreign investment proposal under its internal 
law, that investment must be taken to be registered and approved also for the purposes of 
the Agreement”.211 
The ASEAN Member States takes account of the YCO tribunal’s reasoning, and 
adds the phase “where applicable” in the ACIA. Where there is a specific requirement to 
have an approval in writing for any particular sub-sector of investment or in any particular 
                                                 
 
205 IGA article II Applicability or Scope 
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Award, 31 March 2003, para.54. 
207 Yaung Chi Oo v. Myanmar (2003). 
208 Idem, para.55. 
209 Idem, para.55. 
210 Idem, para.22. 
211 Idem, para.59. 
67 
 
 
zone, the investment must possess such approval in order to be covered under the ACIA.  
In contrast, investors are ensured that where a host State does not specifically require 
approval in writing, a normal lawful investment is, as a general rule, covered.  
Approval in writing can be evidence of a State’s acknowledgement of a particular 
investment. It increases not only legal certainty for investors, but also can be a sign to 
determine a State’s consent to arbitration. In other words, approval in writing may make it 
easier for a tribunal to determine its jurisdiction. The first task of the tribunal is to check if 
there is an approval in writing requirement, and if that investment has retained such 
proof.212 Otherwise, the tribunal may need to further consider whether the investment had 
actually been made according to the other requirements, discussed supra. 
The ACIA requires legality of investment for the admission phase, whereas it does 
not require the same in the post-establishment phase. It is then doubtful whether an 
investment which has breached laws after its admission is still regarded as a qualified 
investment and may be protected under the ACIA. Some scholars and tribunals posit that 
the legality may be used to deprive the investor of its treaty protection for serious 
violations of host country law during the life of an investment.213 Even though the ACIA 
does not spell out the legality requirement of investment in the post-establishment phase, 
an admitted investment “in operation” must remain “lawful” at all times. Otherwise, it 
would be unreasonable to grant protection to an investment which had pretended to comply 
with the host State’s rules at the admission stage and would break them afterward. The 
ACIA allows an ASEAN host State to decide this question, as: ACIA article 19(2) 
provides for the States denying the ACIA’s benefits to the investors, “where it establishes 
that such investor has made an investment in breach of the domestic laws of the denying 
Member State by misrepresenting its ownership in those areas of investment which are 
reserved for natural or juridical persons of the denying Member State”.214  
  
                                                 
 
212 See Grueslin v. Malaysia, Award 27 Nov 2000, ICSID Case No.ARB/99/3, para.17. 
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Stämpfli, Manz) (2010), pp.307-335. 
214 See a discussion of other situations where the denial-of-benefits clauses may apply in section 3.2.2.2. 
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Section 3.2 Investor 
Investing in ASEAN depends not only on the definition of “covered investment”, 
but also the definition of “investor”. The definition of the term “investor” is critical to 
determine the scope of the ACIA. Pursuant to ACIA article 4(d), “investor” means a 
natural person of a Member State or a juridical person of a Member State that is making, or 
has made an investment in the territory of any other Member State”. 
The ACIA approach regarding investors is very unusual for BITs in general, 
because it is particularly designed in the expectation of investments from both ASEAN and 
non-ASEAN sources. The ACIA desires to encourage investors to invest in a newly open 
single market and production base under the coming AEC. Due to its particular definition 
of “investor”, ASEAN Member States may envisage subjecting themselves to international 
arbitration with ASEAN and non-ASEAN investors. This selection of investors is 
fundamental to the structure and strength of the ASEAN investment regime. 
 
3.2.1 Natural Investor 
The ACIA provides two alternative criteria for ASEAN natural investors. 
According to ACIA article 4(g), “natural person” means any natural person possessing the 
nationality or citizenship of, or right of permanent residence in the Member State in 
accordance with its laws, regulations and national policies”. 
 
3.2.1.1 General Criterion: Nationality or Citizenship  
Nationality or citizenship is the first criterion used in the ACIA which is commonly 
found in BITs. In accordance with general international law, it has been firmly established 
that the nationality of investor as a natural person is determined by the national law of the 
State whose nationality is claimed, 214F215 and in this case, ASEAN Member States’ domestic 
laws. 
 
3.2.1.2 Alternative Criterion: Right of Permanent Residence 
The second alternative is the right of permanent residence in a Member State, 
which refer to laws, regulations and national policies of a relevant ASEAN host State. This 
criterion is not usually found in BITs, rather it is notably found in multilateral 
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agreements.216 The right of permanent residence may be used as additional requirement to 
nationality or citizenship.217 The ACIA provides for right of permanent residence as an 
alternative criterion, similar to the ECT,218 the Protocol of Colonia of MERCOSUR,219 and 
some BITs of countries with a high rate of immigration.220  
The practice to extend protection to investors with a right of permanent residence 
has a far-reaching effect in a sense that non-ASEAN investors may be treated as national 
investors through this channel. Legitimising permanent residence in this respect creates a 
more favourable investment climate, and may effectively attract the influx of extra-
ASEAN investment, which corresponds to the objective of deeper integration of the AEC. 
At the time of conclusion of the ACIA, ASEAN Member States were still discussing a 
mutually agreed solution on the treatment of “permanent residents” of a Member State as 
investors. ASEAN Member States have used several temporary solutions regarding the 
issue of permanent residence. Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, and 
Viet Nam reserve obligations which would otherwise apply to, or be claimed upon, any 
natural person possessing the right of permanent residence in a Member State as investor 
under the ACIA.221 In the case of Brunei where the investor is a Brunei “permanent 
resident” and also non-national of any country, the other Member States concerned may 
mutually agree to enter into bilateral consultations, on a case-by-case and non-prejudicial 
basis, on the issue of whether to recognise the status of such a natural person as an investor 
of Brunei. For the issue of permanent residence, ASEAN Member States may deliberate on 
enactment or amendment of an immigration act in order to include permanent residence; 
for example, by formation of a scrutiny supervisory committee for the residence grant. 
 
3.2.2 Juridical Person 
The matters of nationality of juridical persons are more complicated than 
nationality of natural persons, because today companies operate their business in a way 
which sometimes makes it very difficult to determine their nationality.222 It is quite 
                                                 
 
216 UNCTAD (2011), Scope and Definition, p.74-75. 
217 See e.g.1976 Germany-Israel BIT, article 1(3)(b). 
218 ECT article 1(7)(a)(i). 
219 MERCOSUR article 2(a)2(a). 
220 See e.g.1995 Argentina-Australia BIT, article 1(c). 
221 Headnote to the Schedule to the ACIA (Reservation list).  
http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/item/asean-compehensive-investment-
agreement-reservation-list (Last accessed:18 August 2015) 
222 See generally on nationality of the legal person in Barcelona Traction Judgment, ICJ, Report 1970, p.3.  
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70 
 
 
common that a company is established under the laws of ASEAN country A, has its centre 
of control in ASEAN country B, and does its main business in ASEAN country C. 
Generally, the ACIA defines specific objective criteria for a legal person to be an ASEAN 
national, rather than to simply rely on the term “nationality” pursuant to customary 
international law, as previously described the practice of defining natural persons. ACIA 
article 4(e) provides that: 
“juridical person” means any legal entity duly constituted or otherwise 
organised under the applicable law of a Member State, whether for profit or 
otherwise, and whether privately-owned or governmentally-owned, including 
any enterprise, corporation, trust, partnership, joint venture, sole proprietorship, 
association, or organisation” 
The ACIA has a broad approach to ASEAN investors, in accordance with a broader 
objective of investment integration. It provides for several alternative tests to determine the 
ASEAN nationality of investors. However, the ACIA specifically allows ASEAN Member 
States to deny ACIA protection to ASEAN investors on several grounds pursuant to ACIA 
article 19. 
3.2.2.1 General Test: Alternative Formal Tests for ASEAN Nationality 
According to the definition, the ACIA recognises place of constitution or 
incorporation as two alternative criteria to determine a juridical person’s nationality.223 
First, the “place of constitution” test provides that a juridical person constituted in 
accordance with the laws of a Member State will be considered an investor of that State.224 
Second, the “place of incorporation” or “registered office” test requires that a juridical 
person must be organised under the applicable law of a Member State.225 
The ACIA follows the traditional “Barcelona Traction” approach, by applying only 
“formal” tests and ignoring the “corporate veil” doctrine.226 The advantage of using the 
country-of-constitution or country-of-organisation test is ease of application, because it is 
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unlikely to doubt on the country under whose law a company is constituted or organised.227 
Hence, the ACIA accepts that the relationship between direct investor and its direct 
investment enterprises to the management structures can be remote. It declines to 
incorporate the two additional tests that have been recognised in the previous IGA/AIA 
regime: the “place of effective management”228 and the “effective ASEAN equity” tests.229 
These approaches are considered too restrictive for the current open-door policy.  
 
3.2.2.2 Specific Test: Substantial Business Operations Test in Denial of 
Benefit Clauses 
Compared to the previous regime, the ACIA has broader definition of investors, as 
it has lightened the qualification of investors, by not requiring an effective management of 
investment and an effective ASEAN equity. The ACIA seeks to attract foreign investment 
regardless of its origin, since ASEAN Member States are convinced that it would make 
economically little sense to discriminate between investors of different foreign 
nationalities. As mentioned in Chapter 2, ASEAN Member States have relied on extra-
ASEAN foreign investment flows. Consequently, the ACIA definition of investor possibly 
extends the ACIA benefits to the assets owned by investors of non-ACIA parties which are 
based in the ASEAN Member States’ territory, thereinafter “foreign-owned ASEAN-
based” (FOAB) investment. 
                                                 
 
227 UNCTAD (2011), Scope and Application, p.82. 
228 IGA article I(2) provides that a “company” shall not only be incorporated or constituted under the laws in 
force in the territory of any Contracting Party, but also it shall have the place of effective management in that 
State. This requirement had been scrutinised in Yaung Chi Oo v. Myanmar. The fact that the claimant’s 
management spent considerable time in Myanmar attending to its investment prompted Myanmar to claim 
that the claimant’s place of “effective management” had shifted to Myanmar. But the tribunal finally held 
that the claimant was a company of a contracting State other than Myanmar. Unless some indication of 
improper protection shopping exists, the company would be a company of the State of incorporation when 
the legal requirements of that State on this issue are satisfied and there are some other indicia of management 
in that state. The requirements were then satisfied: i) the claimant had a resident director in Singapore; and ii) 
the claimant also conducted certain business activities from Singapore. The nationality of the company’s 
shareholders was irrelevant, as was the source of the capital. The definition of “investment” in the 1987 
Agreement focuses on local incorporation and effective management, and pays no regard to the ultimate 
source of the funds used. See Yaung Chi Oo v. Myanmar, ICSID AFR Case No.ARB/01/1, 31 March 2003, 
42 ILM 540 (2003), paras.49, 62, 82. 
229 AIA Article 1, “ASEAN investor” means:  
(i) a national of a Member State; or  
(ii) any juridical person of a Member State, making an investment in another Member State, the effective 
ASEAN equity of which taken cumulatively with all other ASEAN equities fulfills at least the minimum 
percentage required to meet the national equity requirement and other equity requirements of domestic laws 
and published national policies, if any, of the host country in respect of that investment. 
“Effective ASEAN equity” in respect of an investment in an ASEAN Member State means ultimate holdings 
by nationals or juridical persons of ASEAN Member States in that investment. Where the 
shareholding/equity structure of an ASEAN investor makes it difficult to establish the ultimate holding 
structure, the rules and procedures for determining effective equity used by the Member State in which the 
ASEAN investor is investing may be applied. If necessary, the Co-ordinating Committee on Investment shall 
prepare guidelines for this purpose. 
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Under the formal tests mentioned above, a company may take benefits from the 
ACIA without genuinely enriching the ASEAN Investment Area. Investors may try to 
build their legal structure in their favour and generates the risk of “treaty shopping” which 
may result in “forum shopping”. In response, the ACIA offsets the minimum formal tests 
by granting ASEAN Member States power to deny, and to avoid claims from certain 
entities to which they did not intend to offer the ACIA’s protection.  
The ACIA has created a mechanism of denial of benefits.230 Pursuant to ACIA 
article 19(a) and (b), an ASEAN Member State may deny the benefits of the ACIA 
affording to an otherwise qualifying juridical person, where an investor of a non-Member 
State and of a home State “owns”231 or “controls”232 the juridical person in question and 
that person has “no substantive business operations (SBO) in the territory”233 where it is 
firstly established. This signifies that a company, which has substantial business operation 
in the host State, even if owned or controlled by a national of the denying Member State or 
by a foreigner, may benefit from the ACIA protection. For illustration, Thailand cannot 
deny benefits under the ACIA to a Malay automobile company investing in Thailand, even 
though the majority of shareholders are Thai nationals. It is explicit that the investment 
source, either ASEAN or foreign, does not matter, as long as such investment flows 
through a non-national company with real business operations.  
This mechanism is powerful in a sense that it can rebut the qualification of investor 
and investment according to the criteria, discussed supra. However, this test does not aim 
to determine if a juridical person is an ACIA investor like the formal tests in the admission 
phase. Rather, it will be used only in the post-establishment phase where States respond to 
investors without SBO. This signifies that State may not deny benefits to juridical investors 
if the State deems proper to allow such juridical person to invest in its territory. Logically, 
it follows that the right to deny is required to be exercised through positive action taken by 
                                                 
 
230 The denial of benefits clause has been found in several investment agreements, e.g. ECT article 17, Draft 
MAI article 12 Final Provisions, NAFTA article 1113, US Model BIT article 17, Canada FIPA article 18, in 
the BITs concluded by ASEAN Member States and other contracting parties contain similar language with 
some variation. See Mistelis, L.A., Baltag, C.M., (2009), “Denial of Benefits and Article 17 of the Energy 
Charter Treaty”, Penn State Law Review, Vol. 113, Issue 4, pp.1301-1321; UNCTAD (2011), Scope and 
Definition, pp.92-98; OECD (2008), International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking 
Innovations, pp.28-33. 
231 ACIA article 19(3)(a) “Owned” by an investor in accordance with the laws, regulations and national 
policies of each Member States. 
232 ACIA article 19(3)(b) “Controlled” by an investor if the investor has the power to name a majority of its 
directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions. 
233 ACIA article 19(a) and (b). 
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the relevant ASEAN host state, because “the existence of a ‘right’ is distinct from the 
exercise of that right”.234  
The ACIA does not provide specific recourse for the question of substantial 
business operations, whereas some treaties have provided for recourse to prior notification 
and prior consultations to seek a mutually satisfactory resolution to the matter.235 However, 
investor-State may use the consultation procedures available under ACIA article 31, which 
are a fortiori obligatory in the event where an investment dispute has occurred. The ACIA 
leaves the formality to the denying State to decide. For instance, a State may deny 
investors by a general declaration in an official gazette, a statutory provision in investment 
or other laws, or even an exchange of letters with a particular investor or class of investors. 
The burden of proof to establish the lack of SBO may fall with the ASEAN State 
authorities, because not only they are the ones who invoke the right to deny, they also have 
had in the first place the right to request supporting documents from the investors for the 
approval of investments. 
The question of what constitutes “substantial business operations” remains 
worrisome. Due to the lack of a clear legal definition, it is possible that a State may abuse 
its power by denying benefits to a decent investor, or contrarily, an investor may take 
profit of the ACIA without contribution to the States. Despite the diversity of the business 
nature of individual enterprises, a concept of “centre of economic interest”, akin to the 
concept of rules of origin, or performance requirement, may be of interest.236 A Working 
Group on “substantive business operation” has been assigned to settle the issue.237  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
234 Plama v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Awarded 27 Aug 2008, paras.155-165.  
235 See e.g. NAFTA article 1113. 
236 Fink, C., Nikomborirak, D. (2007), Rules of Origin in Services: A Case Study of Five ASEAN Countries, 
World Bank Policy Research, WP 4130. 
237 The Working Group may try to give a list of reference, such as business operations; volume/ intensity/ 
percentage of business operations; capital investment; number of employees; information on customer/ 
clients; minimum duration of establishment of the company at the time of loan application; business or 
correspondence address; information/ assessment by relevant financial and professional institutions, payment 
of local profit taxes, owning or renting of premises, etc. 
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Conclusion to Part II 
The definitions of “investment” and “investor” are the most important elements in 
the ACIA, as they determine the beneficiaries of the ACIA. ASEAN drafters have tried 
hard to balance the goal of protection and achievement of liberalisation in the ASEAN 
Investment Area through these terms. The ACIA has adopted a broad asset-based 
definition of investment, with specifying substantive investment characteristics as well as 
investment forms.  
The term “investment” covers not only direct investment but also it takes into 
account the contemporary economic evolution, and expressly includes portfolio 
investments. Given the fact that portfolio investments have not been customarily protected 
under BITs, combined with the fact that most of ASEAN Member States are developing 
countries who have suffered from the Asian Economic Crisis, it is quite astonishing that 
the ACIA adopts such a liberal and ambitious approach. The ACIA has become bold and 
innovative among existing IIAs.  
Nevertheless, the liberal definitions of investments under the ACIA are subject to 
the specific requirements. In order to be “covered” under the ACIA, an “investment” must 
be an existing or future investment in an ASEAN Member State’ territory which is 
admitted in accordance with national laws, as well as specifically approved in writing, 
when national laws so demand. In this regard, ASEAN Member States retain the power to 
issue the eligibility criteria in order to regulate the admission and operation of investments. 
This, in turn, improves the transparency for both States and investors as to who are entitled 
to the ACIA privileges.  
By the same token, the ACIA has opted for a broad and liberal definition of 
ASEAN investors. It includes a natural person who holds an ASEAN State’s nationality or 
a right of permanent residence, and requires only a formal test to attribute the nationality of 
juridical person. It also gives the green light to non-ASEAN entities to invest and expand 
their business through an ASEAN-based company. This stratagem is provocative in a way 
that it simultaneously stimulates deeper and more rapid liberalisation of the intra-ASEAN 
market and broader extra-ASEAN investment flows, regardless of its provenance. Owing 
to the FOAB construction, the ACIA has responded to the “ASEAN Open Regionalism”, 
and become an ASEAN “shortcut” to the World.  
While this definition of investor conveys a risk of “ACIA shopping”, the ACIA has 
created a defensive mechanism to circumvent unfortunate scenario, e.g. a denial of benefits 
mechanism by which an ASEAN host State may deny benefits to a foreign-owned or a 
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national-owned ASEAN based entity which has no “substantive business operations” in the 
territory of the denying State.  
In conclusion, while many improvements have been made, the ACIA suffers from 
some drawbacks. A positive is that definitional provisions of the ACIA and procedures for 
obtaining specific approval in writing are written in a more detailed manner, which means 
more legal certainty and transparency for States and investors. However, while the classic 
definitions and their relevant application and interpretation have conventionally been 
firmly set, most of the new additional elements still lack application in real cases and 
remain weak, e.g. portfolio investment, right of permanent residence, and substantive 
business operations. Also, the very broad definition of investment under the ACIA, 
altogether with several unsettled issues, may lead to multiple claims by investors. These 
shortcomings have greater impact as they concern not only protection but also 
liberalisation. ASEAN Member States must sincerely implement the ACIA in order that its 
objectives can be finally realised.   
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Part III Core Protection Standards 
Following Chapter 3 on definitions of investment and investors which provides the 
scope of application of the ACIA in Part II, Part III focuses on the key standards 
constituting the body of the ASEAN investment protection regime. These standards are 
divided into substantive and procedural standards. Under the ACIA, ASEAN Member 
States must accord ASEAN investors substantive standards of protection. The ACIA also 
provides dispute settlement mechanisms (DSM) which allow ASEAN investors to enforce 
these standards. 
BITs from the 1980s usually have had simple and short provisions of both 
substantive and procedural standards, leading to extensive, inconsistent and uncertain 
interpretation and application by arbitral tribunals. In response, IIAs in the 2000s include 
more detail in order to clarify the content of protective standards. This detailed approach 
allows States to have more control over the use of the IIAs. Currently, mega-regional IIAs 
negotiations address several key issues of investment protections, including investor-State 
dispute settlement (ISDS). The main concern is how to balance the interests of investors 
and of States: how to create an investment-friendly environment while preserving policy 
space for States to exercise their sovereign power for public interests?  
Striking this balance is most important in the ASEAN context. As most ASEAN 
Member States are developing countries, they need foreign investments for their 
development. However, these countries may not wish to accept harmful foreign 
investments just for the sake of economic growth, as they had done in past decades. For the 
promotion of the new era of the intra-ASEAN investment, ASEAN Member States realise 
that the ACIA should be perceived as an instrument to achieve a greater objective, i.e. the 
sustainable development of ASEAN Member States under the auspices of the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC). Therefore, it is important to ascertain that, while 
encouraging regional investment flows, ASEAN Member States retain their policy space to 
regulate matters of public interests, such as environment, labours, or health. 
During the last decade, when the debate of the IIAs practice regarding regulatory 
power of States was not as intense as it is currently, ASEAN Member States were already 
clear about the balance of interests that they were attempting to strike. To understand the 
actual ACIA balance, a comprehensive reading of both substantive and procedural 
standards is required.  
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Generally, the standard provisions discussed in Part III follow the global trend of 
this current detailed approach. Nevertheless, the ACIA has specific features due to the 
ASEAN-specific context. Some of its interpretations of protection standards may be 
considered original and innovative solutions to solve the issue of balance of interests. Part 
III of this thesis scrutinises the elements of the ACIA standards in a view to understand the 
choices made by ASEAN Member States. These choices altogether frame the “ASEAN 
Way” of investment protection under the ACIA.  
Accordingly, chapters 4, 5 and 6 are organised into two parts: first, the IIAs general 
practice, second, the ASEAN-specific features. Chapters 4 and 5 address substantive 
standards: absolute and relative standards, respectively. An “absolute” or “non-contingent” 
standard of treatment is one by which the treatment is precisely determined in the treaty,  
by reference to given circumstances of application, as opposed to “relative” standards 
which define the required treatment by reference to that accorded to other investments.238  
Chapter 4 discusses the tension which makes the ACIA a battle ground of the 
economic interests of ASEAN investors and the public interests of ASEAN host States. 
This chapter attempts to strike the right balance between ASEAN investment protection 
and the preservation of the freedom of ASEAN host States regarding their legitimate 
actions. Three substantive standards are selected to illustrate the “ASEAN Way” of 
investment protection. First, the ACIA addresses the debate of indirect expropriation and 
regulatory measures, mainly in the expropriation and compensation provision. Second, the 
ACIA has an unusual approach to the fair and equitable treatment (FET). Third, while 
guaranteeing investors’ right to transfers, the ACIA expressly allows ASEAN host States 
to control transfers in extraordinary circumstances. Given the “ASEAN Way”, it is not 
surprising that the ASEAN Member States prefer to retain some legitimate control over 
investment regulations by a narrower than usual interpretation of the content of the 
standards. 
Chapter 5 deals with ACIA relative rights. They closely connect to and affect the 
content of absolute rights. This effect is far-reaching in terms of intra- and extra-ASEAN 
investment integration. This chapter examines the development of the ASEAN approach 
regarding two important standards of non-discrimination, namely most-favoured nations 
and national treatments. Lastly, chapter 6 treats procedural standards or dispute settlement 
mechanisms under the ACIA. 
 
                                                 
 
238 UNCTAD (1998), BITs in the Mid 1990s, UN Publication. 
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These ACIA standards are examined as to their scope and content through the lens 
of international practices, both treaty practices and arbitration practices, in order to see 
how far the ACIA shares common elements with other contemporary IIAs. The findings in 
Part III lead to a discovery of the “ASEANised” elements or specialities of the ACIA in an 
ASEAN-specific context. Part III demonstrates that the ACIA standards are unique but 
interconnected in a sense that their comprehensive reading eventually allows an answer to 
the question of whether the ACIA is landmarked as an ASEAN practice of investment 
protection by better balancing the legitimate interests of all stakeholders.  
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Chapter 4. Absolute Rights 
In an ASEAN-specific context, the first question is whether the ACIA guarantee 
investors’ absolute rights as the other IIAs. If the answer is positive, the next question is to 
what extent the ACIA follows the conventional line. In case that the ACIA are different 
from the others, why is it so? The following discussion infers that the articulation of 
investment protection rules in the ACIA is inevitably underlined by a consciousness of the 
importance of preserving regulatory powers. The negotiation process attested the delicate 
attempt to strike a balance between these two objectives. 
Generally compared to old-fashioned BITs, the ACIA’s provisions are modernised 
and becomes clearer, which enables the Member States to identify the boundaries of their 
obligations and to provide a more realistic level of protection to investors. While the ACIA 
maintains all investor’s rights existing previously in the IGA/AIA regime, it gives more 
indications and inserts more channels where State can exercise its regulatory rights, not 
only in exceptional circumstances but also in normal circumstances. 
In the light of the current jurisprudence and recent treaty practice, the ultimate 
question is to test whether the ACIA approach conceptualises the phenomenon of a 
paradigm shift from a conventional pro-investor paradigm towards a more “regulatory 
State paradigm”.238F239 However, it is cautioned that this particular balance possibly makes the 
ACIA less attractive in the investors’ eyes. It remains to be answered whether decent 
investors prefer more concrete legal certainty that the ACIA offers in the exchange of their 
seem-to-be more protective but abstract rights existing in the common BITs.    
In this chapter, three particularly important standards are chosen to be scrutinised. 
Section 4.1 deals with the expropriation provisions which embed the most obvious power-
struggling issues. The standard is particularly detailed in ACIA article 14 and Annex 2 on 
expropriation and compensation. In addition, the expropriation discussion covers also the 
analysis on legitimate expectation of legal stability, generally debatable under the FET 
issue. Section 4.2 addresses the ACIA FET provision. The FET is remarkably useful for a 
denial of justice of in judicial and administrative proceedings. This FET approach 
composes the ASEAN-specific elements which are not commonly found elsewhere. 
Section 4.3 continues to address the transfer of fund standard. It specifically tackles 
ACIA economic exceptions. Where every investment treaty has general exceptions and 
security exceptions provisions to disable investment rights under extraordinary 
                                                 
 
239 K. Yeung (2010), “The Regulatory State”, in Baldwin, R., Cave, M., Lodge, M., The Oxford Handbook of 
Regulation, Oxford, OUP, pp.64-85. 
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circumstances, the ACIA contains distinctive exceptions under financial crisis, particularly 
regarding the balance-of-payments. This specific clause originated from the ASEAN 
economic crisis at the end of the last century, and therefore merits particular attention.  
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Section 4.1 Expropriation and Compensation 
The protection of ASEAN investors from unlawful expropriation has traditionally 
been the main guarantee in the ASEAN investment treaties.240 ACIA article 14 enshrines 
one of the most important absolute rights, namely compensation for expropriation. The 
main issue is the balance between the protection of private property rights of ASEAN 
investors and the legitimate exercise of sovereign power of the ASEAN Member States. 
The ACIA recognises that an ASEAN Member State has the sovereign right to expropriate 
ASEAN investments situated within its territory, subject to conditions. Article 14(1) states 
that expropriation is lawful provided that the State fulfils the following criteria.  
A Member State shall not expropriate or nationalise a covered investment 
either directly or through measures equivalent to expropriation or 
nationalisation (“expropriation”), except: 
(a) for a public purpose 
(b) in a non-discriminatory manner; 
(c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; and 
(d) in accordance with due process of law. 
 
The ACIA recognises both direct and indirect expropriation. Direct expropriation is 
easy to determine. It is an open, deliberate and unequivocal intent, as reflected in a formal 
law or decree or physical act, to deprive the owner of his or her property through the 
transfer of legal title or outright seizure of the investment of the ASEAN foreign 
investors.241 The expropriatory measures must be for a public purpose, in a non-
discriminatory manner, and in accordance with due process of law. Furthermore, the 
compensation is immediately due to an investor who is directly expropriated.242 At present, 
issues regarding direct expropriation or nationalisation are relatively rare.  
Since the late 1990s, indirect expropriation has become one of the most important 
issues in international investment law. Concern has rather been raised over the significant 
number of indirect forms of expropriation, or “measures tantamount” or “having an 
equivalent effect to” expropriation. Due to the lack of definition of indirect expropriation 
in investment treaties, determination of indirect expropriation is very difficult. Tribunals 
are required to improvise their own criteria and definitions, which differ from one to 
                                                 
 
240 See, generally on expropriations, Lowe, V. (2004), “Regulation or expropriation”, Transnational Dispute 
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M. (2010), The International Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd  ed., Cambridge , CUP; Newcombe, A. (2005), 
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another.243 In general, indirect expropriation could occur even without formal transfer of 
title or outright seizure, yet may have an effect equivalent to direct expropriation. In other 
words, short of an actual taking, such measures may “result in the effective loss of 
management, use or control, or a significant depreciation of the value of the assets of a 
foreign investor”.244 
The concept of indirect expropriation is much broader than that of direct 
expropriation because those property rights may have been expropriated even though the 
State in question has not purported to expropriate.245 The determination of indirect 
expropriation is complicated by the fact that it can result from a “series of related 
actions”.246 In contrast to direct expropriation which usually results from a single act of 
deprivation of a property right, indirect expropriation is rather found on the basis of the 
accumulation of acts or omissions. This term includes expropriation formed “over a period 
of time”.247 In practice, the term is variously called “de facto”, “consequential”, 
“creeping”248 or “constructive” expropriations.249  
Despite the non-conformity of the terminology, the term “may be defined as the 
slow and incremental encroachment on one or more of the ownership rights of a foreign 
investor ... The legal title to the property remains vested in the foreign investor but the 
investor’s rights of use of the property are diminished as a result of the interference by the 
State”.250 Several individual actions or omissions of a State, analysed in isolation seem 
“innocuous vis-à-vis a potential expropriation”.251 Only being retrospectively overviewed, 
would those acts constituent part of an expropriation of an ASEAN investor’s property 
rights.252  
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Newer and more difficult legal issues occur regarding “regulatory takings”, 
especially where ASEAN Member States need more space to regulate foreign investments 
in the ASEAN investment Area, “for exercising the police powers of a State or otherwise 
arise from State measures like those pertaining to the regulation of the environment, health, 
morals, culture or economy of a host country”.253 While tribunals have long explored 
differing approaches, this section considers the two main theories that have been proposed 
to resolve these issues the sole effects doctrine and the police powers doctrine. It seeks to 
situate the ACIA amidst the investment treaty practices. 
The adoption of a broad approach of indirect expropriation may cover all measures 
taken by authorities that have an adverse effect on the total value of a private foreign 
investment, irrespective of any other consideration.254 This exclusive approach, considered 
pro-investor, is known as the “sole effects” doctrine.255 Apparently, if a tribunal considers 
regulatory measures amount to indirect expropriation, the State must compensate the 
expropriated investors.  
As a result, the sovereign power and policy space of the host States are restricted by 
the broad interpretation of the treaty obligation. This may happen in the case where a 
tribunal interprets undefined indirect expropriation under the IGA. Under the IGA or other 
traditional BITs, it is possible that States develop “extremely timid behaviour when 
adopting measures to implement human rights,” which may lead them “to subordinate 
collective choices in the general interest to the rights of private foreign investors”.256 
In fact, it is sometimes inevitable that, in pursuing public interest objectives such as 
public health, environment and labour protection, States’ measures may have some adverse 
impact on the existence or profitability of ASEAN investments. It would be unreasonable 
if a State needed to compensate an investor for the fulfilment of its sovereign duties.  
In this regard, the overwhelming majority of doctrinal opinions257 and international texts258 
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recognise that States possess the power to regulate and therefore all their laws and 
regulations are presumed valid.259  
Tribunals have increasingly understood the need of States to maintain regulatory 
space. Hence, in lieu of accepting the exclusive criteria of the injurious effect, they have 
referred these public-purpose regulations to the “police power” doctrine,260 according to 
which a legitimate objective would justify these measures. In order to determine whether 
an action or series of actions by a State constitutes an indirect expropriation, an arbitral 
tribunal shall not totally disregard the intention and purposes of national legislators and 
count only the effect of such measures. According to the narrow approach, not every State 
regulation, harmful to investments, constitutes indirect expropriation; therefore, 
compensation is not always due. This approach provides States more regulatory space. 
In contrast to the majority of 1990s BITs, the ACIA follows the narrow approach 
and gives more details to help tribunals define the threshold of indirect expropriation.  
On top of the common provision found under article 14(1), Annex 2 is added to the ACIA. 
Annex 2 is based on the NAFTA model. It clarifies the concepts of direct and indirect 
expropriations, determines the types of investment at stake and gives indicators of indirect 
expropriation:  
1. An action or a series of related actions by a Member State cannot constitute 
an expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or intangible property right 
or property interest in a covered investment. 
2. Article 14(1) addresses two situations:  
(a) the first situation is where an investment is nationalised or otherwise 
directly expropriated through formal transfer of title or outright seizure; and 
(b) the second situation is where an action or series of related actions by a 
Member State has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation without formal 
transfer of title or outright seizure. 
 
 
3. The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Member 
State, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an expropriation of the type 
referred to in sub-paragraph 2(b),  requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry 
that considers, among other factors: 
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(a) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an 
action or series of actions by a Member State has an adverse effect on the 
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that such 
an expropriation has occurred; 
(b) whether the government action breaches the government’s prior binding 
written commitment to the investor whether by contract, licence or other legal 
document; and   
(c) the character of the government action, including, its objective and 
whether the action is disproportionate to  the public purpose referred to in 
Article 14(1).  
4. Non-discriminatory measures of a Member State that are designed and 
applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, 
safety and the environment, do not constitute an expropriation of the type 
referred to in sub-paragraph 2(b). 
 
From the text, the ACIA explicitly rejects the “sole effects” doctrine. It asserts that 
the requirement of legal stability is not absolute and cannot affect an ASEAN Member 
State’s right to exercise sovereign power to legislate and adapt its legal system to changing 
circumstances; customary international law commonly accepts that this right is within the 
police power of States.261 Even though these regulatory measures may lead to effects 
similar to indirect expropriation, they are not categorised as expropriation and do not give 
rise to the obligation to compensate ASEAN investors who are allegedly affected by such 
measures.  
Having based its model on NAFTA and the US Model BIT, the ACIA provisions 
are very detailed. It reaffirms the right to regulate and attempts to increase predictability 
for the determination of indirect expropriation. In doing so, the ACIA has used three 
techniques: (1) exception provisions, (2) an explanatory annex, and (3) exclusion of some 
measures out of the scope of ACIA article 14. It is worth noting that the ACIA is one 
among a relatively small number of investment treaties which have combined all three 
techniques. Compared to NAFTA model, the ACIA provisions are even more innovative 
and effective. The ACIA proposes specific details which give tribunals more concrete 
guidelines, concretise the concept of the ASEAN investor’s expectations, and relieve 
ASEAN Member States from the fear of broad regional obligations.  
Section 4.1.1 examines aspects of the ACIA approach that are similar to 
expropriation provisions of other agreements, i.e. scope of article 14, types of 
expropriation, and conditions of a lawful expropriation. Subsequently, section 4.1.2 tracks 
specifically the ASEAN-specific techniques used for the determination of indirect 
expropriation proposed by the ACIA. This chapter investigates how the “ASEAN Way” of 
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investment protection approaches the question of the balance between the investors’ and 
States’ rights and obligations regarding expropriation. 
 
4.1.1 General Practice: Investors’ Right to Lawful Expropriation 
and Compensation 
An ASEAN Member State does not incur any international liability by carrying out 
expropriation. In the event of expropriation, the primary obligation of States lies not in the 
act of expropriation, recognised as sovereign right of States, but in the conditions for its 
lawful implementation.261F262 Therefore, liability only attaches if the State fails to meet the 
conditions for lawful expropriation set out in ACIA article 14. These conditions were 
previously found in the IGA, and are generally found in the majority of IIAs. In order to 
file an expropriation claim, an investor must, first of all, demonstrate that the asset is 
susceptible to be expropriated. An expropriation act or omission of an ASEAN 
governmental authority which does not fulfil one of the four criteria set out in the ACIA 
becomes an unlawful expropriation. A finding of an unlawful expropriation will trigger a 
compensation mechanism.  
 
4.1.1.1 Expropriation of Property Rights 
Not all investments fall within the scope of expropriation provision. ACIA article 
14 denotes a narrower notion of the term “covered investment”, and limits expropriation 
claims only to property right or property interest. The domestic laws of the ASEAN host 
States are decisive in determining the definition of “property”. 262F263 The ACIA only 
recognises and protects them so determined in the ASEAN Investment Area. 
Following a number of modern investment disputes of the US-Iran Claims 
Tribunals, the UNITRAL or ICSID tribunals, 263F264 the ACIA clearly supports a wide 
conception of property rights. These rights include both tangible and intangible rights. The 
intangible rights include the rights under contracts, concession agreements, as well as 
shareholder rights. The property rights also include intellectual property rights (IPRs), 
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except for the compulsory licences granted in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement.265 
This exception ensures coherence between the ACIA and WTO law.266 On the contrary, 
the formulation excludes non-property rights, such as the right to admission, and economic 
interests, where they do not create property rights, such as goodwill, customer base, and 
market share.267 In fact, these non-property rights can also be taken away but no 
compensation is due under ACIA article 14.  
Questions may be raised regarding types of measures which can be challenged. The 
range of measures which may give rise to expropriation claims is remarkably broad.268  
A tribunal needs to verify whether the acts concerned are attributable to the respondent 
State. The conduct of an ASEAN Member State is considered an act of that State under 
international law “whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other 
functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its 
characterization as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the 
State”.269     
Questions of attribution may arise in connection with the expropriation of 
contractual rights.270 “Not every failure by a government to perform a contract amounts to 
an expropriation even if the violation leads to a loss of rights under the contract”.271 The 
mere breach of a contract by an ASEAN host State does not by itself lead to a breach of the 
ACIA – what is required is a use of governmental prerogative.  Expropriation occurs solely 
in the case that a State exercises its governmental or public power or in its sovereign 
capacity, known as “acta iure imperii” or “puissance publique”.272  
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It is a delicate matter to distinguish between acta iure imperii and acta iure 
gestionis.273 For instance, in the Jalapa Railroad case, the tribunal needed to consider 
whether the nullification of a contractual clause by the Mexican Government was  
“effected arbitrarily by means of a governmental power illegal under international law”.274 
An ASEAN State’s behaviour may go beyond that which an ordinary contracting party 
could adopt; for example, an issuance of legislative acts or administrative decrees, 
revocations of licences and authorisations by State organs that are necessary for the 
operation of a business.275  
This distinction relates to the jurisdiction over contract claims or treaty claims.  
In this regard, an ordinary breach of contract may give rise to legal action under the 
applicable domestic law, whereas the expropriation of contractual rights may entail 
consequences under the ACIA. However, while the distinction between acta iure imperii 
and acta iure gestionis may be helpful for the determination of an expropriation, it is noted 
that “one could envisage conduct tantamount to an expropriation which consisted of acts 
and omissions not specifically or exclusively governmental”.276 Besides, an opposite view, 
supported at least by two arbitral tribunals, considers that termination of contracts by States 
violates the principle of pacta sunt servanda and thus is internationally unlawful.277 
Presumably, expropriation means that assets or property-related interests of an 
investor are wholly sequestered or substantially deprived.278 The disability of an individual 
treatment of those items or discrete economic right, functioning as part of an integral 
business operation, is not sufficient to viably ground an expropriation claim. In other 
words, the question is whether such interests or assets are independent of economic 
exploitation.279 Several tribunals require the whole business enterprise to be qualified as an 
investment, and not just its constituent parts.280 However, in certain cases, different 
interests attached to the same business have been individually treated.281  
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Given the transitional stage of the ASEAN Member States, tribunals – while 
interpreting the ACIA – may consider adopting the approach of whole expropriation. 
Otherwise ASEAN Member States may be faced with numerous trivial claims. A partial 
expropriation should be possible only if: (a) an overall investment project can be 
disaggregated into a group of individual rights; (b) each right is considered a “covered 
investment” under the ACIA; and (c) such a right is capable of economic survival 
independently. For example, a loss of business future incomes or a refusal of a VAT 
refund282 would not be regarded as detached investments exposed to expropriation. 
4.1.1.2 Conditions of Lawful Expropriation  
Liability only attaches if an ASEAN Member State fails to meet these four 
conditions: (1) public purpose, (2) non-discrimination, (3) payment of prompt, adequate, 
and effective compensation, and (4) due process of law. Similar to many recent IIAs,283  
the ACIA includes a reference to “due process of law” as a condition for a lawful 
expropriation. Tribunals must check serious procedural violations that may occur at several 
points of the proceedings, in the adoption or substance or scope of the measure. Similarly, 
irregularity may be found in the application of a general regulation to a particular ASEAN 
investor, e.g. denials, cancellations or revocations of contracts, licences, permits or 
concessions.  
However, minor procedural deviations should not change a lawful measure into an 
unlawful expropriation. As a consequence, an expropriation is found unlawful when it has 
not been undertaken in accordance with due process of law. An ASEAN host State may 
also breach the FET, if, subsequent to the depriving action being taken, the affected 
ASEAN investor is denied access to justice in that the case is not reviewed before an 
independent and impartial body.                    
For non-discrimination, a tribunal should distinguish the non-discrimination for 
expropriation purpose from relative non-discriminatory standards, i.e. most-favoured-
nation or national treatment.284 Regarding absolute standards, the element of 
discriminatory intent is particularly stressed.285 The doctrine of “good faith” precludes 
State authorities from exercising their rights or police powers “for an end different from 
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that for which the right has been created”.286 If the host State generally adopts any measure 
in good faith but such measures result in targeting a particular ASEAN investor, the 
measure may not be considered discriminatory. In contrast, a regulation is discriminatory if 
it is intentionally based on, linked to or taken for reasons of, certain investors, or to 
exclude foreign control from the host State market.287 In this case, the true intention of the 
State is not consistent with the alleged public purpose, such measure may constitute an 
“abuse of rights”, also known as “détournement de pouvoir”.288  
Provided that the evidence of such intent of the State is not easy to determine, the 
discriminatory effect of an intended public measure may become merely a subsidiary or 
additional element to prove indirect expropriation.289 These conditions of public purpose 
and non-discrimination need to be further examined in connection with the test of 
proportionality set out in Annex 2.290 Meanwhile, the compensation issues are discussed in 
the following sub-section. 
4.1.1.3 Compensation 
Similarly to a significant number of BITs, the ACIA adopts the standard of  
“Hull formula”,291 guaranteeing that the right of ASEAN investors must not be 
expropriated without “payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation”.292 
ACIA article 14(2) gives more explanation on this formula, that an expropriation is lawful 
only if a payment of compensation is processed in the following manner:  
(a) be paid without delay; 
(b) be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment 
immediately before or at the time when the expropriation was publicly 
announced, or when the expropriation occurred, whichever is applicable;  
(c) not reflect any change in value because the intended expropriation had 
become known earlier;  and 
(d) be fully realisable and freely transferable in accordance with Article 13 
(Transfers) between the territories of the Member States. 
Firstly, by “prompt”, the compensation must be granted to an ASEAN investor as 
soon as the expropriation is made. The State has an obligation to pay without delay.  
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The ACIA does not set a specific time by which the payment must be made. In most cases,  
a common time to process such payment would be expected between three and six 
months.293 Secondly, by “adequate”, the ACIA refers to the fair market value of 
expropriated investment to calculate compensation. Among various methods of valuation, 
the fair market value is the most favourable method for the investors.294 Thirdly, by 
“effective”, the ACIA requires that such money must be fully realisable and in a freely 
transferable and exchangeable currency. The ACIA opens the choice to investors to receive 
the compensation and its interests either in the currency in which the investment was 
originally made or in a freely usable currency.295  
Compensation upon expropriation serves a different function than damages after  
an unlawful act. With respect to lawful expropriation, an unfavourably affected investor is 
entitled to “compensation” figuring to the damnum emergens, i.e. the losses of the 
objective value suffered upon the announcement of expropriation. According to the 
principle of “full reparation” recognised in the Chorzów Factory case,296 which further 
codified in the 2001 ILC’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts,297 the investor must be put in the position pertaining before the investment 
was made.  
Unlawful expropriation gives rise to State’s responsibility and attracts “reparation” 
which goes beyond “compensation”. Hence, the sum includes not only actual losses but 
may also include lucrum cessans, or loss of profits,298 aiming at providing “reparation” for 
the damage caused by the unlawful act.299 A case where the difference between the parties 
is restricted to the amount of compensation awarded may be classified as lawful 
expropriation, because the State has already agreed to pay the aggrieved investor in 
accordance with ACIA obligations, but only the amount offered or schedule of payment is 
disputed.  
For indirect expropriation, the obligation to pay compensation arises only after the 
measure is found as an expropriation by a tribunal, because the lawfulness of regulatory 
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measures is presumed.300 In case a breach has been found, the ASEAN host State has an 
obligation to pay compensation. The ASEAN host State has no obligation to make any 
change or to revoke the relevant measures. The fact that the State compensates the 
wronged investors will bring the unlawful measure of indirect expropriation in conformity 
with the obligation of lawful expropriation.  
As the ACIA does not provide a particular rate or method of calculation for indirect 
expropriation, tribunals should apply the same method as for direct expropriation, i.e. fair 
market value. However, the existence of a single “uniform standard” for both lawful and 
unlawful expropriation seems not to have been fully appreciated by tribunals in investment 
cases.301 Three awards – ADC v. Hungary, Siemens v. Argentina, and Vivendi v. 
Argentina302 illustrate a departure from the treaty standard of compensation in the case of  
a breach of the applicable treaty. Likewise, the compensation standard in the ACIA, which 
applies expressly to lawful expropriation, may not preclude additional damages in the case 
of unlawful expropriation.303 
Particularly on the fact of the ADC v. Hungary case, the tribunal noted that the 
investment’s value had risen considerably after the expropriation, and therefore considered 
that “the application of the Chorzów standard requires that the date of valuation should be 
the date of the Award and not the date of expropriation, since this is what is necessary to 
put the Claimants in the same position as if the expropriation had not been committed”.304  
This approach, however, could not be adopted in the context of a lawful taking where the 
ACIA require that the investment be valued at the date immediately before the taking.305 
In Siemens v. Argentina, the tribunal rejected the claim for lost profits as it 
considered that “the amount claimed on account of lost profits [was] very unlikely to have 
ever materialized”.306 Rather, the tribunal turned to the claim on account of post-
expropriation costs, which it considered “justified in order to wipe out the consequences of 
the expropriation”.307 Also, in Vivendi v. Argentina case, where the Tribunal took into 
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account not only the amounts invested up to date of expropriation, but also the loans made 
after that date,308 considered as “incidental expenses”.309 In order to give better protection 
to ASEAN investors, tribunals may adopt the same line of reasoning as the three awards 
discussed above on the issue of the applicable standard of compensation.  
Some agreements currently take into account other relevant factors for calculation 
of indirect expropriation compensation. For example, SADC Model article 6.2 introduces 
an innovation of “fair and adequate” compensation, “based on an equitable balance 
between the public interest and interest of those affected”. It provides an indicative list, 
such as earlier misconduct of investors, cleaning costs associated with damage to the 
environment, current and past use of the property, history of its acquisition, fair market 
value of the investment, purpose of the expropriation, extent of previous profit made by the 
foreign investor through the investment, and duration of the investment. COMESA CIA 
article 20(2)310 also provides for this: “compensation may be adjusted to reflect the 
aggravating conduct by a COMESA investor or such conduct that does not seek to mitigate 
damages.” As a result, all relevant circumstances will be taken into the calculation of 
compensation. The arbitrators may assess compensation beyond fair market value and 
purely financial factors, by including non-financial factors.  
This approach posits clearly a presumption in favour of fair market value as one 
factor of assessment of indirect expropriation among others. It seems to strike a better 
balance of public and private interests, because it gives tribunals more discretion to survey 
other relevant factors. However, the ACIA does not adopt this approach and leaves to 
tribunals to apply the principle of “full” or “fair” reparation, according to the new 
interpretation of the Chórzow Factory case, in combination with other relevant non-
financial factors. Supposing that these formulations provide a useful indication, they 
ultimately leave the choice of an appropriate valuation method to arbitrators before a 
concrete case with the assistance of experts.  
Even though the ACIA imposes four conditions that States have to fulfil, their 
effectiveness should be questioned. The public purpose condition is largely subject to  
a State’s discretion to prioritise its affairs, and any hidden discriminatory intent is very 
difficult to determine. The tribunal has to limit itself to a supplementary role for these first 
two criteria. However, while the tribunal may have more exercise on the examination of 
compensation and due process of law, the amount of compensation and the compliance 
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with due process of law depend basically on the State’s legislation. The more pressing 
concern is that investors tend to base their claims on undefined indirect expropriation and 
yet tribunals do not have guidelines to determine whether the State’s measure is, in the first 
place, an expropriation. 
 
4.1.2 Specificity: Increased-Predictability Model and Reaffirming 
the Right to Regulate 
ASEAN host States need to protect the public interest by maintaining their 
regulatory space within which they will not be pursued for compensation, even though 
their measures may harm ASEAN investments. Nonetheless, this does not mean that 
ASEAN Member States are permitted to harm investments as they wish. Therefore, several 
techniques are designed to differentiate indirect expropriation from regulatory measures. 
The challenge is to achieve the right balance between public and private interests. 
The assessment of indirect expropriation involves a case-by-case factual inquiry, 
requiring a balancing of factors. Similar to most IIAs, the ACIA rarely tries to define 
concrete cases of outrageous acts of indirect expropriation. It has rather attempted to define 
indirect expropriation in a negative way, by describing regulatory measures that must not 
be considered indirect expropriation. The ACIA has opted three techniques used in recent 
investment treaties: (1) general exceptions and security exceptions; (2) exclusion of 
specific matters, and (3) explanatory annex to expropriation provision. These techniques 
are not usually found in old-fashioned BITs. As mentioned supra, the ACIA is unusual in 
that it has combined all three techniques in its text, while some IIAs have only one or have 
combined only two techniques.  
Some significant differences are found in the actual techniques used in the ACIA. 
These differences, further examined below, denote the “ASEAN Way” of investment 
protection. These ASEAN specific elements illustrate more concern for ASEAN host 
States. The ACIA uses these techniques in order to advise tribunals in the interpretation, 
which, in turn, leaves less room for tribunals to create their own criteria. These techniques 
are used to provide more margin of manoeuvre for ASEAN host States. Annex 2 
demonstrates that ASEAN Member States concerns protection of their regulatory power, 
resulting in a precautionary approach regarding expropriation and compensation.  
Pursuant to the indicators set out in Annex 2, tribunals will decide whether the 
threshold has been crossed from legitimate regulatory action to compensable expropriation. 
However, as these criteria give a wide margin of manoeuvre to the ASEAN host States, 
there is less chance that the tribunal will find a non-discriminatory regulatory measure to 
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be in breach of an expropriation standard. As the nature of indirect expropriation is not as 
visible as that of direct expropriation, it will only be found when the tribunal decides it to 
be so. Once an act or omission of an ASEAN Member State is considered an act of 
expropriation, the tribunal will continue to determine whether the expropriation is lawful, 
discussed in Section 4.1.1.2. In addition, while the ACIA has attempted to maintain the 
general conditions and formula, as discussed in 4.1.1.3, it gives specific details on 
compensations and “appropriate interest” in case of delay. 
 
4.1.2.1 Specific Details on Compensations 
ASEAN host States are required to compensate ASEAN investors only to a no less 
favourable degree than that it accords, in like circumstances, to their nationals. Footnote 10 
provides that any measure of expropriation relating to land and its payment of 
compensation must be as defined in the Member States’ respective existing domestic laws 
and regulations.311 This approach reflects the ASEAN Member States’ attempts to retain 
maximum sovereignty over sensitive matters. It underlines the important of the ASEAN 
Member States’ laws in the interpretation of ACIA article 14.  
Despite the formula of “prompt, adequate, and effective compensation”, “Member 
States understand that there may be legal and administrative processes that need to be 
observed before payment can be made”.312 This approach reasonably gives some flexibility 
to the ASEAN host States and better responds to realities of their administrative system 
and financial resources. As a result, ASEAN investors may have to tolerate delay for some 
justifiable time. Some IIAs even allow a host State to pay the compensation yearly over  
a period agreed by the parties, in the case that the awards are significantly burdensome.313  
Even though the ACIA does not fix a specific time of payment, ACIA article 14(3) 
imposes an obligation to pay “appropriate interest”314 in case the payment of the principal 
amount of compensation is delayed. Arbitral tribunals should take into account specific 
facts and laws of the case in order to determine the date from which the payment is 
considered delayed, and the interest begins to accrue. These specific detailed given in the 
ACIA illustrates the ACIA’s attempts to strike a balance between investors’ and host 
States’ interests and concerns.   
                                                 
 
311 ACIA footnote 10. 
312 ACIA footnote 11.  
313 COMESA CIA article 20(5), SADC Model BIT section 6.4.  
314 The term “appropriate interest” in the ACIA may be equivalent to the term “commercially reasonable 
interest” found in other modern IIAs, for example, COMESA CIA article 20(3). Pursuant to ACIA article 
14(3), the “appropriate interest” is calculated “in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Member 
State making the expropriation”.  
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4.1.2.2 General Exceptions and Security Exceptions  
The ACIA provides “general exceptions” in its article 17 and “security exceptions” 
in its article 18. Exception provisions are rarely found in old-styled BITs, including the 
IGA. The “exception” is the first technique used to explicitly affirm the regulatory right of 
the States in order to protect certain public interests. The ACIA employs “general 
exceptions” in order to exclude every governmental measure considered necessary for 
public policy objectives from the scope of the treaty as a whole. Most of these general 
exceptions clauses are modelled on GATT article XX and GATS article XIV.315 
Meanwhile, “security exceptions” may be invoked by an ASEAN Member State for 
the protection of its essential security interests, such as in time of war or other emergency 
in domestic or international relations; to protect critical public infrastructure, including 
communication, power and water infrastructures, from deliberate attempts intended to 
disable or degrade such infrastructure; or to take any action pursuant to its obligations 
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.316 
The ACIA asserts that an ASEAN host State can exercise its regulatory power in 
normal circumstances. ACIA articles 17 provide that nothing in the ACIA can be construed 
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member State of measures: necessary to 
protect public morals or to maintain public order; to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health; necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations on a contract; relating to 
the protection of the privacy of individuals; safety; imposition or collection of direct taxes 
in respect of investments or investors of any Member State; national treasures of artistic, 
historic or archaeological value; natural resources. 
The ACIA also provides “safety valves”317 which ensure that the exceptions are not 
abused by ASEAN Member States. Other investment treaties that incorporate general 
exceptions include similar provisions.318 Pursuant to ACIA article 17(1), the measures 
concerned must not be applied “in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between Member States or their investors where like 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on investors of any other Member State and 
their investments.”  
                                                 
 
315 Canada Model BIT article 10 General Exception; US Model BIT article 18 Essential Security. 
316 ACIA article 18. 
317 UNCTAD (2012), Expropriation, p.89. 
318 See e.g. 2004 Canada FIPA, article 10. 
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Compared to other IIAs, the ACIA gives more clarification regarding the use of 
public order exception. Its footnote 12 emphasises that “the public order exception may be 
invoked by a Member State only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to 
one of the fundamental interests of society.” Nonetheless, the existence of a “serious 
threat” is primarily appreciated by an ASEAN host State, while tribunals consider 
characters of arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith of measures concerned.   
Articles 17 and 18 confirm the ASEAN Member States’ right to regulate within 
their sovereign power by excluding the measures that States may adopt or enforce as they 
deems necessary to public order or to protect essential security interests. These regulations 
are immune from being categorised as indirect expropriation. If a tribunal establishes that 
the challenged measures fall within one of these exceptions, it appears that the ASEAN 
Member State may not be held liable for violating any of the ACIA’s substantive 
protections. However, in case of a direct expropriation, existence of these exceptions 
presumably does not exclude payment of compensation.319 
While the ACIA attempts to balance between States’ and investors’ interests by 
including these exceptions, this practice is limited in that these exceptions carve out only 
measures relating to public policy objectives which are specifically listed in the exceptions 
clauses. In fact, there may be some public-interest measures which are not on the list but 
which still can be considered non-expropriatory and non-compensable. Hence, the ACIA 
combines the exception technique with the exclusion and explanation techniques, 
discussed in the following sections. 
4.1.2.3 Exclusion of Legitimate Public Welfare Measures 
The ACIA also adopts the “exclusion” technique used in the 2004 US and Canada 
BIT Models. Annex 2(4) explicitly excludes measures taken by an ASEAN Member State 
with a legitimate public welfare objective from the definition of an indirect expropriation. 
A State is not obliged to pay compensation, even though the regulations may have harmful 
effects on an ASEAN investment. The tribunal may not categorise these regulations as an 
indirect expropriation, except where they are adopted or applied in a discriminatory 
manner.  
 
                                                 
 
319  Newcombe, A., Paradell, L. (2009), p.506. 
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Although the ACIA provisions are based on US and Canadian models,320 there are 
some significant differences. US Model BIT Annex B(4)(b) provides an exclusion on 
specific matters but with room for exceptions:  
Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party 
that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, 
such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations. [Emphasis added.] 
Canadian Model FIPA Annex B.13(1) formulates exceptions with illustration:   
Except in rare circumstances, such as when a measure or series of measures 
are so severe in the light of their purpose that they cannot be reasonably 
viewed as having been adopted and applied in good faith…[Emphasis added.] 
This “in rare circumstances” exception may allow a tribunal to rebut the 
presumption of non-expropriation of measures protecting legitimate public welfare 
objectives and find such State measures indirect expropriation. On the contrary, ACIA 
Annex 2(4) does not include this exception in its provision. It is written in an 
“unconditional” manner.321 This means that the ACIA has taken more a robust position 
than its inspiring models, which grant more regulatory space to ASEAN Member States.   
Consequently, any non-discriminatory measures of an ASEAN Member State, designed 
and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, do not constitute an indirect 
expropriation. 
The term “legitimate public welfare objective” can cover a wide range of 
governmental aims.322 The COMESA CIA explicitly refers to the customary international 
law principles on police powers, in order to guide the interpretation of the term “legitimate 
objectives”.323 Although the ACIA does not refer to the customary international law on this 
matter, its provisions demonstrate the intention of ASEAN Member States to interpret this 
exclusion in a broad manner. The ACIA mentions, as examples, public health, safety and 
environment.324 
This technique of exclusion is an effective solution for the determination of what 
does not amount to indirect expropriation. Yet there may be an area of uncertainty as to 
                                                 
 
320 2004 US Model BIT Annex B.4.a, 2004 Canadian Model BIT. 
321 UNCTAD, Expropriation, p.130 
322 See e.g. Marvin Feldman v Mexico, ARB(AF)/99/1, 16 December 2002, 18 ICSID Rev-FILJ 488 (2003), 
para.103. The “governments must be free to act in the broader public interest through protection of the 
environment, new or modified tax regimes, the granting or withdrawal of government subsidies, reductions 
or increases in tariff levels, imposition of zoning restrictions and the like”. 
323 COMESA CIA article 20(8). 
324 ACIA Annex II(4). 
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whether the measures in question intend to protect legitimate objectives. Hence, tribunal 
need to refer to the factors provided in ACIA Annex 2(3). 
4.1.2.4 Factors Establishing Indirect Expropriation  
ACIA Annex 2(3) contains a non-exhaustive list of factors or decisive criteria 
which serve as guidance in the assessment of whether a measure or a series of measures 
departs from the normal activity of the State and constitutes indirect expropriation, for 
which the ASEAN Member State owes compensation. Among other factors, the ACIA 
requires a tribunal to use, at least, three elements set out in Annex 2, on a cumulative basis. 
These three elements are: economic impact of the government action, the government’s 
prior binding written commitment and the character of the government action.  
          (1) Economic Impact of the Government Action 
The tribunal must consider the economic impact of the government action, i.e. 
assess whether it causes “persistent or irreparable obstacle to the claimant’s use, enjoyment 
or disposal of its investment”325 or total or nearly total loss of control of the investment’s 
value.326 In practice, the difficulty lies in establishing the exact level of deprivation of 
property rights of the investor. Nonetheless, although substantial and effective deprivation 
of the economic value of an investment is a necessary and an important condition, Annex 
2(3)(a) emphasises that economic impact, “standing alone”,327 does not suffice, to establish 
that an indirect expropriation has occurred. This ACIA approach clearly rejects the  
“sole effects” doctrine. 
Arbitral tribunals should give due deference to the choices of ASEAN Member 
States when deliberating issues of priority of public purpose and suitability of the measure 
for achieving such a purpose. The ACIA has a specific mechanism for the determination of 
whether the taxation measure in question has an effect equivalent to expropriation or 
nationalisation.328 In the case of dispute, upon request from the disputing Member State, 
the disputing Member State and the non-disputing Member State must hold consultations 
with a view to determining the existence of an expropriation within 180 days after the date 
of such referral. Investors are allowed to submit a claim to arbitration only if they have 
first referred to the competent tax authorities of both Parties in writing, and if the 
competent tax authorities of both Parties fail to agree that the taxation measure is not an 
                                                 
 
325 Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine, Award, 16 September 2003, para.20.32. 
326 See for example, Sempra v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16, Award 28 Sept 2007, para.285. 
327 ACIA Annex 2(3)(a). 
328 ACIA article 36(7), Conduct of Arbitration. Similar mechanism of joint decision of tax authorities is 
found in the US Model BIT (2004, 2012), Canada FIPA, AANZFTA, ASEAN-PRC and ASEAN-Korea 
investment agreements. 
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expropriation.329 The effect of the determination is such that a tribunal has to accord 
“serious consideration” to the decision.330 In reality, if the Parties jointly determine that a 
measure does not constitute an expropriation measure, it is difficult for a tribunal to depart 
from such a joint declaration.  
           (2) Interference with Investor’s Expectations  
In the US or Canadian BITs, the term “legitimate expectations” figures in the 
provision and is read as “the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, 
reasonable investment-backed expectations.”331 The notion remains vague, even though 
the text adds the term “distinct” and “reasonable” to clarify it. On this issue, the ACIA 
proposes a more precise meaning of legitimate expectation, by concluding that an ASEAN 
investor can have legitimate expectation only in the case that he/she possesses 
“government’s prior binding written commitment”. As a result, the ASEAN Member 
States can avoid being liable due to “legitimate expectations” that do not derive from the 
host State’s legal obligations. 
The legitimate expectation of the investor originates from the legal framework of 
the host State as it stands at the time the investor acquired the investments.332 This notion 
is usually debated in the context of the FET standard.333 Its application in the expropriation 
context is narrower than its application in the FET, because the scope of expropriation is 
limited to property rights. Hence, the question is how to balance between the legitimate 
expectation on the legal stability of investor’s property rights and the legitimate and 
reasonable regulatory right of the ASEAN Member States.  
States have a right to regulate investments in their territory. At some point during 
an investment’s cycle, an ASEAN host State may change its laws based on governmental 
policies and evolving circumstances. This tension is particularly evident when the change 
of general legal frameworks impacts on an existing investor-State contract or quasi-
contractual relationship, such as a permit, license or authorisation issued by the 
government to a private entity.  
                                                 
 
329 ACIA article 36(9). See also footnote 694. 
330 ACIA article 36(8). 
331 Annex B 13(1)(b) 2004 Canadian Model BIT. Also see Article 4 (b)(2) China-Colombia BIT (2008), 
Annex 10-B 3(a)(ii): Expropriation of the Australia-Chile FTA (2008), Annex 13: Expropriation of the 
China-New Zealand FTA (2008).  
332 See e.g. Tecmed v. Mexico, Award, 29 May 2003, para.154; GAMI v. Mexico, Award, 15 Nov 2004, 
paras.93-94; BG Group Plc v. Argentina, Final Award, 24 Dec 2007, para.298; National Grid v. Argentina, 
Award, 3 Nov 2008, para.173. See Schreuer, C, Kriebaum, U. (2009), “At What Time Must Legitimate 
Expectations Exist?”, in Werner, J., Ali, A.H., A Liber Amicorum: Thomas Wälde - Law beyond 
Conventional Thought, London, Cameron May, pp.265-276. 
333 More discussion in section 4.2 FET. 
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Arbitral tribunals and scholars have repeatedly pointed out that investment treaties 
may not serve as de facto insurance against ordinary commercial risks.334 They cannot act 
to freeze the law unless those changes are contrary to a specific commitment made by the 
State to refrain from making such changes. In the same vein, the existence of the ACIA is 
not a guarantee of the immutability of the laws on foreign investments, or other general 
laws which affect investments of ASEAN investors.  
Under the ACIA, “legitimate expectation” is not a sufficient factor to determine 
expropriation. ASEAN investors must legally rely on only the “government’s prior binding 
written commitment”.335 Such written commitment can serve as a waiver of regulatory 
power regarding future regulatory treatment by restraining future use of its sovereign 
power for a period of time. The commitment can be by contract, license or other legal 
document, as well as by approval in writing in the case that an ASEAN Member State 
requires this at the admission of investment.336 Accordingly, where an ASEAN host State 
has not originally provided any specific written commitment to the investor that it would 
renew the contract, the refusal to renew such a contract may not be deemed indirect 
expropriation.  
From a broader perspective, the requirement of a written commitment improves the 
transparency of the ACIA, because the tribunal will investigate only whether there is a 
written commitment, and not the undefined notion of “legitimate expectation”. However, 
this requirement illustrates the restrictive approach of the protection of investor’s rights 
under the ACIA, as it obviously supports the regulatory capacity of the State for public 
interests. The assessment of legitimate expectations is by no means an exclusive test to be 
applied to an alleged indirect expropriation.337 Particularly, legitimate expectations cannot 
be assessed in isolation from the character of the governmental action or its economic 
impact,338 discussed infra.  
The ACIA has set a highly objective and formal threshold relating to investor 
expectations for purposes of expropriation claims under the ACIA. As a consequence, 
some wronged investors may attempt to claim the breach of FET standard, as the FET 
                                                 
 
334 See e.g. Oscar Chinn Case (UK v. Belgium), Judgment, 12 December 1934, PCIJ Series A/B, No.63 
(1934), para.88; Marvin Feldman v Mexico, ARB(AF)/99/1, 16 December 2002, 18 ICSID Rev-FILJ 488 
(2003), para.112; CME Czech Republic BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 14 March 
2003, para.562; AES v. Hungary, ICSID Case No.ARB/07/22, Award, 23 Sept 2010, para.9.3.34. See 
Reinisch, A. (2008), “Expropriation”, p.433. 
335 ACIA Annex 2(3)(b). 
336 See details of requirement of “approval in writing” in Section 3.1.2.2. 
337 Paulsson, J, Douglas, Z. (2004), “Indirect Expropriation in Investment Treaty Arbitration”, in Horn, H., 
Kröll, S. (Eds.), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes, the Hague, Kluwer Law International, p.157. 
338 Newcombe, A. (2005), p.38. 
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seems to be less exigent than the expropriation claim. However, from the discussion in 
chapter 4.2, the FET standard of the ACIA also has a narrow reading of legitimate 
expectations, and the investor may only base his or her claims on the lack of due process or 
the denial of justice.339  
The ACIA emphasises that the unlawful expropriation standard and the FET 
standard are two distinctive standards. The finding of the breach of unlawful expropriation 
right is not equivalent to the breach of FET standard, and vice versa.340 Nonetheless, it is 
also true for the ACIA that “the line separating indirect expropriation from the breach of 
FET can be rather thin”,341 particularly if the breach of the FET standard is “massive and 
long-lasting”.342 In most decisions where tribunals find a breach of lawful expropriation 
obligations, they also find a breach of FET. In practice, the amount of compensation may 
not be different, whether the State’ conduct is held in breach of one or two obligations. The 
tribunal, however, must not concern itself only with compensating losses, but must also 
specify which right has been breached.  
          (3) Character of the Government Action: Question of Proportionality 
ACIA Annex 2(3)(c) requires that tribunals take into account the “character of the 
government action” as a third factor for determination of indirect expropriation. In the US 
or Canadian Model BITs, the term “character” is not defined. Compared to the lack of 
clarity of its models, the ACIA has the advantage of specifying that the character of the 
action relates to its objective and its proportionality vis-à-vis public purposes referred to in 
article 14(1), discussed supra. 
Among the three factors, the “character of the government action” is the most 
difficult to use, because character is less concrete than economic impact or a writing 
commitment. Generally, the ACIA gives ASEAN Member States a wide margin to 
determine their action in public interests. It has recognised that national authorities are the 
ones who make an initial assessment of the existence of a public concern underlining such 
dispossessing measures.343 After a tribunal finds that measures taken by an ASEAN host 
State have totally deprived of the value of an investment (factor 1) and it is satisfied with 
an evidence of a government’s prior written commitment (factor 2), the tribunal proceeds 
                                                 
 
339 ACIA article 11(2)(a). See detailed discussion in section 4.2. 
340 ACIA article 11(3). 
341 Enron v. Argentina, Award 22 May 2007, para.363. 
342 Sempra v. Argentina, Award 28 September 2007, para.301. 
343 OECD, (2004), Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law, 
WP on International Investment, No.2004/4, Paris, p.17. 
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to test the expropriatory character of the government action,344 in order to distinguish 
compensable expropriation from non-compensable regulation. 
The principle of proportionality in the ACIA is a state-of-the-art feature in 
investment treaties. This principle has not been universally recognised in classic BITs as 
relevant in the expropriation context,345 and it is also relatively unfamiliar to the ASEAN 
Way of investment protection. Nonetheless, investment arbitral tribunal have taken the 
principle of proportionality from the TECMED v. Mexico case onwards.346 After finding 
that the deprivation had been total, the tribunal proceeded as follows:  
...the Arbitral Tribunal will consider, in order to determine if they are to be 
characterized as expropriatory, whether such actions or measures are 
proportional to the public interest presumably protected thereby and to the 
protection legally granted to investments, taking into account that the 
significance of such impact has a key role upon deciding the proportionality. … 
There must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the charge or 
weight imposed to the foreign investor and the aim sought to be realized by any 
expropriatory measure.347 
The tribunal weighed the specific facts of the case and found that State’s denial to renew 
the permit was disproportionate to the total deprivation of the investment’s value. 
Therefore, it decided that an indirect expropriation had occurred. This approach has been 
followed in some subsequent cases.348 
ACIA Annex 2(3)(c) specifically instruct tribunals to examine two issues: objective 
and proportionality. In this connection, tribunals must investigate whether the 
expropriation leaves out or goes manifestly beyond public purpose to the extent that the 
host State is discovered to be in mala fide. Firstly, the tribunal must investigate whether the 
cited purpose is genuine. For instance, the tribunal may find that the taking of the 
company’s property, rights and interests violates public international law, if the measure 
“was made for purely extraneous political reasons and was arbitrary and discriminatory in 
character”.349 The public purpose character takes into account the time element. It must be 
realised before or at the time when the expropriation measure was implemented. The fact 
that State endorses such a measure a posteriori will not reflect genuine public purpose.  
                                                 
 
344 The character of the government action is designed for cases of direct expropriation where the taking itself 
is self-evident. See UNCTAD (2012), Expropriation, p.95. 
345 UNCTAD (2012), Expropriation, p.97.  
346 Tecmed v. Mexico, Award, 29 May 2003. 
347 Idem, para.122.   
348 Azurix v. Argentina, Award, 14 July 2006, para.312; LG&E v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, 3 October 
2006, para.195. 
349 BP v. Libya, Award, 10 October 1973, 53 ILR (1979), p.329.  
104 
 
 
Secondly, tribunals must perform a proportionality assessment by finding  
a reasonable nexus between the intended public purpose and the effect of the measure. This 
second question does not aim to scrutinise the legitimacy of the measure. The questions are 
whether measures exceed normal regulatory powers and fundamentally modify the 
regulatory framework for the investment beyond an acceptable margin of change, whether 
the related measure is designed to achieve it,350 or whether the State’s action is obviously 
disproportionate to the need being addressed.351 The expropriation takes place, inter alia, 
where “the misuse of otherwise lawful regulation” is found,352 or where there is 
“unreasonable departure from the principles of justice” and “abuse of powers”.353  
A question has been especially raised to what extent arbitral tribunals may 
legitimately intervene in how States regulate their affairs. Deciding instead of the State will 
otherwise constitute far-reaching intrusion into governmental decision-making and,  
by that, interference with sovereign power. However, despite all critiques, the fact that the 
ACIA provides elements of clarification for arbitrators is a positive step towards achieving 
a more objective definition of indirect expropriation.  
 
Conclusion to Section 4.1  
            Compared to traditional BITs, the ACIA expropriation provision is a bold initiative. 
The ACIA has made an effort to strike a fairer balance between the property right of 
ASEAN investors and the sovereign right of ASEAN host States. On the issue of indirect 
expropriation, the ACIA denies the sole effect doctrine and reaffirms the police power 
doctrine, coupled with elements of proportionality analysis. The ACIA adopts three 
techniques to guide the interpretation of tribunals: general and security exceptions, 
exclusions of specific matters, and explanatory annex. The first technique is found in 
ACIA articles 17 and 18; the second and third techniques in Annex 2. The explanatory 
techniques are also used several times in footnotes.  
Annex 2 offers novel solutions to the reading of the ACIA. It narrows down the 
extremely vague concept of the “legitimate and reasonable expectations” of the investor 
into “a government’s prior binding written commitment”. It also clarifies the “character” of 
government’s actions. As a result, the ACIA may serve as a modern basis for on-going 
                                                 
 
350 See e.g. El Paso v. Argentina, Award 31 October 2011, para.402. 
351 LG&E v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, para.195. 
352 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property (1967), article 3. 
353 Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injury to Aliens (1961), article 
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investment treaty negotiations, and may clarify the undefined terms used in the treaties 
already signed. 
The ACIA emphasises States’ right to regulate for public purpose which 
differentiate regulatory measures from indirect expropriation. It ensures bona fide 
regulatory rights of ASEAN Member States and effectively places reasonable regulatory 
risks on ASEAN investors. It is the duty of any prudent investor to carefully examine laws 
and regulations before investing in a relevant State. Given the amount of compensation for 
investment arbitration, ASEAN Member States are relieved of the need to deliberate on the 
allocation of funds in their budget for the implementation of such regulatory measures, 353F354 
provided that they are non-discriminatory and proportionate. The question remains as to 
whether ASEAN States’ intervention, for economic, social, environmental and other 
development ends, is able to observe basic standards of good governance for the 
investment regime, or whether this makes the ACIA regime less attractive because foreign 
investors may not feel as protected as they previously were.  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
354 See for example, Yukos v. Russia (PCA Case No.AA227), Award, September 2014, where US$50 billion 
have been awarded against Russia. 
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Section 4.2 Fair and Equitable Treatment  
Fair and equitable treatment (FET) has been a major battle ground between 
investors’ and States’ interests in modern investment treaties. Due to its vagueness, FET 
was a “Sleeping Beauty”354F355 for decades, but now has been kissed awake. However, it is 
also because of its vagueness that investors can base most of their claims on FET. 
Tribunals have interpreted FET differently, and sometimes extensively. The most 
important question regarding FET is how to identify its content. Such content should 
reflect the right balance between ASEAN investment protection and preservation of 
freedom of legitimate ASEAN host States’ actions.  
The FET standard appeared at the same time as BITs. 355F356 It has gained a particular 
prominence among investment protection elements. FET has been regularly invoked by 
claimants in ISDS proceedings with considerable rate of success. However FET 
interpretation and application is a difficult task, apart from its vague definition, and despite 
a multitude of scholarly commentary, there is a growing volume of decision tied to the 
facts of each particular case. 
FET is the clearest example of how dubious is the formulation of standard clauses 
in IIAs. There is a lack of clarity concerning its scope and normative concept. No 
international attempt has defined what “fair” and “equitable” mean. The prominent use of a 
FET clause in the context of IIAs can be traced back to Article I of the “Draft Convention 
on Investments Abroad” proposed by Hermann Abs and Lord Shawcross in 1959:  
Each Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to the property 
of the nationals of the other Parties. Such property shall be accorded the most 
constant protection and security within the territories of the other Parties and 
the management, use and enjoyment thereof shall not in any way be impaired 
by unreasonable or discriminatory measures. 356F357  
                                                 
 
355 Schreuer, C., “FET Standard as ‘Sleeping Beauty”’, in Ortino, F. et al., (2007), Investment Treaty Law: 
Current Issues Volume II: Nationality and Investment Treaty Claims, Fair and Equitable 
Treatment in Investment Treaty Law, London, BIICL, p.92. 
356 FET clauses used in BITs and other IIAs appeared in early international economic agreements such as the 
Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (1948) and the Economic Agreement of Bogotá 
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(eds), International Investment Law and History, (2016, Forthcoming). 
357 Abs, H., Shawcross, H. (1960), “The proposed convention to protect private foreign investment, Journal 
of Public Law,Vol.9, pp.115-124. 
107 
 
 
The term “FET” does not “connote a clear set of legal prescriptions”.358  
Fair and equitable treatment does not have a consolidated and conventional 
core meaning as such nor is there a definition of the standard that can be 
applied easily. So far it is only settled that fair and equitable treatment 
constitutes a standard that is independent from national legal order and is not 
limited to restricting bad faith conduct of host States. Apart from this very 
minimal concept, however, its exact normative content is contested, hardly 
substantiated by State practice, and impossible to narrow down by traditional 
means of interpretative syllogism.359 
The ACIA tries to redress this problem and to lessen tribunals’ difficulties of 
interpretation by designing the FET standard in a more concrete manner. This approach is 
a novelty and reflects the “ASEAN Way” of investment protection. While some arbitral 
decisions have tended to read FET extensively, the ACIA puts forward a narrower 
construction. The standard is found in ACIA article 11, along with the full protection and 
security treatment. While article 11(1) provides the usual vague principle, article 11(2) 
gives more detail for the precision of FET. 
Article 11 ACIA, Treatment of Investment 
1. Each Member State shall accord to covered investments of investors of any 
other Member State, fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security.  
2. For greater certainty: 
      (a) fair and equitable treatment requires each Member State not to deny 
justice in any legal or administrative proceedings in accordance with the 
principle of due process; and 
      (b) full protection and security … 
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of this 
Agreement, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that 
there has been a breach of this Article. 
Compared to the expropriation and transfers provisions under the ACIA, the FET 
language found in article 11 is minimalist, as it is short and does not contain any 
exceptions or conditions for its application. Generally, arbitral tribunals have related FET 
obligation with differing elements, taking into account the myriad of different specific 
factual contexts: legitimate expectations, manifest arbitrariness, denial of justice and due 
process, discrimination, abusive treatment.360  ACIA article 11 requires only the obligation 
of non-denial of justice from the State. The denial of justice element should be considered 
the only element of FET to which ASEAN investors have rights. The ACIA practice 
                                                 
 
358 Vasciannie, S. (1999), “FET Standard in International Investment Law and Practice”, BYIL, Vol.70, 
p.101. 
359 Schill, S.W. (2009), The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, Cambridge , CUP,  p.263. 
360 See generally UNCTAD (2012), FET; Dolzer, R., Schreuer, C. (2012), pp.130-160; Salacuse, J. W. 
(2010), The Law of Investment Treaties, pp.218-244; Newcombe, A., Paradell, L. (2009), pp.255-296. 
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proposes a solution to the vagueness of the FET standard by giving the exact content of 
FET. This precision solves the problem of extensive interpretation. Its stricter notion of 
fairness and justice also introduces an element of the “rule of law”361 in ASEAN economic 
agreements, in accordance with the objective of a rules-based community.  
In order to interpret the exact meaning of FET, ACIA article 11 should be assessed 
against a general background of FET debate and in conjunction with other potentially 
overlapping standards of the ACIA, i.e. unlawful expropriation provisions.362 This reading 
may clarify the authentic notion of “legitimate expectations” under the ACIA. It may guide 
ACIA tribunals to interpret FET according to ASEAN Member States’ intention and  
to apply these interconnected core standards consistently throughout the treaty. Section 
4.2.1 traces the origins and general content of the FET standard of the ACIA, its broad 
interpretation and extensive use in investment arbitrations. Section 4.2.2 provides ACIA-
specific solutions for these concerns and discusses its implication and effectiveness.  
 
4.2.1 General Practice 
To the question of the source of FET, the ASEAN investment treaties have never 
referred to international minimum standards of treatment of aliens. Their FET is an 
autonomous self-standing standard. FET appeared for the first time in IGA article IV, 
which did not refer to any particular measures but generally provided that “investments 
made by investors of any Contracting Party shall enjoy fair and equitable treatment in the 
territory of any other Contracting Party”.  
In the absence of reference to customary international law of minimum treatment of 
aliens, together with the imprecise meaning of the FET standard, some tribunals favour  
a case-by-case interpretation largely depending on circumstances. This has led to 
substantial interpretative uncertainty. To a large extent, FET has been even praised as an 
“overriding obligation”, as it encompasses a wider treatment than other standards of 
protection.363 As general as FET can be, it “may well be that other provisions […] offering 
substantive protections are no more than examples or specific instances of this overriding 
duty”.364 The less guidance arbitrators have, the more discretion involves. 
                                                 
 
361 Schill, S. W. (2006), Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the 
Rule of Law, IILJ WP 2006/6, Global Administrative Law Series.  
362 See discussion on “investors’ legitimate expectations” in section 4.2.2.3(1). This reading of the ACIA’s 
approach of FET makes FET an independent standard rather than a duplication of the investor’s backed 
expectations under expropriation and compensation provisions. 
363 Mann, F.A. (1981), “British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments”, BYIL, Vol.52, 
p.244. 
364 This approach is also supported by the 1992 World Bank Guideline III.2 that FET is the general standard.  
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Until recently, authoritative attempts to clarify the normative content of the 
standard – that went beyond the case-specific application by tribunals − were relatively 
few. In case of NAFTA, the notion of FET had not been clarified until NAFTA article 
1105(1) became the subject of an official interpretation by the NAFTA Free Trade 
Commission of 31 July 2001. The interpretation states that article 1105(1) reflects the 
customary international law minimum standard and does not require treatment beyond 
what is required by customary international law.365  
FET standard may be an autonomous self-contained concept in the case that  
a particular treaty does not explicitly link FET to international law, for instance, the Energy 
Charter Treaty.366 Instead of inducing FET content from original sources of international 
law, tribunals have chosen to focus on the literal meaning of the provision, lending 
themselves to a more general fairness and equity appraisal. Given the expansive 
interpretation and imbalanced approach, the ACIA tries to clarify what its standard covers, 
without mentioning other source of FET obligation. 
 
4.2.1.1 FET as an Autonomous Standard of Treatment 
The obligations under FET are mainly determined by reference to an established 
source of law. The question is which sources of law should be used when determining the 
proper limits of the discretion to interpret the standard: a broader international law standard 
and general principles customary international law; or the minimum standard of treatment 
of aliens under customary international law.367  
The ACIA FET is autonomous from two perspectives, externally and internally. 
Regarding the external aspect, firstly, unlike the NAFTA-inspired treaties,368 the ACIA 
FET has a content of its own, and is not benchmarked with the minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens under customary international law. Secondly, ACIA article 11(3) has 
                                                 
 
365 The language of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission’s Note has found its way into the subsequent model 
BITs of the NAFTA countries. US Model BIT 2012 puts FET under article 5 on Minimum Standard of 
Treatment, which refers to customary international law and emphasizes that the MST do not require 
additional treatment, nor create additional substantive rights. Its footnote 9 states that the interpretation of the 
MST shall be in accordance with Annex A. It has also has been echoed in a significant and growing number 
of recent IIAs involving non-NAFTA countries, including the Japan-Philippines FTA (2006), AANZFTA 
(2009), China-Peru FTA (2009), Malaysia-New Zealand FTA (2009), India-Korea (2009), etc. 
 366 ECT article 10(1). See Final Act of the European Energy Charter Conference, Understandings (No.17) 
with respect to articles 26 and 27, p.28 and Chairman’s Statement at Adoption Session on 17 December 
1994, p.57. 
367 In the notes and comments to article 1 of the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign 
Property, “the standard required conforms to the ‘minimum standard’ which forms part of customary 
international law”. See OECD, 1967, p.120.  
368 AANZFTA article 6(1)(c), AKIA article 5(2)(c), Malaysia-New Zealand FTA article10.10 (Minimum 
Standard of Treatment) provide that the concepts do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which 
is required under customary international law, and do not create additional substantive rights.  
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provided that the breach of another provision in the ACIA or separate international 
agreements does not by itself constitute a breach of FET standard. This provision prevents 
tribunals from automatically finding a breach of FET standard. It dismantles the 
relationship of different treaty regimes, in particular, where the non-IIA treaty 
obligations,368F369 such as WTO law and IMF Articles, lack an enforcement mechanism like 
the one existing in the ACIA. If investors could automatically establish violations of FET 
standard on the basis of a host State’s breaches of extra-ACIA laws, this would expose 
ASEAN host governments to the risk of numerous suits accompanied by compensation 
claims under the ACIA.  
Regarding the internal aspect, FET is independent from the other core standards in 
the ACIA. Although FET seems to be a more general obligation, this does not mean that a 
breach of other standards is equivalent to a breach of FET. This independence can be 
justified regarding different standards. While FET is found in the same article as full 
protection and security treatment, they structurally figure in separate sub-clauses and 
implicate two distinct substantive protections. 369F370  
Moreover, although FET implies non-discrimination, it does not duplicate relative 
non-discrimination rights such as MFN or national treatment. 370F371 Relative non-
discrimination rights have become insufficient because they are contingent in nature and 
may not reach the basic expectation of the investors, or may not cover all aspects of non-
discrimination principle, which all the more includes religion, sex, age, etc. In this 
connection, IGA article IV(2) links FET to the MFN standard, while the ACIA applies 
both MFN and national treatment to FET; i.e. FET should be no less favourable than 
treatment granted to investors of most-favoured nations as well as the nationals of such 
States. 
FET is also distinguishable from unlawful expropriation right, because not all  
kinds of unfair administrative or governmental conduct concern property rights. 371F372 The 
conditions to be fulfilled for a breach of non-expropriation standard are more exigent and 
more specific, requiring approval in writing and total loss of property right, than those for 
FET standard violation, which are more flexible and also cover all ranges of potential acts 
                                                 
 
369 Mitchell, A. D. (2008), Legal principles in WTO disputes, Cambridge, CUP, p.150. 
370 Under the ACIA, “full protection and security” requires each Member State to take such measures as may 
be reasonably necessary to ensure the protection and security of the covered investments. 
371 As happened in the SD Myers v. Canada case under NAFTA, the majority of the tribunal held that having 
breached NAFTA’s provision on national treatment, Canada had also breached the minimum standard of 
treatment. SD Myers v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Second Partial Award, 21 October 2002. 
372 UNCTAD (2012), FET, p.7. 
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or measures. Nevertheless, it is very likely that, in the same case, a host State may in  
a breach of several standards cumulatively.373 
FET’s purpose is “to fill the gaps which may be left by the more specific standards, 
in order to obtain the level of investor protection intended by the treaties”.374 In the context 
of the ACIA, even though FET is not the overriding obligation, it may be considered  
as a “gap-filling” device of the ACIA standards, i.e. expropriation and non-discrimination 
standards. In this respect, the ACIA mentions specifically denial of justice and due process 
as the core of FET standard. 
4.2.2.2 Background Discussion: Extensive Interpretation of FET  
The variations in language affect the scope of discretion offered to an interpreting 
body, whether a government official, agency or an arbitral tribunal, and in particular, 
impact the outcome of the interpretative process. The interpretation may be influenced by 
the degree of generality or specificity of the wording of a particular treaty, its context, 
negotiating history or other indications of the parties’ intent. There is a view that the 
vagueness of the phrasing is intentional to give arbitrators the possibility to articulate the 
range of principles necessary to achieve the treaty’s purpose in particular disputes.375 
Similar to traditional BITs, ACIA article 11(1) has provided only a vague provision on the 
FET standard. Without the following paragraph (ACIA article 11(2)) explaining the 
content of FET, the ACIA could have rendered an extensive interpretation. 
A critical issue of FET interpretation arises out of an increasing reference by 
arbitral tribunals to the notion of investors’ “legitimate expectations”, which originally did 
not exist in FET provisions.375F376 The terminology refers to a situation when economic, 
regulatory or other conditions general or specific to the investment undergo changes 
negatively and substantially affecting the investment’s value against the legitimate 
expectations of an investor prevailing at the time when the investment is made. 376F377 
Tribunals should determine whether a State is attempting to avoid investment-backed 
expectations that State created or reinforced through its own acts. 377F378 A tribunal may read a 
                                                 
 
373 Sempra v. Argentina, 2007, para.301. 
374 Dolzer R. (2005), FET: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties, Int’l Law., Vol.39, p.90.   
375 OECD. (2004), FET Standard in International Investment Law, WP on International Investment, No.3, 
p.3. 
376 Tecmed v. Mexico, Case No.ARB (AF)/00/2, Award 29 May 2003, para.154. The tribunal held that fair 
and equitable treatment requires “provid[ing] to international investment treatment that does not affect the 
basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investors to make the investments.”  
377 Bayindir v. Pakistan , ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Date of Dispatch to the Parties: August 27, 2009 
378 Paulsson, J. (2000), “Investment Protection Provisions in Treaties” in International Chamber of 
Commerce, Investment Protection, No.8, Vol.19, p.22.  
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FET clause against the background found in the preambles of many BITs, that the main 
objective is emphasising investor protection. Pro-investor interpretation runs the risk of the 
true purpose of fair and equitable concept in BITs being lost under the weight of investor 
concerns alone. 
Due to this lack of definition, FET obligation can be seen as lacking legitimacy as a 
legal norm.378F379 This raises the issues of legitimate expectation, which involves 
reasonableness and proportionality. 379F380 The tribunal in Saluka v. Czech Republic considered 
the case along with the principle of proportionality arguing that “the determination of  
a breach [of FET] requires a weighing of the claimant’s legitimate and reasonable 
expectation on the one hand, and the respondent’s legitimate regulatory interests on the 
other”. 380F381 
In recent years, tribunals have emphasised the need for States to maintain 
regulatory space. A balance between the investor’s rights and the host State’s public 
interests has to be established. 381F382 “The protection of the legitimate expectations must be 
balanced with the need to maintain a reasonable degree of regulatory flexibility on the part 
of the host State in order to respond to changing circumstances in the public interest”.382F383 
Hence, it is crucial to determine what kind of investor expectations can be seen as 
legitimate and in what circumstances they may reasonably arise. Furthermore, it is 
necessary to strike a balance between the expectations of the investor and those of the host 
country and its community at large in order to establish proper and more predictable 
approaches which reflect the actual social, economic and policy context in which foreign 
investors find themselves.  
UNCTAD has illustrated the main concepts relevant in the context of fair and 
equitable treatment which cover prohibition of manifest arbitrariness, denial of justice and 
due process, discrimination and legitimate expectations: 383F384  
                                                 
 
379 Porterfield referred to Thomas Franck’s definition of a legitimate norm as the one providing reasonably 
clear guidance concerning the obligation that it imposes. “To be legitimate, a rule must communicate what 
conduct is permitted and what conduct is out of bounds”. See Porterfield, M.C. (2006), An International 
Common Law of Investors Rights?, U.Pa.J.Int’l Econ. L., Vol.27, Issue 1, p.99. 
380 Salacuse is of opinion that regardless of the different arguments on the issue, it shall be accepted that the 
MST and FET standard overlap significantly in regards to arbitrary treatment, discrimination and 
unreasonableness. See Salacuse, J.W. (2010), The Law of Investment Treaties, p.227.  
381 Saluka v. Czech, UNCITRAL, partial award, 17 March 2006, para.306 
382 Total v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, 27 Dec 2010, ICSID Case No.ARB/04/01, paras.123-124, 162, 
309,333, 429. See also Plama v. Bulgaria, Award, 27 Aug 2008, para.177; EDF v. Romania, Award 8 Oct 
2009, para.299, El Paso v. Argentina, Award, 31 Oct 2011, para.358. 
383 Lemire v. Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 14 Jan 2010, para.500. 
384 UNCTAD (2012), FET, p.xvi. 
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(a) Prohibition of manifest arbitrariness in decision-making, that is, measures 
taken purely on the basis of prejudice or bias without a legitimate purpose or 
rational explanation; 
(b) Prohibition of the denial of justice and disregard of the fundamental 
principles of due process; 
(c) Prohibition of targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such 
as gender, race or religious belief; 
(d) Prohibition of abusive treatment of investors, including coercion, duress 
and harassment; 
(e) Protection of the legitimate expectations of investors arising from a 
government’s specific representations or investment inducing measures, 
although balanced with the host State’s right to regulate in the public interest. 
The concern about application and interpretation of FET provisions has also 
brought to light the need to balance investment protection of ASEAN investors, with 
competing policy objectives of the host State, in particular, its right to regulate in the 
public interest. The ACIA follows an emerging trend in IIAs rule-making. It has added 
substantive content to FET clauses, for more precision in their content and more 
predictability in their implementation and subsequent interpretation.  
Lastly, like other IIAs, ACIA article 11 does not address the issue of criteria of 
compensation.384F385 The question of measuring compensation for breaches of FET has not yet 
received much attention from arbitral tribunals. However, the compensation stage 
potentially allows additional room for balancing of relevant interests. It may be useful to 
allow ACIA tribunals some flexibility to adjust the amount of compensation in light of the 
circumstances of the case and equitable considerations. Faced with a FET breach, tribunals 
may award less than full compensation where the measure is at least partially explained by 
other mitigating circumstances, such as the investor-claimant’s own conduct. These facts 
may affect the chances of a successful FET claim.  
 
4.2.2 Specificity: Specifically Narrow Reading to FET 
Newly-negotiated treaties have the UNCTAD-proposed elements, mentioned 
previously, into their negotiated texts. 385F386 However, given many ambiguous subjective 
elements in the text, one might wonder if these elements really help to clarify the notion of 
                                                 
 
385 See discussion on compensation for a breach of FET standard in Weiniger, M. The Standard of 
Compensation for Violation of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, in Ortino, F., BIICL (2007). 
Investment Treaty law: Current Issues Volume II: Nationality and Investment Treaty Claims, Fair and 
Equitable Treatment in Investment Treaty Law, London, BIICL; Kaj Hober, “Fair and Equitable 
Treatment”: Determining Compensation, in Hofmann, R., Tams, C.J. (2007). The International Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID): Taking Stock after 40 Years, Baden, Nomos, pp.79-102.  
386 See e.g. the proposed FET clause in CETA, Section 4: Investment Protection, Article X.9: Treatment of 
Investors and of Covered Investments. 
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FET. The result remains an open-ended and imbalanced approach, which may unduly 
favour investor interests and overrides legitimate regulation in the public interest.     
ACIA article 11(2) has chosen one element among possible FET elements: denial 
of justice and due process. While a prohibition of the denial of justice and disregard of due 
process of law are commonly considered as one of the FET element, the ACIA is specific 
in that these elements are the only elements of the ACIA FET. In this sense, the ACIA 
proposes an alternative formulation, a novel approach to addressing key issues in a more 
restricted and careful manner than traditional FET text. It provides interpretative guidance 
in the event of future disputes. The language on FET presented in the ACIA is the least 
likely to lead to misleadingly expansive interpretations by arbitrators.  
Two important reasons may support the ACIA’s choice of a specifically narrow 
construction of FET. First, this specificity responds generally to a lack of predictability of 
the concept of FET. Second, as the ACIA takes into account the level of ASEAN Member 
State’s development, it responds to the need for effective balancing between States’ and 
investors’ interests. The ACIA has chosen essential objective elements for the normative 
content of FET provision, namely, denial of justice and due process.  
The concrete content, in turn, grants more legitimacy to FET clauses. This signifies 
that if FET is put in terms of legitimate expectation, what ASEAN investor can 
legitimately expect is emphatically the procedural regularity. The fact that the ACIA omits 
to mention other traditional FET elements make “denial of justice” the only element of 
FET pursuant to the ACIA. The identified elements may give sufficient grounds which 
allow cases to be judged on the basis of law in accordance with the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. 386F387  
4.2.2.1 FET as Non-Denial of Justice and Due Process Standard 
The ACIA has favoured a closed list of situations that amount to a breach of FET 
obligation, which introduces legal certainty to the content of FET. It is also important to 
note that no reservations, protecting regulatory measures or regulatory authority from FET 
provision, are permitted. The ACIA “requires each Member State not to deny justice in any 
legal or administrative proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process.”387F388 
The concept of “denial of justice” and “due process” presupposes the existence of justice 
and rules at domestic level, in order to promote the rule of law at regional level, which is 
also in accordance with the rules-based objective of the ASEAN Community.  
                                                 
 
387 VCLT articles 31, 32. See OECD (2004), FET Standard in International Investment Law, p.40. 
388 ACIA article 11(2)(a).  
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There are two approaches regarding the term “denial of justice”.389 It may be 
employed extensively with the general notion of State responsibility for harm to aliens 
under customary international law, or as in the US Model BIT, which refers to “the 
principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world”390 or to a 
higher level of an emerging body of global administrative law.391 In contrast, the narrow 
sense refers merely to direct intervention by governmental authority and by judicial power. 
The ACIA’s FET has chosen a narrow reading, its FET takes on only the notion of denial 
of justice, without referring to external source. This approach is reflected in the ADC v. 
Hungary case where the tribunal held that the State is expected to avail the investors: 
 
Some basic legal mechanisms, such as reasonable advance notice, a fair hearing 
and an unbiased and impartial adjudicator to assess the actions in dispute… to 
make such legal procedure meaningful. In general, the legal procedure must be 
of a nature to grant an affected investor a reasonable chance within a reasonable 
time to claim its legitimate rights and have its claims heard. If no legal 
procedure of such nature exists at all, the argument that ‘the actions are taken 
under due process of law’ rings hollow.392 
 
The “denial of justice”, which has been linked to “due process” in legal and 
administrative proceedings, is fundamental for the interpretation of the scope of FET 
provisions under the ACIA. Pursuant to the ACIA, the scope of FET relates to all types of 
governmental conduct – legislative, administrative and judicial alike.393 The lack of 
“denial of justice” refers to any action of an ASEAN host State’s organ which leads to the 
outcome offending “judicial propriety”.394 In this account, “procedural irregularity” plays  
a significant role.  
Regarding the legal proceedings, the principle of “denial of justice” relates to three 
stages of the judicial process: (1) the right to bring the claim or access to courts, (2) the 
right of both parties to fair treatment during the proceedings and (3) the right to an 
appropriate decision at the end of the process and its enforcement. An affirmative action to 
deny foreign investors’ access to court, or any unlawful conduct, results in a breach of FET 
obligation under the ACIA; for example, any undue interference with the ordinary 
proceedings of  
                                                 
 
389 See generally Brownlie, I. (2008), Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed. Oxford  New York: 
Oxford University Press; Paulsson, J. (2005), Denial of Justice in International Law, Cambridge, CUP.  
390 2004/2012 US Model BIT Article 5 (2)(a). 
391 Slaughter, A.M. (2004), A New World Order, Princeton University Press. 
392 ADC v. Hungary, Award, 2 October 2006, para.435. 
393 ACIA article 11(2)(a). 
394 The term “judicial propriety” has been found in several decisions, for example, Waste Management v. 
Mexico (No. 2), Final Award, ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/00/3, 30 April 2004, para.98; Loewen v. USA, 
Award, 26 June 2003, para.132. 
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a court, failure to give investors proper notification of court hearing, unjustified decisions, 
or undue delay in judicial proceedings,395 corruption of a judge,396 discrimination against 
the foreign litigant.397  
Regarding the denial of justice in administrative proceedings, a wide range of 
ASEAN Member State’s governmental conduct against an ASEAN investor may be 
challenged as inconsistent with the FET standard; for instance, refusal to issue a permit or 
revocation to renew an operating licence without giving reasons, or unreasonable 
procrastinating administrative procedures. A denial of justice may also include a case of 
“pretence of form”398 in order to mask a violation of the ACIA. 
The next question is the degree of seriousness of breach that is required to activate  
a compensable claim. Since the ACIA does not tie FET obligation to the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens, tribunals should not limit 
themselves to the high threshold of liability, as in the Neer case.399 This famous case 
conveyed a clear message that only the very serious, extreme, egregious or outrageous 
conduct or maladministration of the host State can be seen as violating the treaty. A line 
should be drawn between an ordinary error and a gross miscarriage of justice or the gravest 
instances of injustice by domestic courts.400 In contrast to the Neer case, the violations of 
FET standard under the ACIA arise out of procedural irregularity of administration or 
when courts refuse to entertain a suit, and arbitral tribunals consider the State’s conduct in 
question to be simply unfair towards the investor. FET obligations may be breached 
regardless of whether an ASEAN host State has acted intentionally in bad faith or not.401  
In order to activate a compensable claim, an ASEAN investor does not need to 
invoke a duty of State to make full reparation under customary international law, such as 
that provided by article 31 of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on 
                                                 
 
395 Paulsson, J. (2005), Denial of Justice in International Law, Cambridge, CUP.  
396 UNCTAD (2012), FET, p.80. 
397 Loewen v. United States, ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)98/3, Award, 26 June 2003, para.135. 
398 Azinian v. Mexico, ICSID Case No.ARB (AF)/97/2, Award, 1 November 1999, para.99. Tribunal further 
noted, at para.103, that this type of wrong doubtlessly overlaps with a case of “the clear and malicious 
misapplication of the law”.   
399 Neer, Mexico-US General Claims Commission, Decision 15 October 1926, 4 Report of International 
Arbitral Awards. 
400 See e.g. Loewen v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, 26 June 2003, para.242; 
Azinian v. Mexico, para.102. 
401 According to Salacuse, “good faith” or “bad faith” is the notion concerning the motivations of a public 
authority when dealing with foreign investors. However, no tribunal has found that a State acts in bad faith 
even if it is found to be in breach of FET, because faith is very difficult to prove, and the tribunal can 
establish the violation of standards without referring to “faith”. See Salacuse, J.W. (2010), The law of 
investment treaties, pp.230, 233-234; The tribunal in CMS v. Argentina considered that “such intention or 
bad faith can aggravate the situation but are not an essential element of the standard”. CMS v. Argentina, 
2005, para.280. 
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State’s responsibility402 or the principle formulated by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the Chorzów Factory Case.403 Pursuant to the ACIA FET, the 
wronged investor may invoke the ISDS mechanism wherever such violation has incurred 
loss or damage on covered investments.404 Tribunals should ignore minor administrative 
faults with no consequences. Not all imperfection in a government’s conduct or violation 
by the host State of its own domestic law necessarily amounts to a breach of FET standard. 
On the contrary, a State may be in a breach of FET obligation even though it has not 
breached its own laws. 
 
4.2.2.3 Exclusion of Substantive Irregularity          
The language used in the ACIA is written in a way to suggest that the FET standard 
is limited to the denial of justice: “for greater certainty, … treatment requires” rather than 
“includes”. It is also obvious that denial of justice is the only “specified” element, and not 
“additional” content on top of customary international law; nor does it comprise other 
protections that may exist in the minimum standard of treatment of aliens, generally 
considered as an intrinsic element to the FET standard. 
As highlighted above, the ACIA FET only deals with procedural irregularity, and 
declines to deal with substantive exercise of justice. The consequence is three-fold. Firstly, 
ASEAN investors seem to have less protection, and in the case that they desire to invoke 
their right to FET standard, they are obliged to specifically form its claim on procedural 
grounds. Secondly, carte blanche in interpretation of FET was revoked from tribunals. 
They are no longer capable of extending its consideration over the substance of the host 
State’s acts. Thirdly, and in proportion to the two consequences mentioned above, ASEAN 
host States have reclaimed a generous part of their sovereignty which was previously 
unsecured under the vagueness of FET obligations.  
The ACIA’s positive approach to FET straightforwardly repudiates three categories 
of tentative FET grounds. Firstly, it refuses to recognise misapplication of the substantive 
law, where an investment has been affected by gross defects in the substance of the 
                                                 
 
402 Article 31 Reparation, ILC’s Draft on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001  
1. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the 
internationally wrongful act.  
2. Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of a 
State.  
403 Chorzów Factory, 1927, PCIJ, Series A, No.9, p.2. 
404 ACIA article 29. 
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judgement itself or “manifestly unjust judgement”.405 Tribunals are not require to examine 
if the measures concern abusive treatment of an investor, such as arrest of the investor’s 
employees and family members, imposition of an unfavourable agreement under physical 
and financial duress,406 or continuous interference with activities and management of 
investment by a State tax authority.407 These substantive issues are deemed ambiguous and 
susceptible to unpredictable interpretations.  
Secondly, the ACIA FET does not mention the principle of consistency, contrary to 
the Tecmed v. Mexico case, where the tribunal emphasised the need for consistency in the 
decision-making of a national agency in order to conform to the FET standard.407F408 ASEAN 
Member States have not committed to guarantee consistent application of corresponding 
laws, regulations, procedures and administrative guidelines. Besides, ASEAN investors 
cannot invoke FET against measures of targeted discrimination. 
Thirdly, the ACIA has altogether discharged the “legitimate expectation” of its FET 
composition, because this element most conspicuously touches on sovereignty of State. 
“There can be no doubt… that a stable legal and business environment is an essential 
element of [FET]”,408F409 and investors should be able to predict the applicable investment 
rules during the whole life of investment in order to make a decision to invest. Therefore,  
a number of tribunal have considered that the stability of the domestic legal framework is 
in investors’ “legitimate expectation”.409F410 Nevertheless, the incorporation of the vague 
concept of “legitimate expectation” into FET is particularly troubling, and poses a clear 
threat to the rights of governments to regulate. 
Under the ACIA, a desire to provide a stable legal framework is not identical to  
a “stability clause”, where the legislation of ASEAN host States cannot change in a way 
that may negatively affect investors. FET is not a “virtual freezing” of legal regulation of 
economic activities against the usual State’s regulatory power and the evolution of 
economic life. 410F411 The ASEAN Member States preserve their power to change and 
                                                 
 
405 See Article on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its 53rd Session, UNGAOR, 56th sess. Supp. NO.10 UN Doc A/56/10(2001) 
art.4. 
406 See e.g. Desert Line Projects v. Yemen, ICSID Case No.ARB/05/17, para.194. 
407 See e.g. Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No.ARB/02/18, paras.4, 39. 
408 Tecmed v. Mexico, Case No.ARB (AF)/00/2, Award 29 May 2003, paras.154, 162 et seq.   
409 CMS Gas v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8, Award 12 May 2005, para.274. 
410 Metalclad v. Mexico, ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/97/1, Award 30 August 2000, para.99; Tecmed v. Mexico 
(2003), para.154. 
411 AES v. Hungary, ICSID Case No.ARB/07/22, Award 23 Sept 2010, para.9.3.29: The tribunal in AES v. 
Hungary pointed out that a “legal framework is by definition subject to change as it adapts to new 
circumstances day by day and a State has the sovereign right to exercise its powers which includes legislative 
acts.” 
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strengthen regulatory measures in response to changing circumstances, new knowledge, 
investors’ behaviour, public perceptions of risk, and democratic decision-making.  
A fortiori, legal certainty and legal security are sometimes contingent on economic 
and political situations; in the case of a serious crisis or an emergency situation, ASEAN 
Member States may even invoke exception clauses and react in various ways.412 In brief, 
the ACIA FET will not, in an investor-State arbitration, restrict ASEAN host State 
administrative and governmental action to a degree that threatens the policymaking 
autonomy of that State, because arbitrators have no ample latitude to second-guess 
regulators and no ability to impugn government legislative, regulatory, or administrative 
measures. ASEAN Member States retain the right to regulate in the public interest but they 
must do so without violating the due process of law.  
Contrary to the conventional approach, the close-ended nature of the ACIA FET 
may turn FET claims into a less popular form of litigation. Nonetheless, even though the 
ACIA specifies that the FET refers only to “denial of justice”, traditional FET elements 
may survive ‘sous le chapeau’ of “denial of justice”. In other words, tribunals retain 
latitude of interpretation and application of the FET standard, supposing that they reason 
within the sphere of denial of justice regarding procedural issues.  
 
Conclusion to Section 4.2 
Without guideline, a tribunal may use “common sense” approach to what is fair and 
equitable in investigating the components of FET. ACIA article 11 tries to reduce 
vagueness of its FET standard by adding substantive content to the text. This reading of 
FET may cool down a heated controversy on the content of FET. The precision proposed 
by the ACIA leads, to some extent, to more consistency, being predictable in its 
implementation and subsequent interpretation. This practice shows the willingness of 
ASEAN Member States to limit tribunals’ discretion.  
The ACIA FET is not an “overriding” but more balanced standard. It mentions 
specifically denial of justice and due process of law, which concerns only procedural and 
not substantive matters. Along this line of discussion, it has been seen that the ACIA was 
designed by very much taking into account the State’s concerns. This is realistic in the 
sense that ASEAN States commit themselves only to the level that they can achieve. While 
                                                 
 
412 For instance, in LG&E Energy, the ICSID tribunal considered whether the measures taken by Argentina 
during a severe economic and financial crisis which affected adversely the investors’ gas distribution licences 
were arbitrary and therefore violate US-Argentina BIT article II(2)(b). It concluded that the measures taken 
were not arbitrary because they resulted from reasoned judgment of Argentina seeking to avert a complete 
economic collapse, rather than a disregard for the rule of law. LG&E v. Argentina, ICSID, Case 
no.ARB/02/1, Decision on liability, 3 October 2006, para.162. 
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being more precise, the ACIA’s approach to FET seems to give less protection to investors 
than other IIAs, which may render the ASEAN Investment Area less attractive. Despite 
this drawback, the certainty in the content is better than a vague and extensive content 
which surely no one comprehends.  
Procedural fairness of governmental and judicial authorities is a fundamental 
requirement when dealing with foreign investment issues within the States, and even more 
so within the region. For the realisation of intra-ASEAN integration, the quality of  
a country’s administration is a key element in the choices made by foreign investors. These 
choices mainly rely on a comparative public law approach that takes a cross-view of the 
restrictions of governmental activity in domestic legal systems that embrace the concept of 
the rule of law.413  
It should be borne in mind that the national legal systems of ASEAN Member 
States are utterly different, from a constitutional system to tiny specific administrative 
requirements on foreign investment regulations, and that the ACIA FET refers to national 
treatment standard, and does not allude to the minimum standard of treatment. It is then 
possible that an ASEAN Member State may be in a breach of FET, if it does not provide 
reviews by an independent body in any kind of adjudicatory proceedings. In this situation, 
a denial of justice may arise out of substantive deficits of ASEAN States’ laws themselves, 
i.e. where the domestic laws do not allow ASEAN investors to have access to courts or do 
not empower the authorities to the laws.  
It is essential that the FET standard enshrined in the ACIA operates as the 
expression of an international standard that requires the establishment of a decent and 
civilised system of justice as reflected in accepted international and national practice. If the 
application of the relevant principles is a rather fact-specific one, in broader terms, it 
generally obliges ASEAN host States to establish a judicial system that allows the effective 
exercise of the substantive rights granted to foreign investors. Hence, although there are 
effective and efficient laws administrative procedures in some ASEAN countries, the 
others need to make changes in order to meet a higher standard within a time-bound 
schedule. This further concerns the questions of legal facilitation and harmonisation in the 
ASEAN Investment Area.  
  
                                                 
 
413 Schill, S. W. (2006), Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the 
Rule of Law, IILJ WP 2006/6, Global Administrative Law Series, p.4.  
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Section 4.3 Transfers 
           The right to transfers is one of typical standards of protection of foreign investments 
found in BITs. BITs normally require host States to allow the full range of investments 
made by the investors of the Parties. Under customary international law, States may 
impose exchange control restrictions without incurring international responsibility. 
Investors’ exposure to loss comes from the fact that States have sovereign power over their 
own currency, which relates to both internal and external aspects of their monetary and 
financial systems. 413F414 Most ASEAN governments are usually reluctant to accept 
international legal obligations that would constrain their monetary sovereignty, especially 
where the “ASEAN Way” esteems so much sovereignty and non-external interference in 
domestic affairs.  
In order to attract investment flows, the ACIA guarantees an investor’s right to 
cross-border transfers in its article 13, which allows both inward and outward transfers of 
all types of “covered investments”. It offers a range of specific guarantees to ASEAN 
investors to mitigate the risk of arbitrariness of ASEAN host States. In addition, the ACIA 
typically establishes a number of obligations regarding the manner in which ASEAN host 
States should treat investments prior to the transfer of the proceeds. These obligations are 
necessary to render the right to transfers effective.  
Under the AEC, freedom to manage funds to and from ASEAN host States is 
essential for any business operation. The ACIA transfer provision allows freer flow of 
capital in the ASEAN single market.414F415 The transfer provision ensures that a foreign 
investor is able to enjoy financial benefits from successful investments. In general, States 
that commit to permit foreign investors to transfer and repatriate proceeds of investments 
in their territory are more attractive than States with transfer restrictions. 415F416  
Nevertheless, a notable feature of the ACIA is that it contains a provision that 
specifically allows for temporary imposition of restrictions on transfers in exceptional 
circumstances. Although “general exceptions” and “security exceptions” are commonly 
found in other BITs, this specific economic exception is unusual. The temporary use of 
                                                 
 
414 Zimmermann, C.D. (2013), “A Contemporary Concept of Monetary Sovereignty”, EJIL, Vol.24, No.3, 
p.799.   
415 The AEC Blueprint sets the ACIA as a realising tool of a single investment area as ASEAN policy is to 
allow greater capital mobility. 
416 Dolzer, R., Schreuer, C. (2012), p.212; Newcombe, A.P., Paradell, L.S. (2009), Law and Practice of 
Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment, p.399. 
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capital controls as a safeguard measure is similar to rules under the IMF,417 OECD,418 and 
the WTO.419 Most bilateral and regional investment agreements do not contain such 
derogations. The general absence of these provisions may be attributable to the general 
perception that the priority of BITs is to protect FDI, rather than the State.420  
Among regional agreements in force in the 1990s, only the NAFTA contains such  
a specific provision. The ACIA has opted for the NAFTA model and become one of the 
few investment agreements to contain this peculiar feature. Hence, ACIA article 13 
contains not only a non-exclusive list of “all transfers relating to a covered investment to 
be made freely and without delay into and out of” the ASEAN Member State’s territory, 
but also circumscribes the situations in which the imposition of restrictions on any capital 
transactions are allowed.  
Two observations may explain the derogation provisions provided in the ACIA. 
First, the objectives and the scope of application of the ACIA are broader than the 
IGA/AIA agreements. The ACIA covers not only protection but also liberalisation of 
investment. This means that ASEAN Member States must not only allow the repatriation 
of the proceeds but also liberalise transfers that are necessary to make new investments. 
The treatment of transfers for liberalisation purposes reduces the economic and financial 
policy space of ASEAN Member States. Besides, the ACIA unusually includes portfolio 
investment in its definition of “investment”, and portfolios investment flows are more 
volatile than FDI. In the context of a balance-of-payments crisis, it is possible that an 
ASEAN Member State may be forced to impose restrictions to the investment-related 
transfers.  
Second, ASEAN experienced its greatest financial crisis at the end of last century, 
where the whole region suffered from the threat of serious balance-of-payments and 
external financial difficulties. Under the previous regime, there was no exception provision 
in the IGA allowing States the use of capital control without the possibility of infringing 
investor’s right to transfers. In that situation, an ASEAN Member State could have only 
invoked, as defence, the “state of necessity” under customary international law, as codified 
by article 25 of the 2001 International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. This defence was repeatedly 
                                                 
 
417 IMF Articles of Agreement, Article V: Operations and Transactions of the Fund, Section 3(a) Conditions 
governing use of the Fund’s general resources. 
418 OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements, article 7. 
419 GATT, Article XII: Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments, Article XVIII:B Governmental 
Assistance to Economic Development. 
420 UNCTAD (2000), Transfer of Funds, New York Geneva, UN Publication, p.37. 
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invoked, with or without success, by the Argentinean Government during its financial 
crisis in 2001-2002.421 
For these two major reasons, the ACIA is specifically designed to balance the value 
of monetary sovereignty and the attraction of the AEC. Given its significance in the 
ASEAN context, the transfer provision became the longest substantive article in the ACIA. 
ACIA article 13 provides details on transfers and several categories of exceptions, whereas 
ACIA article 16 further explains one specific exception regarding measures used by an 
ASEAN host State to safeguard the balance-of-payments, as follows:  
         Article 13 Transfers 
1. Each Member State shall allow all transfers relating to a covered investment 
to be made freely and without delay into and out of its territory.  Such transfers 
include: 
           (a) contributions to capital, including the initial contribution;  
(b) profits, capital gains, dividends, royalties, license fees, technical 
assistance and technical and management fees, interest and other current 
income accruing from any covered investment; 
(c) proceeds from the total or partial sale or liquidation of any covered 
investment; 
(d) payments made under a contract, including a loan agreement; 
(e) payments made pursuant to Articles 12 (Compensation in Cases of Strife) 
and 14 (Expropriation and Compensation); 
(f) payments arising out of the settlement of a dispute by any means including 
adjudication, arbitration or the agreement of the Member States to the 
dispute; and earnings and other remuneration of personnel employed and 
allowed to work in connection with that covered investment in its territory. 
2. Each Member State shall allow transfers relating to a covered investment to 
be made in a freely usable currency at the market rate of exchange prevailing at 
the time of transfer. 
3. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, a Member State may prevent or delay a 
transfer through the equitable, non-discriminatory, and good faith application 
of its laws and regulations relating to: 
(a) bankruptcy, insolvency, or the protection of the rights of creditors; 
(b) issuing, trading, or dealing in securities, futures, options, or derivatives; 
(c) criminal or penal offences and the recovery of the proceeds of crime; 
(d) financial reporting or record keeping of transfers when necessary to assist 
law enforcement or financial regulatory authorities; 
(e) ensuring compliance with orders or judgments in judicial or administrative 
proceedings;  
(f) taxation; 
(g) social security, public retirement, or compulsory savings schemes;   
(h) severance entitlements of employees; and 
                                                 
 
421 See e.g. CMS v. Argentina, ICSID case no.ARB/01/8, Award 12 May 2005; LG&E v. Argentina, ICSID 
case no.ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 Oct 200; Enron v. Argentina, ICSID case no.ARB/01/3, Award 
22 May 2007, Sempra v. Argentina, ICSID case no. ARB/02/16, Award 28 Sept 2007; Vivendi v. Argentina, 
ICSID case no.ARB/03/09, Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010; BG Group v. Argentina, UNCITRAL, Final 
Award 24 Dec 2007; National Grid v. Argentina, Award 3 Nov 2008. 
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(i) the requirement to register and satisfy other formalities imposed by the 
Central Bank and other relevant authorities of a Member State. 
4. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights and obligations of the 
Member States as members of the IMF, under the Articles of Agreement of the 
IMF, including the use of exchange actions which are in conformity with the 
Articles of Agreement of the IMF, provided that a Member State shall not 
impose restrictions on any capital transactions inconsistently with its specific 
commitments under this Agreement regarding such transactions, except: 
(a) at the request of the IMF;  
(b) under Article 16 (Measures to Safeguard the Balance-of-Payments); or  
(c) where, in exceptional circumstances, movements of capital cause, or 
threaten to cause, serious economic or financial disturbance in the 
Member State concerned. 
5. The measures taken in accordance with sub-paragraph 4(c):  
 (a) shall be consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the IMF; 
 (b) shall not exceed those necessary to deal with the circumstances described 
in sub-paragraph 4(c); 
 (c) shall be temporary and shall be eliminated as soon as conditions  no 
longer justify their institution or maintenance; 
 (d) shall promptly be notified to the other Member States; 
 (e) shall be applied  such that any one of the other Member States is treated 
no less favourably than any other Member State or non-Member State; 
 (f) shall be applied  on a national treatment basis;  and 
 (g) shall avoid unnecessary damage to  investors and covered investments, 
and the commercial, economic and financial interests of the other 
Member State(s). 
 
Footnote 8. For greater certainty, any measures taken to ensure the stability of 
the exchange rate including to prevent speculative capital flows shall not be 
adopted or maintained for the purpose of protecting a particular sector. 
         Article 16 Measures to Safeguard the Balance-of-Payments 
1. In the event of serious balance-of-payments and external financial 
difficulties or threat thereof, a Member State may adopt or maintain restrictions 
on payments or transfers related to investments.  It is recognised that particular 
pressures on the balance-of-payments of a Member State in the process of 
economic development may necessitate the use of restrictions to ensure, inter 
alia, the maintenance of a level of financial reserves adequate for the 
implementation of its programme of economic development. 
2. The restrictions referred to in paragraph 1 shall: 
  (a) be consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the IMF; 
  (b) avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial, economic and financial 
interests of another Member State; 
  (c) not exceed those necessary to deal with the circumstances described in 
paragraph 1; 
  (d) be temporary and be phased out progressively as the situation specified in 
paragraph 1 improves;  
   (e) be applied such that any one of the other Member States is treated no 
less favourably than any other Member State or non-Member State. 
3. Any restrictions adopted or maintained under paragraph 1, or any changes 
therein, shall be promptly notified to the other Member States. 
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4. To the extent that it does not duplicate the process under WTO, IMF, or any 
other similar processes, the Member State adopting any restrictions under 
paragraph 1 shall commence consultations with any other Member State that 
requests such consultations in order to review the restrictions adopted by it. 
The ACIA practice of including such provisions reflects a new and decisive trend in 
the investment treaty rule-making process. The first part of this section examines article 13 
as to the scope and condition of transfer of funds and its implications for deeper economic 
integration, and then its general application in normal circumstances. The second part 
explains the particular context in which ACIA article 16 was conceived, i.e. the ASEAN 
Economic Crisis, the necessity of transfer restriction in exceptional circumstances, and the 
extent to which measures to mitigate the economic crisis are permissible.  
As the adoption of these exceptions may provoke capital flight and make the 
ASEAN Investment Area less attractive, the ACIA has well-defined and internationally 
accepted criteria. Specific attention should be paid to the interaction of regional investment 
law and international financial law under multilateral regimes. All ASEAN Member States 
are members of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose jurisdiction and mandate in 
the area of balance-of-payments assessment overlaps with the scope of application of the 
ACIA. In order to avoid conflicting rights and obligations under the two treaty regimes, 
arbitral tribunals should verify if restrictive measures imposed on transfers under the ACIA 
comply with Members’ rights and obligations under the Fund’s Articles.  
 
4.3.1 General Practice: Article 13 Free Transfers  
The ACIA’s transfer provisions protect the investors’ right similarly to the treaties 
of other major capital exporting nations. ASEAN Member States have relinquished part of 
their monetary sovereignty and aimed higher for the sake of regional economic integration. 
The ACIA contains a number of common considerations that are of particular relevance to 
the treatment of transfers, including: (1) scope of investors’ rights to make transfers, and 
nature and types of payments covered by such rights; (2) conditions that States must allow 
transfers regarding currency convertibility, exchange rate, and time for effecting transfers; 
and (3) limitations to investors’ right, where their transfers may be held for particular 
reasons. 
 
4.3.1.1 Scope of Transfers 
           In order to operate their investments effectively within the ASEAN Investment 
Area, ASEAN investors need to transfer a wide variety of monies. ACIA article 13 
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guarantees that every ASEAN investor may freely and without delay conduct transfers 
relating to its investments into and out of the territory of ASEAN Member State where its 
investment is located. Such transfers include contributions to capital, including the initial 
contribution; profits, capital gains, dividends, royalties, license fees, technical assistance 
and technical and management fees, interest and other current income accruing from any 
covered investment; proceeds from the total or partial sale or liquidation of any covered 
investment; and payments made under a contract, including a loan agreement. Investors are 
also granted the right to transfer payments in case that an ASEAN host State has breached 
articles 12 (Compensation in Cases of Strife) or 14 (Expropriation and Compensation) of 
the ACIA, as well as transfer payments arising out of the settlement of a dispute.  
In order to be protected, ASEAN investors must demonstrate at least two elements: 
first, that they have complied with all established procedures for the grant of the transfer 
permission, for instance, formal application to the relevant government authorities; second, 
that the funds sought to be transferred falls within the ACIA list of permitted transfers. 
Unlike the IMF Article and OECD Codes, the ACIA and most of IIAs make no distinction 
between payments for “current international transactions” and “capital transfers”.422 In the 
absence of explicit reference to the purpose or nature of such transfers, the ACIA obliges 
States Parties to permit all transfers relating to covered investments. 
Under the ASEAN investment regime, the ease of transferring funds across national 
borders has various purposes. Apart from free movement of investment itself, free 
movement of skilled labour also necessitates transfers of earnings and other remuneration 
of personnel employed, which allows them to work in connection with covered 
investments in the ASEAN Investment Area.423 Where appropriate and possible, States 
will remove or relax restrictions, facilitate flows of payments and transfers for current 
account transactions and for capital flows, and support FDI and initiatives to promote 
capital market development and integration. The AEC Blueprint does not entail a complete 
removal of restrictions on cross-border capital flows. The commitment is merely limited to 
“freer” flow of capital than the current situation. The capital mobility within the region 
remains a large part under the control of ASEAN Member States. They have the policy of 
progressive liberalisation and very selective approach for capital flow.  
 
                                                 
 
422 OECD (2013), OECD Codes of Liberalisation of Capital Movements and of Current Invisible Operations. 
423 ACIA article 13(1)(g). 
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4.3.1.2 Currency Convertibility and Time Elements 
The transfer obligation requires that investors are able to receive and repatriate 
amounts relating to investments without any restrictions. Yet, this alone is insufficient to 
protect their right. Key issues relate, first, to the type of foreign currency and the applicable 
rate of exchange that the investor is entitled to convert their capital into, especially prior to 
repatriation; second, to the time element for effecting transfers. The ACIA follows 
standard practice in this respect. 
 
 
           (1) Currency Convertibility and Exchange Rate  
           ACIA article 13(2) specifies that the currency to be made available to ASEAN 
investors is “freely usable currency”. ACIA article 4(b) refers this term to the IMF 
definition. Under the IMF Articles and any amendments thereto, “a freely usable currency 
means a member’s currency that the Fund determines (i) is in fact, widely used to make 
payments for international transactions, and (ii) is widely traded in the principal exchange 
markets”.424 ASEAN host States are required to let investors convert their incomes and 
profits into a foreign currency prior to repatriation, so that investors can realise the 
expected return and repatriated profits. The obligation to allow purchases and outflows of 
foreign currency significantly limits the monetary sovereignty of ASEAN host States. 
Concerning the applicable exchange rate, the ACIA has an approach common to 
other IIAs.425 It does not protect ASEAN-investors against the risk of exchange rate 
fluctuation. The specific exchange rate to be applied in converting domestic currency is at 
the market rate of exchange prevailing at the time of transfer. As a consequence, the rate of 
the outward transfer may be lower or higher than that of the inward transfer that ASEAN 
investors made at the time of the original investment.  
           (2) Time for Effecting Transfers 
Another important element which the ACIA guarantees for the profitability of an 
investment project in the ASEAN Investment Area is the time within which an ASEAN 
host State must allow an investor to make transfers. ASEAN Member States have agreed to 
allow all transfers of money to be made “without delay”.426 Nevertheless, due to its 
vagueness, the term “without delay” may have several interpretations. Qualification of the 
                                                 
 
424 IMF Agreement article XXX Section f. 
425 See e.g. NAFTA article 1109(2).  
426 NAFTA article 1109 and ECT article 14(2) also require that that transfers are to be made without delay. 
However, as the ECT covers a return in kind, it is possible that such return will be transferred with delayed 
due to its nature. 
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term “without delay” is found twice in the ACIA footnotes but without further explanation 
of the term. Footnote 11 to ACIA article 14(2)(a) on expropriation and compensation, and 
footnote 15 to ACIA article 41(6) on settlement of disputes expound that transfers under 
these provisions must be without delay, although there may be legal and administrative 
processes that need to be observed before payment of the expropriation amount can be 
made or before an award can be complied with. Some treaties fix the time limit that 
transfers must not exceed in any case at a six months period,427 or provide that the transfer 
period commences on the day on which the request for transfer has been submitted and 
may not exceed two months.428 Unfortunately, the ACIA does not fix any time limit for the 
transfer obligations, and investors may have to wait longer than they would have thought. 
Yet it is clear from the “without delay” clause that ACIA drafters intended to follow the 
same rationale as that of treaties setting clearer time-limits. 
4.3.1.3 Limitations of Transfers  
           Previously, IGA article VII guaranteed the right to repatriation of capital and 
earning without restriction. However, ACIA article 13(3) now sets some limitations to the 
right of transfers. The ACIA’s obligation not to restrict payments for transactions is 
circumscribed by a number of exceptions for specific purposes. Commonly found in 
modern IIAs, the first type addresses “good governance”, requiring ASEAN host State 
governments to have legal authority to supervise and regulate financial transfers under 
specific legislations in normal circumstances. Without this limitation to the transfer 
obligation, an ASEAN host State may find itself in breach of the transfer obligations. The 
second type is temporary derogation in exceptional circumstances. This second feature, 
specific to the ASEAN context, is further discussed in section 4.3.2.  
           Under normal circumstances, ASEAN investors must respect laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures of host States concerning money transfers. Investors must 
register and satisfy other formalities imposed by the Central Bank of a Member State, in 
order for the relevant State authorities to oversee all inward and outward transfers and so 
State may be able to prevent potential crisis. Meanwhile, ASEAN host States are not 
required to abandon measures that ensure compliance with their laws and regulations in 
order to safeguard national “public order”. ACIA article 13(3) allows States to prevent or 
delay transfers if those transfers are effectuated under laws and regulations mostly relating 
to criminal and public laws. 
                                                 
 
427 See e.g. 2006 French Model BIT article 6. 
428 See e.g. Austria-Philippines BIT article 6. 
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           With respect to civil, administrative or criminal proceedings within an ASEAN host 
country, proceedings may result in the issuance of a monetary judgement against investors 
which may attach the proceeds of amounts derived from the foreign investments. In these 
circumstances, investors will be restricted from making necessary transfers. Regarding the 
protection of creditor rights, it is not a breach of free transfer obligation when assets related 
to covered investment are frozen and transfers of payments are restricted, pursuant to 
bankruptcy and insolvency laws of a host State. Administrators of insolvency proceedings 
retain the authority to nullify earlier payments that have been made.429 ASEAN host States 
may also hold transfers until the tax issue of that ASEAN investor is satisfied, so that such 
investors cannot evade taxation.430 Nonetheless, even though ASEAN host States are 
allowed to regulate transfers under these specific laws, a national supervision power is 
obliged to apply laws in an equitable, non-discriminatory, and good faith manner. This 
practice is consistently found in IIAs where limitations to transfers obligation are 
included.431  
 
4.3.2 Specificity: Capital Restriction in Exceptional Circumstances 
The issue of economic exceptions within economic integration treaties is highly 
controversial. While supporting the free transfer principle, from the perspective of both 
developing and developed countries, exceptions should be allowed,432 obviously with 
certain conditions. The ACIA is one of the notable exceptions which explicitly allows  
for prudential regulation of the financial sector in time of economic emergency. This 
exception is neither found in other regional investment agreements nor in BITs in force at 
the end of the 20th Century. While most of modern IIAs may have provisions on limitations 
to transfers, as discussed in section 4.3.1.3, they do not have specific exceptions  
on balance-of-payments.433 Indeed, balance-of-payments exceptions are originally found  
in a bilateral comprehensive investment agreement between Japan and Korea.434  
                                                 
 
429 UNCTAD (2000), Transfer of Funds, p.36. 
430 ACIA article 13(3)(f). 
431 See e.g. ECT article 14(4). 
432 UNCTAD (2000), Transfer of Funds, p.44. 
433 For example, ECT article 14(4). However, Kolo argues that the absence of such an explicit stipulation on 
balance-of-payment exceptions, a host State may still be able to restrict capital transfers, either ECT article 
24 (Exceptions) or under the doctrine of necessity in general international law (as codified in article 25 ILC’s 
Articles on State Responsibility). See Kolo, A. (2010), “Transfer of Funds: the Interaction between the IMF 
Articles of Agreement and Modern Investment Treaties: a Comparative Law Perspective”, in Schill, S.W. 
(ed.) (2010), pp.357. 
434 2002 Japan-Korea CIA article 17. 
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            While the IGA (protection agreement) contained no exception to the right to 
repatriate capital and earnings, emergency safeguard measures provisions appeared in AIA 
(liberalisation agreement) article 14. These two agreements treat only outflow direct 
investments. Unlike the previous IGA/AIA regime, the ACIA transfer of fund provision 
now covers both inflows and outflows of direct and portfolio investments. As a result, the 
current regime may be more vulnerable to serious balance-of-payments or external 
financial difficulties.  
Contrary to the exclusive list of permitted transfers previously set in IGA article 7, 
the ACIA adopts more modern approach.435 ACIA article 13 states a general obligation to 
allow transfer, combined with a non-exclusive list of permitted transactions, which covers 
both direct and portfolio investments. The term “transfer” in the ACIA covers a broader 
category of transfers than the term “repatriation”, previously used in the IGA.436 While the 
latter allowed only repatriations of capital and earnings in the post-establishment phase,  
the former includes both inward and outward transfers in the admission and establishment 
phase. This more liberal approach of the ACIA should be seen as an exception to general 
IIAs practice. Only few investment treaties, mainly those negotiated by the US, Canada, 
and Japan, encompass the pre-establishment phase.437 Regarding inward transfers, the 
ACIA covers both transfers made for purposes of making initial investments, and transfers 
made to develop or maintain existing investments. 
The ACIA and some agreements that ASEAN concluded in 2009, such as the 
AANZFTA and the ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement (AKIA), are among the first 
agreements which follow the NAFTA in allowing States to control investment-related 
transfers in extraordinary circumstances. Model BITs, such as the 2012 SADC Model 
BIT,438 include these special economic exceptions in their text. Newly negotiated IIAs, 
such as CETA, and TTIP,439 are proposing to include them. To date, the balance-of-
payment provisions have not yet been interpreted by any investment arbitral tribunals.440   
ACIA article 16 provides two scenarios where ASEAN Member States may invoke 
balance-of-payment exceptions: “serious balance-of-payments and external financial 
                                                 
 
435 See generally UNCTAD (2000), Transfer of Funds, pp.24-27. See e.g. NAFTA article 1109, Transfers. 
436 The OECD Codes are the examples of the broad coverage. See OECD (2013). 
437 See Dolzer, R., Schreuer (2012); Palacio I., Muchlinski, P., “Admission and Establishment”, in 
Muchlinski, P. et al (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (2008) p.226, pp.239-245. 
438 2012 SADC Model BIT article 8, Repatriation of Assets, 8.4 Safeguard provision. 
439 Cf. Public consultation on TTIP (the proposed template is negotiated based on the CETA draft) Article X: 
Prudential Carve-out, Article X Safeguard measures, Article X BoP.  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc_152280.pdf (Last accessed: 23 September 2015). 
440 Desierto, D. (2015), Public Policy in International Economic Law: The ICESCR in Trade, Finance and 
Investment, Oxford, OUP, p.332. 
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difficulties or threat thereof” and “economic development”. While the former scenario  
is commonly found in the NAFTA,441 AKIA,442 COMESA443, CETA444 the latter scenario 
is absent from their texts. The “economic development” exceptions are specifically 
mentioned in the ACIA and the AANZFTA.445 These “economic development” exceptions 
are originally found in GATS.446  
Several questions arise from the application of exceptions under ACIA article 13 
and 16. Economic exceptions may be placed in three stages of reasoning: (1) in exceptional 
circumstances, such as the 1997 ASEAN Economic Crisis, the 2001 Argentinian Great 
Depression or the 2008 US Financial Crisis, an ASEAN Member State may invoke 
balance-of-payment concern as a defence against breach of transfers right of investors;  
(2) these measures should be in accordance with the IMF Articles; and (3) tribunals should 
restrict themselves only to the examination of necessity and proportionality of such 
measures.  
 
4.3.2.1 Background of Exceptions: ASEAN Economic Crisis  
           In the 1980s-1990s, ASEAN Member States desired to attract foreign investments 
and became leading investment destination in the developing world by opening up 
financially as GATT/WTO, GATS, and IMF members. They accepted article VIII of the 
IMF Articles requiring Members to avoid restrictions on current capital,447 and deregulated 
the currency exchange rules which allowed freer flow of capital, in the same time as they 
concluded IIAs guaranteeing the right to transfers of funds. This engendered the “ASEAN 
Miracle” where the domestic market exploded.448 
Early in 1997, excessive capital flows inevitably led to the collapse of exceeded 
valuations of asset price, while speculative investors attacked rapidly. Large injections of 
money into a small economy caused distortions in the market.449 Eventually there was a 
sudden reversion; foreign investors pulled their money out simultaneously, causing more 
                                                 
 
441 NAFTA article 2104(1) Exceptions, Balance of Payments. 
442 AKIA article 11 Temporary Safeguard Measures. 
443 COMESA CCI article 25 Measures to Safeguard Balance of Payments. 
444 CETA article X.04: Restrictions in Case of BoP and External Financial Difficulties 
445 AANZFTA Chapter 15 article 4, Measures to Safeguard the BoP. 
446 GATS article XII: Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments. 
447 IMF Articles Agreement, article VIII, General Obligations of Members, Section 2, Avoidance of 
restrictions on current payments 
448 Krugman, P. (1994), The Myth of Asia’s Miracle, Foreign Affairs, Essay November/December 1994 Issue 
73, Vol.6, p.62. 
449 See Magud, N., Reinhart, C.M. (2006), Capital Controls: An Evaluation, NBER WP 11973, Cambridge, 
MA, National Bureau of Economic Research; Ocampo, J.A., Palma, J.G. (2008), “The Role of Preventive 
Capital Account Regulations”, in Ocampo, J.A., Stiglitz, J.E. (eds.), Capital Market Liberalization and 
Development, New York, OUP, p.170-204. 
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panic outward flow which further aggravated the crisis.450 The balance-of-payments of 
these countries came under severe pressure. The Asian currencies depreciated, which 
resulted in economic downturn.451  
The Asian crisis was primarily caused by the self-inflicted process of external 
financial liberalisation. ASEAN countries had liberalised capital accounts with the wrong 
speed and sequencing. Furthermore, the financial systems were not sophisticated enough to 
deal with a surge of short-term foreign investment inflows, and the ASEAN governments 
did not have a proper monitoring mechanism.452 This was the most dramatic economic 
crisis in Asia since World War II, where the whole region suffered concurrently.  
At the time of the 1997 Economic Crisis, the IMF was severely criticised for 
inappropriate policy advice, which made the situation worse. Eventually, the IMF changed 
its policy and allowed the use of restrictive measures. ASEAN Governments issued 
restrictive measures in order to slow down inflows and outflows of short-term capital. 
They also adopted a tighter monetary policy.453 This partly solved and prevented further 
financial instability generated by short-term capital flows. 454  
After the Asian Financial Crisis, ASEAN Member States realised their errant steps 
in financial liberalisation. Each country shifted its policy priorities considerably to 
strengthen domestic demand and reform financial systems for more diverse categories of 
financial instruments. As structural weaknesses were addressed, the ASEAN market 
became more resilient; this was proved when the 2008 Global Financial Crisis struck the 
developed countries’ markets, but largely spared ASEAN countries.  
The absence of balance-of-payment or Fund-related provisions from the IGA 
agreement indicates that the contracting parties intended to adopt a more liberal regime on 
outflows. Balance-of-payments derogation provisions are often absent from most bilateral 
and regional agreements which, when States issues restrictive measures on transfers, raises 
the question of consistency with the overarching objective of IIAs. Argentina has the 
highest number of claims which partly relate to the financial crisis, because Argentina 
invoked the use of economic necessity, where it had no balance-of-payments exception 
                                                 
 
450 Gallagher, K. P. (2010), Policy Space to Prevent and Mitigate Financial Crises in Trade and Investment 
Agreements, G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No.58, May 2010, UNCTAD, p.3. 
451 See types of financial crisis in IMF (2009), BoP and International Investment Position Manual, 6th Ed.  
452 Duncan, E.W. (2001-2002), “Policy Perspectives on the Use of Capital Controls in Emerging Market 
Nations: Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis and a Look at the International Legal Regime”, Fordham 
Law Review, vol.70, p.561.  
453 ADB (1999), Policy Response to the Asian Financial Crisis: An Overview of the Debate and the Next 
Steps, Issue May 1999, ADB Publication, p.2.  
454 IMF Staff (2000), Recovery from the Asian Crisis and the Role of the IMF, Issue 00/05  
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm (Last accessed: 27 Aug 2015). 
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clause in its treaties. Most arbitral cases have ruled against Argentina and have awarded 
monetary compensation to the claimant-investors.455  
To forestall risks, ASEAN Member States have developed more detailed and 
clearer provisions on balance-of-payment exceptions in the ACIA because of their 
experiences with exceptional economic and financial circumstances in recent years. 
Similar discussions have taken place in the European Union context. A free transfer of 
funds provision is found in most of the extra-EU BITs without any economic exception, in 
contrast to the TFEU, which contains exceptions to the free movement of capital. Articles 
64,456 66,457 and 75458 of the TFEU permit restrictions on the free movement of capital to 
and from third countries.  
The European Court of Justice (the “ECJ”) ruled in 2009 that the BITs of 
Sweden459 and of Austria460 with non-European countries were in violation of their 
obligations under the EU treaty. A similar case was, later, filed against Finland.461 The ECJ 
recognised investors’ right to move investment-related capital without undue delay. This 
investors’ right, however, cannot be reconciled with the European Community’s right to 
regulate the movement of capital between EU Member States and third countries, 
including restricting capital flows in exceptional circumstances. The ruling found that 
Austria and Sweden had not fulfilled their obligations under TEC article 307 (now TEFU 
article 351), which obliges Member States to take appropriate steps to eliminate 
incompatibilities between their pre-accession agreements and the EC Treaty. The EU trend 
allows more room for States to regulate in case of emergency. 
Given several crises prompted by the failure of global governance to detect the 
faults in global financial systems, it was time for ASEAN to establish its own credible 
                                                 
 
455 See UNCTAD (2009), Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, UNCTAD Doc, IIA 
Monitor No.1, p.2-3. 
456 TEC Ex-Article 57: TFEU article 64(1) allows Member States to maintain certain restrictions on capital 
movements in existence on 31 December 1993. TFEU article 64(2) authorises the European Council to 
regulate the movement of capital “involving direct investment,…the provision of financial services or the 
admission of security and capital markets”, to and from third countries. 
457 TEC ex-article 59: In the same vein, TFEU article 66 permits the Council to “take safeguard measures 
with regard to third countries for a period not exceeding six months if such measures are strictly necessary”, 
such as where the movement of capital causes or threatens to cause serious difficulties for the operation of 
economic and monetary union. 
458 TEC Ex-Article 60: Under TFEU article 75, the Council may restrict economic relations with third 
countries, for instance through economic sanctions, including restricting the movement of capital and 
payments, on the basis of a joint action relating to the common foreign security policy. 
459 C-249/06, Commission v. Sweden. 
460 C-205/06, Commission v. Austria.  
461 C-118/07, Commission v. Finland.  
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regional financial architecture.462 The ACIA requires a more precautionary approach. 
Arguably, the most effective solution to avoid financial disasters is to clarify and establish 
the ability of the host States to impose restrictions on transfers in response to balance-of-
payments crises.463 Consequently, the ACIA provides specific economic and financial 
exceptions on top of general exceptions and security exceptions. In this respect, it is 
important to determine the extent to which measures to mitigate the present crisis or to 
prevent future crises are permissible under the ACIA. The subsequent sections discuss this 
in detail; they distinguish between three “stages” of State interference with the free transfer 
principle. 
4.3.2.2 Stage 1: State’s Legitimacy to Economic Exceptions 
           At a first stage, the free transfer obligation may be temporarily derogated in 
exceptional circumstances. ACIA article 13(4) provides that ASEAN Member States may 
impose restrictions on any capital transactions as a temporary measure on a non-
discriminatory basis, in three specific circumstances: (a) at the request of the IMF;  
(b) where the measure is taken to safeguard the balance of payments, under Article 16; or 
(c) in exceptional circumstances where capital movement causes or threatens to cause 
serious economic or financial disturbance in the ASEAN Member State concerned. 
Capital controls often heighten a country’s financial regulations and seek to limit 
risk-taking of financial intermediaries and borrowers. There are two broad categories of 
control.464 First, administrative or direct controls involve prohibitions on specific types of 
transactions, for example on quotas, rule-based or discretionary approval, or minimum-stay 
requirements. Second, market-based or indirect controls rely primarily on explicit or 
implicit taxation in order to discourage capital flows.465 Under a serious economic crisis, 
the importance of economic derogation clauses, as measures of last resort to confront 
financial chaos, cannot be underestimated. 
                                                 
 
462 Rillo, A.D. (2009), “ASEAN Economies: Challenges and Responses amid the Crisis”, Southeast Asian 
Affairs, Vol.2009, pp.17-27; Sussangkarn, C. (2010), The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: Origin, 
Development and Outlook, ADBI WP Series No.230. 
463 Even “where the proposed Fund institutional view recognizes the use of inflow or outflow CFMs as an 
appropriate policy response, these measures could still violate a member‘s obligations under other 
international agreements if those agreements do not have temporary safeguard provisions compatible with the 
Fund’s approach”. See International Monetary Fund (2012), The Liberalization and Management of Capital 
Flows: An Institutional View, Washington, IMF, p.42. 
464 Ariyoshi, A. et al. (2000), Capital Controls: Country Experiences with Their Use and Liberalization 6, 
IMF Occasional Paper No.190, Part 1: Main Paper, p.6.   
465 Idem. In general, indirect, or market-based, controls discourage particular capital movements by making 
them more costly. Market-based controls often involve explicit or implicit taxation “on external financial 
transactions, thus limiting their attractiveness.”  
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Under exception (a), ASEAN Member States are allowed to breach their transfer 
obligations for the sake of the global financial regime, as the IMF provisions recognise the 
exchange controls as instrument of economic policy. In this connection, it is useful to 
remember that all ASEAN member States are also IMF members.466 In critical situations, 
the Fund may request Member States to impose capital control in order to prevent large 
outflows that could make it necessary for them to resort to the Fund for financial 
assistance. In consultation with the IMF, States may impose restrictive measures, ranging 
from voluntary standstill arrangements with creditors to limit net outflows of capital or,  
if necessary and as a last resort, to impose such measures unilaterally. Foreign private 
investors may not be allowed to repatriate their money freely; they may then be asked to 
stay the capital, rollover the debt, or even take some losses.467 Otherwise, the Fund may 
declare that Member ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund.468 
For exception (b), ACIA article 16 allows States to adopt or maintain restrictions 
on payments or transfers related to investments, in the event of external financial 
difficulties or threat thereof, or for the purpose of economic development. Although these 
measures may result in unduly delay transfers of funds, an ASEAN host State will not be 
held in breach of transfer obligations.  
In the event of external financial difficulties, the balance-of-payment clause in the 
ACIA allows an ASEAN host State to impose new restrictions on a temporary basis for 
reasons of balance of payments stability and macroeconomic management; that is,  
to protect monetary reserves and national currency from abrupt exchange rate fluctuations 
or devaluation,469 by means of capital controls, and restrictions on payments or transfers 
related to investments. This exception is also found in the OECD Codes,470 the GATS471 
and the IMF Articles.472  
The ACIA allows also unusual exceptions for “internal” financial difficulties. 
Article 16(1) contains “transitional derogation” which permits an ASEAN host State to 
                                                 
 
466 See list of members and the effective date of membership at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/memdate.htm  
467 IMF (2000), Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises - Standstills - Preliminary 
Considerations, Prepared by the Policy Development and Review and Legal Departments, 5 September 
2000. http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sstill/2000/eng/ (Last accessed: 26 August 2015) 
468 Article VI: Capital Transfers, Section 1. Use of the Fund’s general resources for capital transfers. 
469 Viterbo, A. (2012), International Economic Law and Monetary Measures: Limitations to States’ 
Sovereignty and Dispute settlement, Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar Pub, p.153. 
470 OECD Codes article 7(c) provides that members may temporarily suspend their measures of liberalisation 
“if the overall balance of payments of a member develops adversely at a rate and in circumstances, including 
the state of its monetary reserves, which it considers serious”. 
471 GATS article XII.  
472 Article VI: Capital Transfers, Section 3 Controls of capital transfers, referring to article VII, Section 3(b) 
Scarcity of the Fund’s holdings, after approval and consultation with the Fund.  
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maintain and adapt existing restrictions to changing circumstances on the grounds that its 
economic position is not sufficiently firm to discard these restrictions.473 As mentioned 
earlier, the balance-of-payment exceptions for economic development are ASEAN-specific 
elements. The balance-of-payment exceptions can be found in multilateral agreements on 
trades, trades in services or financial services. They are not usually found in IIAs, even in 
IIAs among developing countries containing balance-of-payment exceptions.474 Therefore, 
ASEAN Member States are given more leeway in recognition of their foreign exchange 
reserve needs. 
While the GATT has endorsed reduction in trade barriers as one of the means to 
promote economic development, its article XII addresses the balance-of-payment 
exceptions in order to impose quantitative restrictions on imports to safeguard States’ 
balance of payments, by setting conditions relating to the use and subsequent removal of 
emergency trade measures. ASEAN Member States still need to enact financial restrictions 
to maintain an adequate level of financial reserves and to implement national economic 
development or transitional programmes.475 This reflects the economic landscape of 
ASEAN Member States still not yet ready for full liberalisation. 
The ACIA gives particular attention to the exception (c), where movements of 
capital cause, or threaten to cause, serious economic or financial disturbance in the 
Member State concerned. Through this channel, ASEAN host States may defend 
themselves in exceptional circumstances, without calling upon the principle of necessity 
under customary international law. However, one might wonder what the term 
“exceptional circumstances” means. While this term seems to refer to a very narrow set of 
circumstances, in fact, States can put everything under the name of specific circumstances, 
which may be markedly even more extensive than situations targeted in sub-paragraph (a) 
and (b). Hence, despite the fact that States retain discretion to determine whether they are 
in “exceptional circumstances”, ACIA article 13(5) provides a list of criteria that ASEAN 
host States must observe, namely, consistency with the IMF Articles, necessity to deal with 
                                                 
 
473 IMF article XIV, Transitional Arrangements, provides that a member may maintain and adapt the 
restrictions that were in effect on the date on which it became a member, by notifying its intention to avail 
itself of transitional arrangements under this provision to the Fund.  
474 See e.g. COMESA CIA article 25. 
475 AIA article 15(1) (Measures to Safeguard the Balance-of-Payments) is added to general exceptions 
(article 13) and to emergency safeguard measures (article 14). The same provision is found in AANZFTA 
article 4(3)(a) Chapter 15.  
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the circumstances, temporariness, prompt notification to the other Member States, MFN, 
national treatment. These criteria are further discussed in section 4.3.2.4.476   
4.3.2.3 Stage 2: ASEAN under Multilateral Control of IMF  
           Under stage 1, ASEAN Member States are self-judging in determining whether they 
are in exceptional circumstance and need to invoke the safeguard of balance-of-payment 
measures. This ensures the necessary flexibility for ASEAN Member States to adopt crisis 
management measures. However, concerning investment-related transfers, IMF regulations 
partially overlap with the scope of the ACIA.477 At stage 2, ASEAN host States are not 
self-judging anymore. The ACIA specifically contains substantial and procedural linkages 
between exchange restrictions and capital controls, and IMF legal framework in order to 
ensure consistency and avoid norm conflicts between multilateral and regional rules. 
Questions arise as to the role of the IMF in the process of determination of the legal nature 
of opinions. Compared to other IIAs with no link to the IMF Articles, the situation under 
the ACIA is clearer in a sense that articles 13 and 16 expressly refer to the IMF Articles. 
The following analysis is based on both technical and legal grounds. 
First of all, transfer restrictions imposed by ASEAN host States must be  
in concurrence with IMF Articles. IMF Article VIII(2)(a) establishes a general prohibition 
on the imposition of restrictions on payments and transfers for current international 
transactions without the approval of the Fund. 477F478 Consequently, ASEAN Member States’ 
discretion is limited in the sense that their measures must be approved by the Fund. 
Muchlinski advocates that the reference to the right and obligations of the host country  
as a member of the IMF introduces, by implication, the standards of the IMF Articles of 
Agreement into the investment treaty regime.478F479  
The question arises whether the views of the IMF on factual assessment of the host 
State’s exchange restriction measures are binding. While there has never been a case under 
                                                 
 
476 The ACIA mechanism differs from the interpretation mechanism of financial services under the Canadian 
FIPA and the US Model BIT, which delegate interpretation to joint commissions of host and home State 
agencies. For financial services, when a State invoking a “prudential measures” exception in an investor-
State arbitration, a tribunal cannot decide whether that exception is a valid defence. Instead, the tribunal must 
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binding on the tribunal. See Canada FIPA (2004) Prudential Measures article 17(2). US Model BIT (2004) 
(2012) article 20(3) Financial Services. 
477 IMF Article XXX(d) provides that the notion of current payments encompasses investment income, 
interest on loans, and amortisation of principal. 
478 Myanmar is the third ASEAN country to join the IMF, and remains the only country still working towards 
acceptance of the obligations under IMF Articles VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4.  
See article VIII: General Obligations of Members, Section 2 of the IMF Articles. 
479 Muchlinski, P. (2009), “The Framework of Investment Protection: The Content of BITs” in Sauvant, K., 
Sachs, L. (eds) (2009), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment, Oxford, OUP, p.60. 
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the ACIA, tribunals may look at how analogous provisions relating to the relationship 
between the IMF Agreement, GATT480 and GATS481 have been dealt with by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body or by other tribunals as a useful guide in the interpretation of the 
ACIA.  
Two different views are worth consideration. The first view supports the binding 
nature of IMF’s opinions.482 It argues that if the IMF has not approved restrictions where 
necessary, they will not be considered to be maintained or imposed consistently with the 
Articles.483 IMF Article XXIX vests the Executive Board with the power to give 
interpretation of the Agreement in the event of any question of interpretation of the IMF 
provisions arising between any member and the Fund or between any members of the 
Fund, and to refer that question to the Board of Governors, whose decision is final.484  
The question of the consistency of exchange control regulations with this Agreement thus 
falls within the interpretation matters of the Fund’s bodies. In contrast, the second view 
suggests that tribunals are not bound by the Fund’s determinations.485 IMF’s interpretative 
views are regarded as dispositive of the issue in dispute. They were instead viewed as 
having only a persuasive effect. Hence, the consistency of exchange regulations with the 
Fund Agreement will ultimately be decided by the court or tribunal.486 
For the interpretation of the relationship between the ACIA and the IMF, the 
second approach is more persuasive. On policy grounds, the IMF’s political and 
administrative roles could be in conflict; that is, between policy-maker, regulator of 
monetary matters, and lender of last resort to Member States. In other words, the IMF is 
concurrently adviser and judge. This situation potentially undermines the independence 
and neutrality of the IMF and, by implication, the significance or credibility of its opinion 
on the issue of consistency of currency exchange regulations.487 On legal grounds, it 
seems that nothing in the IMF texts suggests the intention of the drafters to extend the 
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487 Idem, p.370. 
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interpretative powers of the Executive Board on questions of the consistency of a Member 
State’s exchange restrictions and the Fund Agreement, to cover disputes between private 
parties. Besides, no ACIA provision explicitly requires tribunals to seek the IMF’s 
advices in such circumstances. However, nothing in the ACIA prohibits tribunals to refer 
the questions of consistency of restrictive measures to the Fund for advice. IMF advice 
may be seen as equivalent to expert opinion, pursuant to ACIA article 38.488 Under the 
ACIA mechanism, reference to expert opinions is totally optional. Nothing hinders 
tribunals either to decide from their own perspective or to base their decisions upon the 
opinions received. 
  
The situation is more nuanced, as it is possible that the IMF provides financial 
help to a Member State even if it does not explicitly approve the restrictive regulations. 
Such IMF financial assistance, with the omission of express approval of the existence of 
exchange regulations in force at the time of crisis, may be considered “de facto” 
approval. The majority of judicial authorities take a pragmatic approach, suggesting the 
appropriateness of such presumptions. Should all questions concerning the consistency of 
a State’s exchange control regulations be referred to the IMF for advice, this would be 
time-consuming, with undue delay and costs to the disputing parties. 
Lastly, under IMF article XXVI, sanctions which may be imposed on a Member 
State in breach of its obligations are limited to it being declared ineligible to use the Fund’s 
general resources, suspension of voting rights, or suspension of membership. They do not 
include an order to pay damages to entities adversely affected by the breach. Hence, even 
if restrictive measures imposed by ASEAN host States are found not to be in conformity 
with the IMF Agreement, investors cannot obtain any remedy under the Fund Agreement, 
or under domestic law. In order to claim compensation, aggrieved investors should bring 
the case before an arbitral tribunal, pursuant to ACIA article 32. 
 
4.3.2.4 Stage 3: Review on Administration of Restrictive Measures before 
Arbitral Tribunal 
           The discussion above has presented two stages of reasoning. Firstly, ASEAN host 
States are sovereign over their monetary matters, and may lawfully and legitimately 
impose outright restrictions on transfers in a situation where they deem that movements of 
capital cause or threaten serious economic or financial disturbance. Secondly, restrictive 
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measures must be in consistent with IMF Articles. At stage 3, tribunals may exercise the 
power of review only on the administration of measures, both procedural and substantive, 
that ACIA article 13(5) has imposed to frame States’ behaviour so that they cannot harm 
an investor’s right in an unacceptable way. 
(1) Procedural Requirements 
 ASEAN host States which adopt or maintain or change any balance-of-payments 
measures must fulfil two procedural requirements, internal and external. Regarding internal 
procedure, ACIA articles 13(5)(d) and 16(3) require that the host State taking such 
measures must promptly notify other Member States, so that the latter can provide 
information to their investors. Article 16(4) further instructs the commencement of the 
consultation to review such restrictions, should any other Member State request this. A 
Member State must commence consultation to the extent that it does not duplicate the 
process under WTO, IMF, or any other similar processes. It is worth noting that 
notification and consultation were also required in the previous AIA regime.489 These 
procedural requirements affirm the ASEAN internal emergency assistance in the event of a 
crisis. 
           (2) Substantive Tests  
           A tribunal should consider whether restrictive measures taken to ensure the stability 
of the exchange rate, and to prevent speculative capital flows, are in accordance with the 
principles of non-discrimination, necessity, proportionality and transparency. These 
conditions are found in most contemporary treaties which contain balance-of-payment 
exceptions, for example, NAFTA, OECD and WTO.490 States issuing measures must avoid 
unnecessary damage to commercial, economic and financial interests of another ASEAN 
Member State.  
Restrictions must respect the MFN and national treatment standards,491 and must 
not exist for the purpose of protecting a particular sector.492 Measures must not exceed 
those necessary to deal with the circumstances described. In order to prevent possible 
abuse by a sovereign power, these principles require an adjudicator to assess whether there 
were any other reasonably available alternatives to such measures which had less 
restrictive effects on ASEAN investors’ rights. Measures must be temporary and be phased 
                                                 
 
489 AIA article 15(2), (4). 
490 GATT article XVIII:B(9) and IMF Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments provisions of the GATT 
1994, para.4. 
491 ACIA article 13(5)(e) and (f). IGA article VII(3) previously required the Contracting Parties to accord 
only MFN treatment to transfers.   
492 ACIA Footnote 8.  
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out progressively as the situation improves and conditions no longer justify their institution 
or maintenance. Some agreements further provide a time limit of restrictive measures; for 
example, one year in the AKIA or six months in the consolidated CETA text, with a 
possibility of an extension. 
Transfer restrictions may also amount to expropriations. It may happen that 
ASEAN investors are unable to buy goods and services from abroad for the establishment 
of their business, or to transfer profits out of the host country. In an extreme case, their 
funds and bank accounts may be frozen or seized. Hence, transfer restrictions may be seen 
as “indirect expropriation” or “creeping expropriation” or “regulatory taking”, where 
investors lose effective management, use or control, or encounter a significant depreciation 
of the value of their invested assets. The burden of proof weighs heavily on a disputing 
investor to display that restrictive exchange measures substantially affected the value of the 
investment, and as a result, amounted to expropriation. 492F493 Otherwise, investors may fail to 
claim that a host State has breached its regional obligations. 
An issue arises regarding the sovereign debt restructuring that States can possibly 
use, after a crisis, in order to recover the economic situation. 493F494 Certain safeguarding 
measures put in place may substantially affect the values of bonds, and private bondholders 
may file arbitral claims on this ground under the ACIA. 494F495 Generally, it is for States parties 
to decide whether to explicitly include sovereign debt in their investment treaties or to 
explicitly exclude it. 495F496 The ACIA does not clearly address sovereign debt nor give any 
special treatment thereof, but has a very broad asset-based definition of “investment”, 
which is deemed to cover “any kind of asset”, 496F497 and sovereign debt should fall within this 
definition. Therefore, measures purporting to sovereign debt restructuring (SDR) could be 
seen as a breach of States’ obligation under the ACIA.  
The SDR may also be considered indirect expropriation in the case that it reduces 
the face value of sovereign bonds. At the time of investing, ASEAN investors would not 
                                                 
 
493 Kolo, A., Walde T. (2008), “Capital Transfer Restrictions under Modern Investment Treaties”, in 
Reinisch, A., Standards of Investment Protection, Oxford, New York, OUP, p.227. 
494 Das, U. S., Papaioannou, M. G., Trebesch, C. (2012), Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: 
Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts, IMF WP/12/203, p.5. 
495 See UNCTAD (2011), Sovereign Debt Restructuring and International Investment Agreements, IIAs 
Issues Note No.2, July; Gallagher, K.P. (2011), The New Vulture Culture: Sovereign Debt Restructuring and 
Trade and Investment Treaties, IDEAs WP Series No.02/2011, IDEAs, New Delhi. 
496 Idem. In most cases, States do not make this clear when they draft treaties. Some of the recent IIAs 
negotiated by the United States precisely include sovereign bonds in the definition of covered investments; 
they even provide explicit guidelines for the interaction between SDR and the IIAs in form of a special annex 
on SDR. The US Government includes sovereign debt in the definition of “investment” in its 2012 Model 
BIT; on the contrary, Section C Definition of the NAFTA excludes sovereign debt from the definition of 
investment altogether.  
497 ACIA article 4 Definition. 
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expect that bonds would be swapped. This may break investors’ legitimate expectations. In 
some financial circumstances, it may be imperative during a crisis for ASEAN host States 
to treat domestic bondholders differently from foreigners, or to treat one ASEAN investor 
differently from another; this is perhaps in contradiction to national treatment and MFN 
principles.498 It is recommended that national governments and their international financial 
and monetary authorities should hold the power to ensure the survival of the country in 
case of crisis, even by way of sovereign debt restructuring.499  Then, it may be of interest 
to expressly exclude sovereign debt from the ACIA.500 
          In conclusion, while the ACIA guarantees to protect investors’ right to transfer of 
funds, it simultaneously maintains a policy space for ASEAN host States in case of 
exceptional circumstances. Remarkably, ASEAN Member States may invoke the balance-
of-payment exceptions as grounds to restrict investors’ right to transfer for many cases 
regarding financial difficulties. These exceptions illustrate the ASEAN Member States’ 
concerns on economic matters. However, the ACIA requires that these measures must be 
reasonably adopted. It is also designed to be consistent with the multilateral rules of capital 
control, such as the IMF Agreement, and with the economic realities of the 21st
 
century. 
  
                                                 
 
498 See Gelpern, A., Setser, B. (2004), “Domestic and External Debt: The Doomed Quest for Equal 
Treatment,” Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol.35, No.4, pp.795-814. 
499 Gallagher, K.P. (2011), p.27. 
500 On 24 February 2015, the German Federal Court of Justice (“Bundesgerichtshof”) handed down two 
judgments holding that the Argentine Republic could not refuse payment to private creditors under its 
government bonds (“Inhaberschuldverschreibung”) by invoking a state of necessity due to inability to pay. In 
the view of the German Court, no rule of general international law existed that would have obliged all 
creditors to participate in debt restructuring with States in economic crisis. 
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Conclusion to Chapter IV  
          Chapter IV has discussed three standards, namely, lawful expropriation, fair and 
equitable treatment and transfer of funds. The ACIA proposes state-of-the-art solutions to 
the debate on how to balance the interests between protection of investors and protection of 
State sovereignty. The ACIA guarantees all commonly found rights of investors in line 
with international practice. However, this thesis shows that several elements of the ACIA 
illustrate significant ASEAN-specific needs, which departs from the general pro-investor 
IIAs approach.  
The overall findings highlight that the ACIA is precautionary in adopting existing 
standards: either it selects only some elements of each standard, or it adopts the whole 
standard but makes it subject to particular exceptions or actions. Arguably, these 
exceptions are, sometimes, as important as the rules. Additionally, none of the States 
demonstrate an overreliance on the doctrine of investors’ legitimate expectations, overly 
advocated in previous decades. An expansive interpretation of minimalist treaty language 
had given rise to a lack of predictability in the application of standards. ASEAN Member 
States realised that such an approach may lead to an imbalanced result. Therefore, the 
ACIA has solved the problem by asserting legitimate State intervention for economic, 
social, environmental and other developmental ends. These substantive provisions reflect 
the “ASEAN Way” of investment protection. 
While each core standard is independent, they are interconnected. FET is the most 
ingenious approach among the ACIA standards. This solution is innovatively proposed to 
solve the intensive debate on extensive interpretation of investors’ legitimate expectations. 
FET provisions are short and less detailed, compared to the other two standards here 
studied. While the latter provide broad principles with several exceptions, the content of 
FET is written in a positive way, under which no exception is allowed. This truly shows 
the character of FET as an absolute right. The ACIA has positively chosen some 
conventional elements of the FET, which concretise the content of the standard. FET 
comes to fill the substantive gap in the ACIA protection standards relating to denial of 
justice and due process.   
          In contrast, the ACIA provisions on expropriation and transfer of funds standards are 
very meticulous. The expropriation provision explicitly recognises both direct and indirect 
expropriation so that aggrieved investors can claim compensation. However, this right 
grants great room for manoeuvre to ASEAN Member States, under normal circumstances, 
to issue regulations for public purpose, where investors are barred from claiming any 
compensation. As a result, investors need more effort to successfully invoke the 
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expropriation claim under the ACIA. Similarly, the transfer standard and its exceptions of 
balance-of-payments provisions, under exceptional circumstances, are utterly detailed and 
complicatedly intertwined with external financial rules. While the expropriation and 
transfers provisions do not break new ground for the IIAs practice, they are pioneers which 
advocate for more concerns on States’ legitimate interests.  
Given their economic and financial significance, the features of these provisions 
were the subject of considerable scrutiny when the ACIA was negotiated, so as to be as 
clear as possible when interpreted and applied. The coordination of these three standards 
demonstrates the deliberate efforts of governmental authorities across ASEAN to design 
the timing and magnitude of the ACIA. Therefore, tribunals should take into account 
ASEAN Member States’ concerns, and give them greater and more tailored flexibility.  
In examining States’ acts, a tribunal is granted powers of consideration which 
possibly intrude on States’ sovereignty and raise the issue of legitimacy of the tribunal.  
For a tribunal, the most important test is the principle of proportionality: measures must 
not exceed those necessary to deal with the circumstances described. Tribunals should 
appropriately distinguish between acts of protectionism and bona fide interventions  
for a public purpose. Exceptional mechanisms should be literally interpreted in a restrictive 
manner. Otherwise, in guise of protectionism, some countries may use restrictive measures 
at risk of breaching commitments under the ACIA.  
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Chapter V. Relative Standards 
This chapter addresses non-discrimination obligations of the ACIA, embodied in 
national treatment and most-favoured-nation (MFN) principles.  Unlike the usual practice 
of BITs, the ACIA opts for a combined approach, guaranteeing both national treatment and 
MFN treatment for its covered investments and investors. Especially with the AEC 
liberalisation objective, issues related to MFN and national treatments lie at the heart of the 
ACIA.  
As opposed to the “absolute” standards discussed in chapter 4, these non-
discrimination standards are “relative” to a designated comparator. In other words, they are 
defined by reference to treatments accorded to other investments or investors.500F501 The MFN 
and national treatment obligations exist only when a treaty clause creates them. 501F502 Unless 
otherwise specified in a treaty, ASEAN Member States retain the possibility of 
discriminating between foreign investors and their own economic activities. By prohibiting 
differentiated treatment in the ASEAN Investment Area, these treatment clauses establish  
a level playing field amongst the relevant players. All investors are subject to the same 
rules and the same level of market access. 502F503  
The non-discriminatory or “no less favourable” standards apply to both ASEAN 
investors and their investments, if they are “in like circumstances” to nationals of a host 
State (article 5 National Treatment), or “to investors of any other Member State or a non-
Member State” (article 6 MFN), as the case may be, with respect to the admission, 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other 
disposition of investments in its territory. 
Article 5 National Treatment 
1. Each Member State shall accord to investors of any other Member State 
treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its 
own investors with respect to the admission, establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of 
investments in its territory. 
2. Each Member State shall accord to investments of investors of any other 
Member State treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like 
circumstances, to investments in its territory of its own investors with 
respect to the admission, establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
                                                 
 
501 See UNCTAD (1998), BITs in the Mid 1990s. 
502 According to article 7 of the ILC Draft Articles on the MFN Clause, 1978. See also Oppenheim’s 
International Law (1992), Jennings, R., Watts, A.(eds.) Vol. I, Harlow, p.1326. 
503 UNCTAD (2010), MFN Treatment: A Sequel, UNCTAD Series on IIAs II. Switzerland, United Nations. 
UNCTAD (1996), International Investment Instruments: A Compendium, vol.I, II and III; UNCTAD (1999), 
National Treatment, United Nations publications. 
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management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of 
investments. [Emphasis added.] 
 
Article 6 Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment 
1. Each Member State shall accord to investors of another Member State 
treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to 
investors of any other Member State or a non-Member State with respect to 
the admission, establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation and sale or other disposition of investments. 
2. Each Member State shall accord to investments of investors of another 
Member State treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like 
circumstances, to investments in its territory of investors of any other 
Member State or a non-Member State with respect to the admission, 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and 
sale or other disposition of investments. [Emphasis added.] 
3. … 
MFN and national treatment standards have parallel structures, regarding 
beneficiaries, models of protection and liberalisation, and conditions for breach of 
obligations. This introductory part limits itself to discussion on these parallel structures, 
whereas the specificities of each treatment are discussed in sections 5.1 and section 5.2.  
As the ASEAN Investment Area is stepping towards a “full integration” investment 
model, the ACIA combines the rules of both internal and external investment liberalisation. 
Under this approach, ASEAN Member States have made commitments to reduce barriers 
and remove restrictions to the entry of foreign investments. Therefore, the application of 
non-discrimination standards is essential to foster deeper economic integration. The MFN 
and national treatment standards in the ACIA seek to ensure a degree of competitive 
equality between national investors and ASEAN investors. MFN and national treatments 
were introduced, firstly, in the IGA regarding the post-establishment phase, then in the 
AIA Agreement regarding the pre-establishment phase. 
Similar to some modern investment agreements, 503F504 the ACIA has adopted the pre-
establishment model. The ACIA guarantees non-discrimination in the post-establishment 
phase, and in the admission phase of investors and their investments, which typically 
includes establishment, acquisition and expansion of investments. The treatments seek to 
avoid preferential access or a selective liberalisation that would benefit some foreign 
investors and not others.  
 
                                                 
 
504 See e.g. NAFTA, AANZFTA, Japan-Singapore EPA (2002); Japan-Thailand EPA (2007). 
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Most old-fashioned BITs follow the post-establishment model, under which the 
entry of investments is fully governed by laws and regulations of host States. States are not 
at all committed to any level of investment liberalisation or to the removal of any 
restriction affecting the establishment of foreign investments.505 Some developing 
countries, such as the SADC countries, consider the non-discriminatory obligations to be 
detrimental to their national development and prefer not to include them in treaties. 
However, if needed, it is recommended that the treatments should be limited to the post-
establishment phase, and subject to exceptions.506  
Some regional economic integration organisation (REIO) agreements rule merely 
on internal investment liberalisation. For instance, the EFTA507 does not have provisions 
on investment coming from non-Member States (external investment relations). Hence, 
each Member State may have different strategies vis-à-vis investors of third countries.508 
Some agreements have internal investment regime and rules on external relations. For 
example, MERCOSUR has two agreements dealing with investments in MERCOSUR: the 
1994 Colonia Protocol regulates investments of MERCOSUR investors,509  and the 1994 
Buenos Aires Protocol regulates investments from non-Member Countries.510 Under the 
1994 Colonia Protocol (on MERCOSUR investors), national treatment and MFN treatment 
apply both in the pre- and post-establishment phases. Up to this stage, the ACIA resembles 
the approach taken in MERCOSUR. 
ASEAN and MERCOSUR differ regarding the application of MFN to investors 
from non-Member States. MERCOSUR State Parties are committed to grant the 
investments made by investors from Third States a treatment no more favorable than that 
stipulated in the Buenos Aires Protocol.511 The application of MFN and national treatment 
is limited to post-establishment phase, whereas its application to pre-establishment phase is 
left to the discretion of each MERCOSUR State.512 While MERCOSUR has two sets of 
rules applicable to internal and external investment relations, the ACIA has one set of rules 
applicable to both ASEAN and non-ASEAN investments in the ASEAN Investment Area. 
As mentioned supra, the ACIA opts for a “full integration” investment model, its 
                                                 
 
505 Joubin-Bret, A. (2008), “Admission and establishment in the context of investment protection”, in 
Reinisch, A. (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection, OUP, pp.9-28. 
506 SADC Model BIT (2012). 
507 EFTA articles 23. 
508 UNCTAD (2004), The REIO Exception in MFN Treatment Clauses, p.23 
509 The Colonia Protocol for the Promotion and Protection of Investments in MERCOSUR was approved by 
the Decision No.11/93 of the Common Market Council of 17 January 1994.  
510 The Buenos Aires Protocol for the Promotion and Protection of Investments in MERCOSUR from Non-
Member Countries was approved by Decision No.11/94, 5 August 1994. 
511 Buenos Aires Protocol, article 1. 
512 Idem, article 2. 
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protective standard apply to both intra- and extra-ASEAN investments. ASEAN Member 
States intend to increase investment flow into the Area from both ASEAN and non-
ASEAN sources. This liberal approach helps avoiding investment distortions within the 
Area.    
The key element to establishing ASEAN as a single market and production base is 
an open investment regime, where non-discriminatory treatments are granted to ASEAN 
investors and foreign-owned ASEAN-based investments. However, the general scope of 
the ACIA is specifically limited by the additional scope of the non-discriminatory 
standards. Pursuant to ACIA articles 3(4)(e) and 3(5), pre-establishment phase of the 
commercial presence (Mode 3) of service supply of the five liberalised sectors under the 
ACIA (manufacturing, agriculture, fisheries, forestry and mining) are excluded from the 
scope of national treatment and MFN treatment. The pre-establishment phase 
(liberalisation) of these services incidental to the listed investment sectors is scheduled in 
the Member States’ schedule of commitments made under the ASEAN Framework 
Agreement on Services (AFAS).513 In other words, for these commercial presences, MFN 
and national treatment are only granted to their post-establishment phase.   
The non-discrimination commitments indicate the readiness of ASEAN Member 
States and their transitional period in investment liberalisation. Non-discriminatory rights 
are generally subject to limited exceptions, due for progressive elimination.514 ASEAN 
Member States may express their reservations regarding some treaty provisions,  
by providing annexes or framing up protocols to limit the application of the treatments, 
especially in the areas where they are not ready to make concessions and need to reserve 
their rights to regulate.515  
The exceptions of MFN and national treatment may differ; nonetheless,  
one common exception to both exists. ACIA article 20 allows ASEAN Member States to 
adopt or maintain a measure that prescribes special formalities in connection with 
investments; for example, a requirement that the investments are legally constituted under 
laws or regulations of host States, provided that such formalities do not materially impair 
protections afforded to ASEAN investors. Subject to the protection of confidential 
information, ASEAN Member States may also require investors to provide information 
                                                 
 
513 See pp.59-60. 
514 See “Progressive Liberalisation” principle in Chapter 2 Section 4. 
515 ACIA article 9. 
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concerning investments solely for statistical or informational purposes.516 This exception 
aims at transparency and the good faith application of national laws.  
Several exceptions are allowed regarding non-discriminatory rights in the pre-
establishment phase because they involve sensitive issues which States need to supervise 
closely. Therefore, only MFN and national treatment disputes arising from the post-
establishment phase are covered by the ISDS mechanisms, whereas disputes arising from 
the pre-establishment phase are subject to the State-to-State mechanism.517 For the post-
establishment disputes, tribunals need to determine appropriate grounds for finding 
whether an investment or investor is “in like circumstances” under domestic measures. 
A violation of the MFN and national treatments may be assessed in the same way, 
as both treatments share the same comparison requirement. The ACIA does not explain the 
meaning of “similarity” or “likeness”.517F518 In practice, “likeness” is a flexible term, which 
refers to the ejusdem generis rule. The ILC Draft Articles on MFN article 10 provides that 
“the rights acquired should be those that the granting State extends to a third State within 
the limits of the subject matter of the MFN clause and only if the beneficiary persons or 
things belong to same category of persons or things which benefit from the treatment 
extended to the third party and have the same relationship with that State”. 518F519 The majority 
of NAFTA cases consider that the investments in question shall be in the same business or 
economic sector. 519F520 Differing sectors are not legitimate comparisons, and they deserve 
different solutions.520F521 The MFN and national treatment of the ACIA should also be 
narrowly interpreted, because extensive interpretation would render the term “likeness” 
uncertain. 
In the likeness test, ASEAN investors may bear a burden of proof. They should 
provide two pieces of evidence: (1) the comparability of investors (like investor, like 
investment), and (2) the less favourable treatment. The intent of discrimination is not 
always required, though having proven the intent of discrimination will render the claim 
more efficient. It is then possible that the ASEAN Member States treat ASEAN investors 
or their investment differently, because different treatment does not necessarily mean less 
favourable treatment. 
                                                 
 
516 ACIA article 20, Special Formalities and Disclosure of Information. 
517 See Chapter 7. 
518 In fact, the “likeness” issue is largely addressed in the international trade law literature, especially under 
the GATT/WTO. 
519 Draft Articles (1978), article 10, Acquisition of rights under a MFN clause. 
520 Methanex vs. USA, 3 August 2005, Final Award. 
521 Sempra v. Argentina, Award, 28 September 2007, para.319; corresopinding to Enron v. Argentina, ICSID 
Case No.ARB/01/3, Award 2007, para.282. 
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Differences are justified only if the sectors are reasonably or objectively different, 
and not considered legitimate comparators. In the case that investors in the same sector are 
treated differently, these different treatments may most likely be justified by legitimate 
host State policies.521F522 Public policy justifications may plausibly appear as rebuttal to 
presumption of “like circumstances”, provided that the domestic policy is reasonable and 
are not based upon nationality discrimination. In response, ASEAN host States may give 
justification of different treatment. While some IIAs put emphasis on the conditions of the 
application of the treatment clauses by defining the method of comparing the treatment 
afforded to foreign investors of different nationalities, 522F523 ASEAN Member States 
intentionally leave this application vague for more room of interpretation.  
 
Section 5.1 Most-Favoured-Nations Treatment 
MFN treatment is one of the most fundamental standards in the ACIA. In order to 
ensure that ASEAN Member States do not discriminate between their trading partners, 
every time a Member State grants investors and investments of a third State more 
favourable benefits, the former must grant the same privileges to investors and investments 
of the other Member States. As discussed supra, ACIA article 6(1) and (2) provides a 
general scope of more favourable rights to all ASEAN investors. Footnote 4 to article 6 
contains, however, the limitation of the MFN application:  
For greater certainty:  
(a) this Article shall not apply to investor-State dispute settlement procedures 
that are available in other agreements to which Member States are party; and  
(b) in relation to investments falling within the scope of this Agreement, any 
preferential treatment granted by a Member State to investors of any other 
Member State or a non-Member State and to their investments, under any 
existing or future agreements or arrangements to which a Member State is a 
party shall be extended on a most-favoured-nation basis to all Member States. 
 
Article 6(3) continues the limitation that: the MFN treatment 
… shall not be construed so as to oblige a Member State to extend to investors 
or investments of other Member States the benefit of any treatment, preference 
or privilege resulting from: 
(a) any sub-regional arrangements between and among Member States;  or  
(b) any existing agreement notified by Member States to the AIA Council 
pursuant to Article 8(3) of the AIA Agreement. 
 
                                                 
 
522 See e.g. in SD Myers v. Canada, 2000, para.250; Enron v. Argentina, Award, para.282; Sempra v. 
Argentina, Award, para. 319; CMS Gas v. Argentina, Pope&Talbot, Award on Merits Phases 2, 2001; 
National Grid v. Argentina, 3 Nov 2008.  
523 See COMESA article 17(2), 2012 SADC Model BIT article 4.2 
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           From the reading of the text, two specificities are found. First, while the issue of the 
inclusion of MFN’s procedural scope is still globally debated, the ACIA explicitly 
excludes procedural rights from the scope of MFN. Second, article 6(3), read in 
conjunction with footnote 4, emphasises that ASEAN Member States cannot be exempted 
from the MFN obligations regarding any existing or future agreements or arrangements. 
They may, however, be exempted if they conclude sub-regional arrangements among 
themselves.  
By adopting this particular approach, the ACIA has created a true system of non-
discriminatory investment based on regional integration. 
 
5.1.1 General Practice 
Under the ACIA, each Member State immediately and unconditionally accords 
MFN treatment to investors and investments of another Member in the pre- and post-
establishment phases. ACIA footnote 4(b) indicates that, except in the case of notification, 
the MFN clause applies retrospectively to any existing ASEAN investment agreement, as 
well as to future agreements.523F524 Contrary to the IGA which limited the MFN application to 
some standards,524F525 the ACIA MFN applies to every standard in the ACIA. Moreover, 
unlike other BITs, the ACIA does not allow States to set up a list of MFN exemptions in 
the schedule of commitment. This demonstrates that the ACIA truly encourages non-
discrimination among ASEAN Member States. 
The MFN of the ACIA unconditionally extends more favourable treatment 
provided in third-party treaties to all Member States. However, the MFN standard is not a 
substitute for external liberalisation policies per se.525F526 It does not multilateralise the 
relationship between ASEAN Member States and third parties. Any extension of more 
favourable elements to non-ASEAN members remains on a reciprocal basis. In this 
context, the third-party treaty does not govern the relationship among ASEAN Member 
States as the applicable international treaty, but its content becomes operative by means of 
the MFN clause. The third-party treaty is incorporated by reference and ipso iure into the 
relationship among ASEAN Member States, without any additional negotiation. For this 
reason, MFN clauses have been characterised as the mechanism of “drafting (and deletion) 
                                                 
 
524 See also AIA article 8(2). 
525 The MFN under the IGA applied merely to fair and equitable treatment, and outbreak of hostilities or a 
state of national emergency. It did not apply to the compensation for expropriation, repatriation of capital and 
earnings, subrogation, and arbitration. See Article 4(2) and (3) IGA. 
526 See Falsafi, A. (2008), “Regional Trade and Investment Agreements: Liberalizing Investment in a 
Preferential Climate”, Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 36, Issue 1, pp.43-86.  
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by reference”.527 As a consequence, the ACIA automatically adapts to changing 
circumstances.  
This adaptation distinguishes the ACIA from other IIAs. For example, the IGA, the 
2009 ASEAN-China and the ASEAN-Korea Framework Investment Agreements do not 
grant the MFN treatment automatically. Their MFN mechanisms do not immediately apply 
more favourable treatment to investors and their investments but entitle States to 
renegotiate the content of the basic agreement in order to include provision for such 
concessions. In this respect, their MFN mechanisms seem self-contradictory and virtually 
render the treatment meaningless because they allow complete discretion of the MFN 
application regarding any future agreements or arrangements. East Asian countries (China, 
Japan, Korea), as well as Brazil and India, demonstrate clear intentions to keep their 
specific bargains from being applied across the board, as they have more negotiating power 
to resist investment rules restraining their ability to regulate foreign investment.528 This 
restrictive MFN formula may trigger more competition in signing new treaties.  
On the contrary, the automatic and extensive MFN clause in the ACIA may prevent 
the issue of power struggle among the Parties, as it moderates differences in negotiation 
power.529 The MFN approach of the ACIA protects the value of ASEAN concessions made 
among contracting parties. It prevents market distortions in the ASEAN Investment Area 
which may stem from the imposition of differential standards of protection offered to 
investors from different ASEAN Member States and non-ASEAN States in bilateral or 
mulitilateral relations. 
Equal treatment demanded by the MFN principle acts as a force for unifying 
treatment at the most advantageous level for ASEAN investors and investments. The MFN 
standard helps ASEAN Member States to reduce their monitoring and negotiation costs for 
new agreements and for remedies to disadvantageous treatments. It may eventually deter 
efforts to contain inter-State investment relations on bilateral grounds. Hence, the MFN 
mechanism enhances predictability and transparency of the ACIA and has broader 
                                                 
 
527 Schwarzenberger, G. (1945), The Most-Favoured-Nation Standard in British State Practice, 22 BRIT. 
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implications for the regional structure by implementing equal treatment among ASEAN 
Member States. 
Cases on MFN issues have highlighted the role of MFN clauses in both 
harmonising and raising standards of investment protection. 529F530 Generally, unless otherwise 
provided by treaty text, tribunals have been more likely to allow the party to attract better 
or even new treatment standards through the MFN clause. 530F531  In the Siemens v. Argentina 
case, 531F532 the tribunal permitted the investor to “cherry-pick” more favourable provisions 
from third-country BITs without being bound to the less favourable conditions. In this 
sense, Schill considers that a selective multilateralisation of certain benefits without 
extending connected disadvantages can also be understood as a stringent application of the 
unconditional character of MFN clauses. 532F533 According to the logic of the MFN mechanism, 
the ACIA should allow investors to choose to import only better standards, without being 
obliged to import every standard. Nonetheless, it should be noted the absence of a 
provision in a third-party treaty cannot be the basis for excluding a non-beneficial 
provision contained in the ACIA, such as balance-of-payment exceptions, by invoking an 
MFN provision.533F534  
Despite the automatic MFN mechanism, the MFN clause should not alter the scope 
of application of the basic treaty (ratione temporis, ratione materiae, or ratione personae), 
as these matters “go to the core of matters that must be deemed to be specifically 
negotiated by the Contracting Parties”. 534F535 “Each treaty defines what it considers a 
protected investment and who is entitled to that protection, and definitions can change 
from treaty to treaty. In this situation, resort to the specific text of the MFN clause is 
unnecessary because it applies only to the treatment accorded to such defined investment, 
but not to the definition of ‘investment’ itself”.535F536 Likewise, the meaning of “investor” or 
“investment” under the ACIA should not change by way of the MFN mechanism, even if a 
third-country BIT provides for a broader scope of application. 536F537 This recommended 
                                                 
 
530 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (AAPL) v. Sri Lanka, Final Award, 27 June 1990, ICSID Case 
No.ARB/87/3; Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 April 2001; ADF v. USA, 
ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/00/1, Award, 9 January 2003. 
531 See e.g. MTD v. Chile, ICSID Case No.ARB/01/7, Award, 25 May 2004, para.104; Bayindir v. Pakistan, 
ICSID Case No.ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005, paras.227-235. 
532 Siemens v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004, paras.32-110. 
533 See Schill, S.W. (2009), The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, CUP, p.156; Schill S.W. 
(2009), Mulitilateralizing Investment Treaties through Most-Favored-Nation Clauses, 27 Berkeley J. Int’l 
Law, p.496. 
534 CMS v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB701/08, Award, 25 April 2005, p.377. 
535 Tecmed v. Mexico, Award, 29 May 2003, para.69. 
536 Société Générale v. Dominican Republic, LCAI Case No.UN 7927, Award on Preliminary Objections to 
Jurisdiction, para.41. 
537 See e.g. Yaung Chi Oo v. Myanmar (2003). 
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approach may strike a fairer balance: ASEAN investors get the most favourable treatments 
but only to the extent that the States have intentionally promised. 
 
5.2.2 Specificities 
As mentioned earlier, the ACIA MFN is specific in that each member accords 
immediately and unconditionally to investors and investments of another member MFN 
treatment in both pre- and post-establishment phases. The ACIA also gives additional 
clarification on the possibility of importing substantive and procedural provisions from 
other treaties via its MFN treatment clauses. On the procedural issue, the ACIA has 
explicitly excluded procedural rights from the scope of the MFN. For the purpose of the 
ACIA, this ends the debatable issue of whether investors can seek to import more 
favourable ISDS provisions from a third-party treaty into the basic treaty. By refusing 
straightforwardly the Maffezini approach, the ACIA has shaped the IIAs practice on an 
MFN issue. On the substantive matter, the ACIA contains remarkable exemptions of MFN 
treatment among ASEAN Member States, by means of more advanced sub-regional 
agreements, while exemption vis-à-vis third parties’ investment agreements, typically 
found in other BITs,  
is not found in the ACIA.  
 
5.1.2.1 Explicit Exclusion of MFN on Procedural Rights           
The application of MFN clauses to dispute settlement provisions has generated  
an intensive debate in academic settings, because traditional BITs had usually not 
determined whether the MFN standard applied to procedural rights, and investment 
jurisprudence had been divergent on this issue. 537F538 In the Maffezini v. Spain case,538F539  
the tribunal decided that, by virtue of the MFN clause in the basic treaty, the claimant had 
the right to import the more favourable jurisdictional provisions from the third party treaty. 
In this case, the investors were not required to submit the claim to domestic courts before 
resorting to international arbitration.  
                                                 
 
538 On this debate, see generally Dolzer and Myers (2004), After Tecmed: MFN Clauses in International 
Investment Protection Agreements, 19 ICSID Review, Foreign Investment Law Journal 49; Radi, Y. (2007). 
“The Application of the MFN Clause to the Dispute Settlement provisions of the BITs: Domesticating the -
Trojan Horse”, The European Journal of International Law, Vol.18, Issue 4, pp.757-774; UNCTAD (2010), 
MFN, pp.66-92. 
539 Maffezini v. Spain, (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, 2000); Kurtz, J. (2005) “The Delicate Extension of MFN 
Treatment to Foreign Investors: Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain” in Weiler, T. (Ed.). International Investment 
Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary 
International Law, London, Cameron, May. 
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However, an increasing number of decisions support the argument that MFN 
clauses relate merely to substantial protections afforded to investors and investments and 
do not extend to procedural issues, such as dispute resolution; for example, Yaung Chi Oo 
v. Myanmar,540 Salini v. Jordan,541 Plama v. Bulgaria,542 and Telenor v. Hungary.543 
These decisions have raised doubts about whether the parties could reasonably have 
intended to provide for jurisdiction through incorporation by reference. The answer should 
be negative unless such intent had been explicitly reflected in the basic investment 
agreement.  
The question of whether to incorporate procedural rights via an MFN clause  
is fundamental, because procedural issues affect the operations and enforcement of the 
protections of the relevant treaties. In the Plama case, the tribunal states that: “[i]t is one 
thing to add to the treatment provided in one treaty more favourable treatment provided 
elsewhere. It is quite another thing to replace a procedure specifically negotiated by parties 
with an entirely different mechanism”.544 “If that were true, a host State which has not 
specifically agreed thereto can be confronted with a large number of permutations of 
dispute settlement provisions from the various BITs which it has concluded. Such a chaotic 
situation – actually counterproductive to harmonization – cannot be the presumed intent of 
Contracting Parties”.545 
Prompted by these debates, the ACIA expressly excludes the ISDS provisions from 
the scope of the MFN. It follows the Yaung Chi Oo approach and directly refuses the 
Maffezini one. A criticism regarding the Yaung Chi Oo v. Myanmar case is that by refusing 
the import of ISDS provisions, this decision probably went against the essence of fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection of investments under the IGA. It was also said to 
frustrate the intent underlining the AIA to create a predictable investment regime in 
ASEAN and to realise a more liberal and transparent investment environment.546 However, 
it has been the only arbitral case under the ASEAN investment regime attempting to clarify 
and articulate the MFN mechanism. The ACIA has ended the debate on the scope of 
application of the MFN treatment regarding procedural rights, and has endorsed the Yaung 
Chi Oo approach.  
                                                 
 
540 Yaung Chi Oo v. Myanmar (2003). 
541 ICSID ARB/02/13, 9 November 2004. 
542 ICSID ARB/03/24, 8 February 2005. 
543 ICSID ARB/04/15, 13 September 2006. 
544 Plama and Bulgaria, ICSID Case No.ARB/03/04, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005, para.209. 
545 Idem, paras.212, 219. 
546 Tan, L.H. (2004), “Will ASEAN Economic Integration Progress beyond a Free Trade Area? International 
& Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.53, Issue 4, pp.935-967.  
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5.1.2.2 Exemption of MFN on Substantive Rights: ASEAN Sub-Regional 
Agreements 
As a second specificity, the MFN obligation can be waived in case of REIO.547 The 
regional integration exception originates from trade agreement practice. Ordinarily, REIO 
explicit exceptions to MFN clauses are an effective means of shielding bilateral bargains 
between Member States and non-ASEAN countries which otherwise would go against the 
regionalising effect of the clauses.548 A number of investment agreements stipulate that if a 
contracting party accords preferential treatment to investors of any third State by virtue of 
an agreement establishing a free trade area, a customs union or a common market, it is not 
be obliged to accord such advantages to investors of another contracting party, by means of 
MFN treatment.549  
While others REIOs have exemptions vis-à-vis other third parties, the ACIA has  
a specific clause allowing exceptions vis-à-vis other ASEAN Member States. ACIA article 
6(3), read in conjunction with footnote 4, emphasises that ASEAN Member States are not 
exempted from the MFN obligations, unless they have notified the AIA Council of any 
extra-ASEAN agreements under the previous regime. Regarding any other existing or 
future agreements or arrangements, only sub-regional agreements, which are more 
favourable among ASEAN Member States, are exempted. 
For extra-ASEAN agreements, the only treaty notified under the AIA regime is the 
1966 Thailand-United States Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations.550 Given the 
economic and political importance of the United States in Thailand, this treaty gives more 
favourable treatment to the Americans. The level of protection and security of this BIT 
must be, in no case, less than that required by international law.551 This BIT grants national 
treatment for American investors and their investments in Thailand, subject to few 
exceptions.552 The American companies are exempted from most of the restrictions on 
foreign investment imposed by the 1999 Aliens Business Act, particularly requirements for 
board of directors and maximum shareholders. Hence, they have an equal playing field 
                                                 
 
547 See generally UNCTAD (2004), The REIO Exception in MFN Treatment Clauses, United Nations. 
548 Idem, p.1. 
549 According to GATT article XXIV, and GATS articles V and XIV, GATT/GATS members are permitted 
to be in a free trade area or customs union with preferential treatments, provided that (a) the purpose of the 
REIO is to facilitate internal trade, and (b) the REIO does not create new trade barriers for importers from 
outside its territory.  
550 ACIA article 6(3)(b) refers to  any existing agreement notified by Member States to the AIA Council 
pursuant to AIA article 8(3). 
551 Thailand-US BIT article I(2). 
552 Idem, article IV. 
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with Thai companies. These preferential treatments are not extended to ASEAN investors 
via the MFN mechanism of the ACIA. 
Regarding intra-ASEAN agreements, the ACIA has innovatively introduced an 
MFN exemption for sub-regional agreements into treaty-making practice. The MFN 
exemption vis-à-vis intra-regional agreements is not found in other multilateral investment 
treaties. ACIA article 6(3)(a)552F553 grants MFN exceptions between two or more ASEAN 
Member States vis-à-vis other ASEAN members. They may conclude new agreements 
among themselves in order to cooperate in projects, for particular purposes, such as 
development projects among neighbouring countries. These agreements reciprocally grant 
more favoured treatment to the parties but benefits enjoyed by specific Members are not 
provided to the countries of non-application.  
The list of ASEAN sub-regional agreements which do not apply MFN treatment  
is evolving. Footnote 5 to the ACIA lists five: Greater Mekong Sub-region (“GMS”), 
ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (“AMBDC”), Indonesia-Malaysia-
Thailand Growth Triangle (“IMT-GT”), Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle 
(“IMS-GT”) and Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area 
(“BIMP-EAGA”). This practice leads to results that are contrary to the general MFN 
principle, according to which the “standstill” obligations prohibit ASEAN Member States 
from introducing any new discriminatory investment restrictions, 553F554 and non-conforming 
measures are subject to gradual elimination.  
Arguably, this anti-MFN practice would defeat the very purpose of the ACIA, 
namely, to create legal stability and predictability, equal rights and obligations for the 
contracting parties. However, wide disparities and development gaps between ASEAN 
Member States may be an obstacle for a more advanced regional regime. In response to 
this potential stumbling block, ASEAN Member States have felt the need to allow some 
departure from their MFN obligation and call for a multi-track and multi-speed approach  
in order to deepen their economic integration. This innovation has enriched a new 
dimension of the “ASEAN Way” of investment protection by allowing for closer economic 
integration within ASEAN.  
                                                 
 
553 Ex-article 8(4) AIA. 
554 ACIA article 10 Modification of Commitments. 
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Section 5.2 National Treatment 
National treatment is one of the most controversial issues in the ACIA. National 
treatment can be defined as a principle whereby a host country extends to foreign investors 
treatment at least as favourable as the treatment it accords to national investors, in like 
circumstances.555 ACIA article 5 requires that ASEAN host States must make no negative 
differentiation between national investors and ASEAN investors when applying their rules 
and regulations. This ensures that ASEAN investors enjoy the same level of treatment as 
nationals, and allows them to compete on an equal footing. Nevertheless, national 
treatment commitments may touch on politically and economically sensitive sectors. Even 
the most advanced economic countries do not totally grant national treatment without 
qualifications, especially with regard to admissions of investments.  
As mentioned supra, national treatment under the ACIA applies to both pre- and 
post-establishment phases, and to both protection and liberalisation regimes. The 
commitment to national treatment in the post-establishment phase is common practice in 
many IIAs; it is rarer that application is extended to the pre-establishment phase. Hence, 
for emerging economic countries such as ASEAN, reservations to the national treatment 
are needed. ACIA article 9(1) provides that:  
Articles 5 (National Treatment) and 8 (Senior Management and Board of 
Directors) shall not apply to: 
(a) any existing measure that is maintained by a Member State at: 
i) the central level of government, as set out by that Member State in its 
reservation list in the Schedule referred to in paragraph 2;  
ii) the regional level of government, as set out by that Member State in its 
reservation list in the Schedule referred to in paragraph 2; and 
iii) a local level of government; 
(b) the continuation or prompt renewal of any reservations referred to sub-
paragraph (a). 
 
ACIA article 9(4) continues further that “[e]ach Member State shall reduce or eliminate the 
reservations specified in the Schedule in accordance with the three phases of the Strategic 
Schedule of the AEC Blueprint and Article 46 (Amendments)”. 
ASEAN Member States consider national treatment as public policy relating to 
countries’ development. For the moment, the ACIA needs to balance the attraction of the 
ASEAN Investment Area by giving equal protection to investors and the regulatory power 
of ASEAN Member States by allowing them to screen and channel investment in tune with 
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their domestic interests and priorities. This dilemma is reflected in the extensive use of 
national treatment and its extensive reservations.  
5.2.1 General Practice 
Early BITs of ASEAN member States, either between themselves or with a third 
party, generally did not contain national treatment commitments. This approach clearly 
reflects a high level of caution towards foreign capital flows. The Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) Non-Binding Investment Principles extend the national treatment 
standard to the pre-establishment of foreign investments.556 However, the APEC 
instrument is non-binding and represents only a “best efforts” commitment.557 The Energy 
Charter Treaty extends national treatment to operations of foreign investments and 
investors in the post-establishment phase, but as regards the making of investments, 
contracting parties are only required to “endeavour to accord” national treatment.558 The 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) also includes national treatment 
clauses but leaves market access to domestic jurisdiction.559 
While most IIAs in the 1990s grant generally national treatment in the post-
establishment phase,560 the IGA had an unusual approach of not automatically granting 
national treatment. Its article IV(4) provided national treatment for ASEAN investors but 
only subject to bilateral negotiations. By virtue of reciprocity, any two or more ASEAN 
Member States were able to grant national treatment to investments of any contracting 
party, providing that they concluded another agreement within the scope of the IGA. The 
national treatment in such agreements was not extendable to other ASEAN countries on an 
MFN basis. Consequently, national treatment under the IGA would hardly be enforceable. 
Apparently, ASEAN Member States were not willing to grant national treatment to 
other ASEAN investors, except on a case-by-case basis and subject to host country 
approval. Putting the national treatment clause beyond the scope of MFN consideration 
preserved the ability of ASEAN Member States to maintain a dual investment regime able 
to discriminate between domestic and foreign investors. Nevertheless, subsequent 
agreements have shown more eagerness to attract foreign investments by extending 
national treatment to more categories of investors and investments. In line with the general 
                                                 
 
556 APEC Non-Binding Investment Principles, adopted in November 1994, Jakarta.  
557 UNCTAD (1996), International Investment Instruments: A Compendium, vol.II, p.536. 
558 ECT article 10(7). 
559 SADC Model BIT, Annex 1 Cooperation on Investment, Article 2 Promotion and Admission of 
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IIAs practice, the ACIA has now granted national treatment in the post-establishment 
phase.  
 
5.2.2 Specificities 
ASEAN Member States are obliged not only to treat ASEAN investors similarly to 
their own nationals in the post-establishment phase, they are also required to liberalise their 
national entry requirements. In practice, discrimination between national investors and 
ASEAN investors enables ASEAN host States to raise their development concerns and to 
pursue national public policies in conformity with their regional investment commitments. 
Given the large scale effects of the pre-establishment commitments, the question is raised 
regarding the proper limits of national treatment in the ASEAN investment regime. As a 
result, while the ACIA has made a concession to accord national treatment to ASEAN 
investors and their investments, it subjects this treatment to a large number of reservations. 
Currently, it remains challenging for ASEAN Member States to find an appropriate 
“ASEAN Way” of dealing with the tension between regional integration objectives and 
national priorities.  
 
5.2.2.1 Realistic Approach to National Treatment 
National treatment in IIAs can be read as a limit on protectionism.561 Modern 
investment agreements provide national treatment for market access, pre-establishment 
rights, and rules for investment protection.562 NAFTA article 1102 provides national 
treatment for both investors and investments. The EU treaty prohibits restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment on a national basis, including both primary rights (to set up and 
manage new undertakings), and secondary rights (to set up agencies, branches, 
subsidiaries) in the territory of any Member State.563 The Colonia Protocol also requires 
that investments of investors from other MERCOSUR Member States must be admitted on 
a national basis.564       
Unlike the restrictive approach of the IGA, the AIA had a liberal policy on the pre-
establishment phase. States were required to relinquish their sovereignty to control access 
                                                 
 
561  Kurtz, J. (2010), “The Merits and Limits of Comparativism: National Treatment in International 
Investment Law and the WTO” in Schill, S.W. (2010), International Investment Law and Comparative 
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563 TFEU article 49 (ex-Article 43 TEC). 
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of foreign investment to their territory. The AIA aimed to accord national treatment to both 
ASEAN and non-ASEAN investors and their investments in all industries immediately.565 
Each ASEAN Member State was obliged to treat other ASEAN investors and investments 
no less favourably than its own. According to the objective of liberalisation, national 
treatment had to be fully granted within six months after the date of signing of the AIA, 
firstly, to ASEAN investors in the manufacturing sector.566  The AIA modality was similar 
to that of the CEPT, i.e. Member States were able to place industries that they were not 
ready to open on either a Temporary Exclusion List (TEL) or a Sensitive List (SL). The 
TEL was to be phased out by 2010 for the six ASEAN countries and by 2020 for non-
ASEAN investors; the SL was subject to periodic review by the AIA Council.567 On this 
schedule, CLMV had a longer timeframe. It is worth noting that the AIA entered into force 
when ASEAN encountered the economic crisis. During the period 1999-2000, ASEAN 
Member States necessarily agreed to liberalise their market in order to attract FDI and to 
solve critical situations. They agreed to waive the 30 percent national equity requirement 
under the AICO Scheme, in accordance with the AIA short term measures.568  
The extension of national treatment to the opening-up phase of industries under the 
AIA greatly modified the previous constraints on foreign investors relating to the right to 
entry and establishment in certain strategic sectors.569 However, despite the ambitious 
objective of full liberalisation, ASEAN Member States realised the impossibility of 
opening up all industries with total non-discrimination obligations.570 Hence, against this 
unbalanced background, the ACIA has attempted to balance between the scope of 
investors’ protection and the regulatory space of the ASEAN Member States.    
Consequently, the ACIA is written in a more realistic way. It continues to 
automatically provide national treatment as a protective standard for admission and post-
establishment phases, as well as in dispute settlement. Nonetheless, the ACIA opens up 
only five strong industrial sectors and not to all investors but only to qualified “ASEAN 
                                                 
 
565 AIA article 7.  
566 The signing date of the AIA Agreement was 7th October 1998. 
567 AIA article 7(2)(3)(4). 
568 See AICO Scheme in Chapter 2. The Sixth ASEAN Summit, 1998, held in Hanoi, Vietnam, adopted 
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investors” and their investments. As a result, the ACIA regime is more restrictive than the 
AIA regime in terms of scope of application of the national treatment. 
Member States must extend non-discriminatory treatments (including MFN and 
national treatments) first and foremost to ASEAN investors (with limited exceptions) and 
minimise and, where possible, eliminate such exceptions. Since 2010, investment 
liberalisation commitments in the goods sector under the ACIA have been remarkably 
liberal in six ASEAN Member States, using as yardstick a minimum of 70 percent 
allowable foreign equity.571 Full realisation of the ACIA, with the removal of temporary 
exclusion lists in manufacturing, agriculture, fisheries, forestry and mining, is scheduled to 
occur by 2015 for Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam.572 
Apart from the general scope of application, the technique of “negative list” 
exemption is also used in the ACIA to limit the scope of national treatment.573 This 
practice appears to have its origins in the United States BITs, followed by the NAFTA, 
among others.574 Most investment agreements which provide national treatment allow 
States to file a list of sectors excluded from the operation of the standard, but subject to the 
gradual removal of these discriminatory measures. This technique requires the State to 
assess its capacity to absorb FDI as well as the ability of its domestic firms to withstand 
foreign full competition in particular sectors.575 As under other regimes, the use of the 
national treatment exception under the ACIA is extensive. Pursuant to ACIA article 47(2), 
the TEL and the SL to the AIA Agreement became the Reservation List of ACIA.576 
Investment restrictions in ASEAN Member States must be eliminated or improved in 
accordance with a modality which has been set out based on the AEC Blueprint 
schedules.577 
 
5.2.2.2 Reservation as Protectionism in Disguise 
The national treatment standard is an articulation between the ACIA and national 
laws. In providing equal treatment to all ASEAN investors, ASEAN Member States lose 
some controls as regards the entry and the operation of foreign investments. Under the 
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ACIA, States are not allowed to differentiate treatments among investors in the post-
establishment phase. Nevertheless, States may treat ASEAN investors and investments 
differently by creating a list of excepted industries.  
A Member State retains the possibility of deciding the level of national treatment it 
proposes to grant in such sectors by listing specific limitations. Despite the fact that the 
AEC Blueprint requires ASEAN Member States to complete the final phase of the 
progressive reduction or elimination of investment restrictions and impediments for eight 
ASEAN Member States in 2014 and ASEAN-2 (Lao PDR and Myanmar) in 2015,578 
numbers of reservations are scheduled regarding both pre- and post-establishment phase. 
ASEAN Member States need more time to prepare themselves before fully liberalising 
certain strategic industries. Therefore, in order for foreign investors to understand precisely 
how they will be regulated by host States, it is necessary to examine ASEAN States’ 
Schedules579 and their domestic legislation governing foreign investment process.  
ASEAN Member States potentially have a number of existing inconsistent 
measures as regards entry conditions. Highly selective exceptions to national treatment 
should be made only on ground of “public interest”. These non-conforming measures are 
diverse, though most of them can be described in terms of requirement of equity 
participation, minimum capital used at commencement of the business under national laws, 
permission to own land, foreign exchange transactions for prevention of currency 
speculation, or flows of portfolio.  
In using these measures, the ASEAN Member States must indicate the level of 
government which issues such measures for the purpose of transparency. The exceptions to 
national treatment can derive from different levels of government; for example, the central 
government of Brunei may use the exemption for reason of food security,580 a regional 
government of Cambodia may reserve national treatment regarding the use of natural 
resources associated with land.581 
The sources and the forms of measures are diverse. They may be constitutions, acts, 
national development plans, long-term development plans, administrative directives and 
guidelines. From a survey of reservation lists, a large part of ASEAN Member States’ 
investment restrictions relates to service sector activities, a smaller part relates to primary 
sector activity, and only a modest number of restrictions involve FDI in manufacturing. 
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Some States may reserve some sub-sectors to State-owned enterprises only; for instance, 
manufacture of pharmaceutical drugs and incidental services in Myanmar.582 
Apart from exceptions in strategic sectors, the ACIA allows a degree of flexibility 
in national treatment through exemptions of specific sub-sectors, in order to secure the 
interests of local entrepreneurs, and the future development and regulatory policies of 
ASEAN Member States. This approach demonstrates the application of special and 
differential treatment, which is one of guiding principles of the “ASEAN Way”.583 
ASEAN Member States often employ exceptions to national treatment to protect their local 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) because they recognise an economic asymmetry 
between these SMEs, which are in an economically disadvantageous position compared to 
ASEAN investors, who may be in control of powerful transnational corporations (TNCs). 
Some departures from national treatment are justified by ethnicity. Ethnic groups 
may be assured of a certain percentage of ownership of various investment projects, most 
notably those in the natural resources sector. For instance, Malaysia has specially reserved 
discriminatory treatment of the Bumiputera people, and Bumiputera-status companies, 
trust companies and institutions.584 For them, national treatment may not apply to any 
measures affecting their land, property and natural resources associated with land, 
including acquisition, ownership and lease of land and property, or treatment of shares in 
the share capital of a corporation quoted on the official list of the stock exchange.  
Obviously, there is a tension between clauses stipulating national treatment 
standard and clauses allowing broad exclusion which seek to delimit the scope of the 
standards. Even though the ACIA’s intent is to discourage discrimination between ASEAN 
nationals, ASEAN Member States try to keep the level of national competition higher than 
that of foreign ASEAN nationals. Exemptions to national treatment standard survive as a 
tool of protectionism for ASEAN Member States, reflecting an unresolved tension between 
nationalism and regionalism. Repeatedly, the ACIA reveals fundamental tensions between 
the intent to create standards of equivalency in the treatment of ASEAN nationals and the 
preservation of national autonomy over investment policy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
582 Myanmar Reservation List No.2. 
583 ACIA article 23. See Chapter 2.4. 
584 The term “Bumiputera” covers Malays, natives of Sabah and Sarawak, and aborigines. See the Treasury 
Circular Letter No.4 of 1995 (also known as Surat Pekeliling Perbendaharaan). 
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Conclusion to Chapter 5 
The MFN and national treatment standards are foundational principles for the 
protection of international investments in the ACIA. The non-discriminatory clauses are 
one of the tools that allow the ACIA to follow very closely the objectives of the realisation 
of the AEC. The ACIA has taken into account the flaws of the previous IGA/AIA regime. 
In its tactics used to clarify the scope of application and subject-matter as well as in the 
exceptions, conditions, and specific qualifications provided in the explanatory notes, the 
ACIA’s provisions are more precise.  
The ACIA is one of the rare investment agreements of developing countries which 
offers both non-discriminatory standards and which regulates internal and external 
investment liberalisation, in both pre- and post-establishment phases. All investors are 
subject to the same rules, level of market access, operational conditions and opportunities. 
However, given the development gap among ASEAN Member States, the ACIA regime 
needs to balance protection of investors with margin of appreciation of States in order to 
regulate the flows.  
Both MFN and national treatment have several features in common, namely, 
beneficiaries, “likeness” test, automatic application, external dimension, and dispute 
settlement. Nonetheless, their dynamics are opposite. Regarding the MFN treatment, the 
ACIA has introduced two ASEAN specific features. The MFN treatment follows the 
extensive approach. It generally allows importing substantive provisions from third-party 
treaties. ASEAN Member States are neither allowed to be exempted from the MFN 
application by schedule of reservations nor by the conclusion of agreements with a third 
party. The only way for substantive exemptions to be accepted is a conclusion of  
sub-regional agreements among ASEAN Member States for deeper economic integration. 
The ACIA has also ended the debate on the importation of procedural provisions  
by explicitly excluding the ISDS provisions from the scope of MFN.  
On the contrary, the ACIA approach on national treatment is more restrictive, 
because every State has set a long list of reservations in its schedule, exempting several 
sectors from the scope of national treatment, principally in order to safeguard national 
security and competitiveness of domestic small and medium enterprises. The overuse of 
national treatment reservation may be counterproductive for regional investment 
integration under the ACIA regime. If national treatment is understood as a limit on 
protectionism, its numerous reservations may result in protectionism in disguise.  
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The ACIA regime is a strong case of non-discriminatory standard, as it mixes the 
use of MFN and national treatment in the “ASEAN Way”. This approach can be 
considered a plausible option for the current negotiations of IIAs.  By according the MFN 
standard, the ACIA has become a genuine tool of harmonisation of standards of investment 
protection for the ASEAN Investment Area. By the national treatment standard, the ACIA 
maintains ASEAN Member States’ regulatory power to the extent of their national needs. 
The non-application of the ISDS to disputes arising from the pre-establishment phase, 
combined with the unqualified term “in like circumstances”, underlines that relative rights 
depend more on States’ generosity than absolute rights.  
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Chapter 6. Dispute Settlement Mechanisms  
 “Substantive commitments go hand in hand with their enforcement mechanism as 
two cornerstones of international investment policies”.585 Before turning to the dispute 
settlement mechanism (DSM) itself, it should be stressed that the DSM provided in the 
ACIA does not exist independently but serves as an enforcement tool for an effective 
guarantee of the substantive rights previously discussed in chapters 4 and 5. The world of 
IIAs has changed tremendously, regarding both substantive and procedural rights. In the 
last decade, the number of investment disputes has constantly increased. At the moment, 
Investor-States Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provided in the investment chapter of major 
mega-regional economic partnership agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP), or Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), has proved to be one of 
the most contentious elements and a major battleground during negotiations.  
The procedures of DSM in ASEAN investment agreements have undergone major 
transformation. While the IGA was written in a minimalistic manner, the ACIA has 
engaged in a detail-enhancing trend by taking into account the issues of transparency, 
predictability and policy space. This legal modernisation is in line with the rules-based 
objective of the AEC. In a broader context, economic integration requires legalisation and 
judicialisation of the regime.586 The AEC cannot happen without rules and enforcement. 
With the realisation of the AEC, the more investments flow, a greater number of disputes 
may be expected. However, given the “ASEAN Way” of cooperation, the ASEAN 
Member States have decided to remain flexible and respect the autonomy of disputing 
parties.  
Like the majority of IIAs, the ACIA has both investor-States and State-to-State 
dispute settlement mechanisms. The ISDS, established under IGA article X has been 
consolidated into ACIA section B (article 28-41) which allows ASEAN investors to sue  
an ASEAN Member State in case of a breach of protection obligations under the ACIA.  
In case of an interpretation or application of the ACIA, a failure of an ISDS or a breach of 
                                                 
 
585 UNCTAD (2014), Investor-State Dispute Settlement, UNCTAD Series on Issues in IIAs II, New York and 
Geneva, p.170. 
586 Kawashima, F. (2005), The Dimensions of Judicialization of the Dispute Settlement Procedures in the 
WTO: The Operation of the DSU during the First Ten Years (in Japanese), Annual of Japanese Association 
of International Economic Law 14, pp.92-117; cited in Kawashima, F. (2011). Judicialization of the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanisms in Asian Economic Integrations?: Expectation, Reality and Ways Forward. Retrieved 
from http://www2.gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp/blog/anda/publications/files/2011/08/8-kawashima.pdf (Last accessed: 
10 September 2015) . 
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liberalisation obligations, ACIA article 27 incorporates the State-to-State DSMs, 
previously provided under AIA article 17 and IGA article IX.  
ACIA article 27 refers to the 2004 ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism (“EDSM”), which provides a detailed mechanism specifically 
addressing disputes relating to ASEAN economic agreements among ASEAN Member 
States. This State-to-State mechanism is linked to the basic instrument of ASEAN. Chapter 
VIII of the ASEAN Charter provides a framework for existing and future dispute 
settlement mechanisms, including the investment ones.   
The evolution of ISDS can be associated with the evolution of investment 
agreements itself. For the first era BITs (before the 1960s), individual investors usually had 
no rights before international tribunals because this period was dominated by a public 
international law paradigm which focused exclusively on inter-State treaty relationship and 
State-to-State arbitration. In other words, investors had been granted substantive rights, but 
they had no procedural enforcement options. In case of treaty violation, investors needed to 
request diplomatic protection from its State. However, due to political situation or foreign 
policy, a home State may refuse to assist its investors to bring suit against a host State. 
Even if a home State decides to proceed with a claim, this mechanism did not guarantee 
that the home State would hand over compensation to the wronged investor under its 
protection. Briefly, the home State had complete discretion over the commencement, 
prosecution, and settlement of such claims, as well as disposal of any damages awarded. 586F587  
These concerns led to the second era (from the late 1960s onwards) during which 
investor-State arbitration clauses were added to investment treaties, resulting in a 
significant shift away from State-centric and towards investor-centric power. ISDS was 
defended as  
a depoliticised neutral system to resolve disputes between foreign investors and host 
States. 587F588 The IGA had moved away from the “ASEAN Way” of political and diplomatic 
channels, and prepared a ground for a rule-based community. ASEAN investors were 
authorised to bring claims directly before international arbitral tribunals for compensation 
against an ASEAN host State in response to alleged breaches of investment standards.  
Since then, ISDS has become a well-established mechanism, commonly found in 
bilateral and multilateral investment treaties. 588F589 It assists investors to protect their 
investments against political or regulatory instability, and other State-driven risks. ISDS 
                                                 
 
587 Roberts, A. (2014), “State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent 
Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 55, No.1, p.2. 
588 UNCTAD (2012), Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, United Nations, p.43. 
589 See generally Dolzer R., Schreuer C. (2012), Chapter X. Settling Investment Disputes, pp.235-310. 
169 
 
 
has traditional advantages of flexibility, efficiency, and neutrality over national court 
proceedings.590 While the role of State-to-State arbitration has been largely ignored, ISDS 
attracts more attention as a main tool to promote investment flows. One investor-State 
arbitral award has been issued under the IGA regime,591 whereas there is no case before 
State-to-State arbitration. 
However, the ISDS is increasingly criticised both from procedural and substantial 
aspects. Procedural speed and efficiency are sometimes questionable, causing delay of 
process and significant expenses. Concerning its substantive aspect, criticism is two-fold. 
Firstly, ISDS confers greater legal rights on foreign investors than those available to 
domestic investors: national investors have no access to international arbitration. Secondly, 
investor-State arbitral tribunals are empowered to interpret and apply vague investment 
treaty standards, which may overly protect economic interests of investors. By that, 
investors could undermine State policy space and regulatory power to change laws for 
public needs, such as social, health or environmental protections. Some States (led by 
Australia,592 and in ASEAN, led by Indonesia)593 have recently reversed their BITs 
practices and disapproved ISDS provisions, as they argue that ISDS has “chilling effect” 
on State regulatory powers.594  
                                                 
 
590 Hamilton, L., Webster, P. (2015), The International Business Environment, 3rd ed., Oxford, OUP, p.279. 
591 Yaung Chi Oo v. Myanmar, ASEAN I.D. Case No. ARB/01/1, Award 31 March 2003. Another case 
brought under the 1987 IGA, Cemex v. Indonesia. The case is reported as settled. See also “Cemex to end 
ICSID claim against Indonesia”, Global Arbitration Review, 30 June 2006.  
592 The Australian Government’s 2011 Trade Policy Statement: Australia would not agree to ISDS in its 
treaties. In part, this policy, motivated by the Philip Morris claim, was instituted in response to legislation 
requiring the plain packaging of cigarettes. Since a change of government in 2013, the inclusion of ISDS will 
be allowed on a case-by-case basis. See Kurtz, J. (2011), “The Australian Trade Policy Statement on 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement”, American Society of International Law, Vol.15, Issue 22, 
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/22/australian-trade-policy-statement-investor-state-dispute-
settlement (Last accessed: 30 Aug 2015); Kurtz, J. (2012), “Australia’s Rejection of Investor–State 
Arbitration: Causation, Omission and Implication”, ICSID Review Vol.27, p.65. 
593 From July 2015, the Indonesian Government intended to terminate its 67 BITs and renegotiate them to 
provide greater capacity to regulate in the public interest for health, the environment or financial reasons. 
http://indonesia.nlembassy.org/organization/departments/economic-affairs/termination-bilateral-investment-
treaty.html. See also Sharma,S., Trakman Leon, “Indonesia’s Termination of the Netherlands–Indonesia BIT: 
Broader Implications in the Asia-Pacific?”, 21 Aug 2014, (Last accessed: 30 August 2015) 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/08/21/indonesias-termination-of-the-netherlands-indonesia-bit-
broader-implications-in-the-asia-pacific/  
594 See developing countries position on this issue: UNCTAD IISD, 7th Annual Reform Forum of Developing 
Countries Investment Negotiators. https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2013/7th_annual_forum_report.pdf. 
South American countries (Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador) have recently withdrawn from the ICSID 
system. See UNCTAD (2010), “Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITs: Impact on Investor-State 
Claims”, IIAs Issues Note No.2 December 2010; Tietje, C., Nowrot, K., Weckernagel, C. (2009)  
“Once and Forever? The Legal Effects of a Denunciation of ICSID”, TDM 1, Investor-State Disputes: 
International Investment Law. For Venezuela, see: 
http://www.pgr.gob.ve/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=531:gobierno-bolivariano-
denuncia-convenio-con-ciadi-&Itemid=23. (Last accessed: 10 September 2015) 
For Ecuador, see Nowrot, K. (2011), “International Investment Law and the Republic of Ecuador: From 
Arbitral Bilateralism to Judicial Regionalism”, TDM 1, Latin America.   
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In the third era (2000s), an effort has been made to correct the unbalanced 
pendulum of the previous eras, by reengaging States in the investment treaty system.595 The 
ACIA has followed a trend towards a more elaborate regulation of ISDS proceedings on 
many basic issues. This development ensures more transparency, and fairer outcomes, 
which increases overall legitimacy of the ISDS regime. The ACIA provides for a fully-
elaborated ISDS section for claims arising under substantive treaty provisions. However,  
it mainly refers dispute resolution to external institutional rules. This system of external 
references gives investors freedom to choose their own appropriate forum. More 
importantly, the ACIA attempts to balance the scales both by taking into account investors’ 
interests and being sensitive to States’ regulatory needs. 
As a consequence, the ACIA DSM becomes more politicised. Not only do ASEAN 
Member States have a prominent role in State-to-State mechanisms, they have also 
increased their role in order to influence ISDS. ASEAN Member States’ intervention is 
significant in applying and interpreting the ACIA. The State-to-State mechanism is the 
only forum for sensitive or political disputes, such as liberalisation in the pre-establishment 
phase. In other words, the ACIA reinserts a dose of the “ASEAN Way” into ASEAN 
relations.      
     Under the new balanced approach, the ACIA offers investors and States a myriad of 
choices ranging from amicable settlements to legally-binding decisions which are 
expeditiously enforced. This chapter analyses components of the ACIA DSM, examines 
their potential and limits, and recommends policy options for reform. As the ACIA 
maintains parallel distinction under the two-pronged approach, this chapter is organised 
into two sections. Section 6.1 addresses ISDS which is the most crucial tool to protect 
ASEAN investors under the ACIA. It is noted that, within mainstream practice, several 
options for each particular clause are available, and different treaties take different 
approaches.596 This section discusses options which the ACIA has chosen on selected 
aspects of arbitral rules and proceedings, in comparison to other prominent models. It is 
also important to consider the implications of the “hybridity”597 of DSM in the ACIA, i.e. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
See also European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration (EFILA), A Response to the Criticism 
Against ISDS, 17 May 2015, pp.26-29. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2014/130710/LDM_BRI(2014)130710_REV2
_EN.pdf  (Last accessed: 9 September 2015)   
595 Roberts, A. (2014). “State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent 
Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol.55, Issue 1, p.1-3.  
596 Pohl, J., Mashigo, K., Nohen, A. (2012), Dispute Settlement Provisions in IIAs: A Large Sample Survey, 
OECD WP on International Investment, OECD Publishing, p.10. 
597 Roberts, A. (2014); Roberts, A. (2013), Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the 
Investment Treaty System, American Journal of International Law, Vol.107, Issue 1, p.92. 
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the potential role of the State-to-State mechanism and its proper relationship with investor-
State arbitration.  
Section 6.2 addresses in detail the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism (“EDSM” or “Vientiane Protocol”)598 with a mechanism specifically designed 
for intra-regional economic disputes between ASEAN Member States. Even though the 
EDSM Protocol does not establish the “ASEAN court”, it provides an enhanced DSM 
dissimilar to a traditional dispute settlement under public international law. The EDSM can 
be seen as a vehicle to a deeper economic integration in ASEAN.  
  
                                                 
 
598 The ASEAN EDSM was signed on 29 November 2004 at Vientiane, Laos. 
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Section 6.1 Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms 
Similar to most EU Member States (traditionally) and the United States,599 ASEAN 
Member States are in favour of including ISDS in their IIAs because they generally 
consider that this type of DSM encourages investment flows. When breaches to guaranteed 
rights are alleged to have taken place, ASEAN investors may have access to various 
mechanisms, which give rise to complaint and initiation of legal action. Given the ASEAN 
context, three specific arguments could explain why ASEAN Member States have decided 
to internationalise and privatise their investment dispute resolution.  
Firstly, the ACIA takes into account the fact that ASEAN Member States have 
diverse legal frameworks and court systems. Due to the different history, economy and 
political backgrounds of ASEAN Member States, ISDS is preferable in order to reinforce 
investors’ confidence. Traditionally, ISDS has advantages of flexibility, autonomy of the 
parties, compared to the only option available under domestic court procedure. 
International dispute settlements are more independent than national courts. The ISDS 
mechanism depoliticises investment disputes and creates a forum that offers ASEAN 
investors a fair hearing before an independent, neutral and qualified tribunal. Without 
requiring permission of their home States, ASEAN investors have discretion over 
commencement, prosecution, and settlement of a claim. Damages awarded are also paid 
directly to the wronged investors. 
Secondly, the ACIA ISDS applies to intra-regional relations, rather than to external 
relations as do the TTIP, TTP and CETA. ASEAN Member States would be less concerned 
about large multinational firms. Better protection of investors’ rights will encourage more 
investment flows, which will strengthen the realisation of the AEC, as well as confirming 
the character of a rule-based community. However, it must be remembered that the ACIA 
also covers foreign-owned ASEAN based (FOAB) investments in the definition of 
“ASEAN investment”. Non-ASEAN investors, who own or control a juridical person of an 
ASEAN Member State with substantive business operations in the territory of such other 
Member State, may potentially have standing before the ISDS mechanism.600  
                                                 
 
599 European Commission, Public consultation on modalities for investment protection and ISDS in TTIP, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc_152280.pdf; Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, “U.S. Objectives, U.S. Benefits in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: A 
Detailed View”, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2014/March/US-
Objectives-US-Benefits-In-the-TTIP-a-Detailed-View (Last accessed: 8 September 2015) 
600 See chapter 3.2.2.2. 
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Thirdly, it is alleged that ISDS freezes policy settings of States, and has 
undermined the ability of legislators to enact for public interest purposes, which is the 
essence of sovereignty.601 On this issue, reference is made to substantive provisions 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. The ACIA has opted for a narrow approach of investment 
standards and has provided more policy space for ASEAN Member States.  However, the 
“ASEAN Way” of consensus and flexibility is observed in several aspects of the ACIA 
ISDS. These aspects are scrutinised in the following sections. 
Section 6.1 discusses whether, and to what extent, the DSM practice of the ACIA 
follows the general trend of more detailed rules. This section shows that the ACIA has  
a standard structure of ISDS provisions. It is based on the NAFTA model,602 and has  
a “system of reference” to the existing arbitration rules under the ICSID603 and the 
UNCITRAL.604 Generally, the ACIA attempts to grapple with some of the inherent 
concerns of the system that have crystallised over the past decades. It takes account of 
developments by including an array of provisions to clarify or to renovate the practice 
under the previous regime.  
However, criticisms have been made, for example, over difficulties in correcting 
erroneous arbitral decisions, independence and impartiality of arbitrators, third-party 
submissions, requirements for a public and transparent process and the possibility of an 
appellate mechanism. In the light of up-to-date practice, developments and flaws of the 
ACIA are addressed in section 6.2. This section attempts to justify the ACIA’s choices.  
It argues that despite its rules-enhancing approach, the ACIA is concluded in a way to 
preserve the autonomy of the parties. The ASEAN Member States do not follow every 
option taken by the newly negotiated IIAs, but rather specifically tailor the ACIA 
according to the “ASEAN Way” of dispute settlement.   
 
6.1.1 General Practice: Towards Rules-Enhanced Procedures 
In order to assess the modernisation of the ACIA, an understanding of the general 
practice of the 1990s-styled BITs is required. There are two major approaches regarding 
ISDS.604F605 The first, traditional, approach is minimalist, exemplified by the IGA and most 
BITs concluded by ASEAN and European countries. This minimalist approach is generally 
                                                 
 
601 Bell-Pasht, K. (2011), Report on the Environmental Impact of the CETA, Toronto, Canadian 
Environmental Law Association, p.29. 
602 Report of the 2nd WG-ACIA, 29-31 January 2008, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
603 Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 
opened for signature 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966. (“ICSID Convention”). 
604 The Arbitration Rules of the UNDTAD. 
605 UNCTAD (2014), ISDS, p.169. 
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characterised by a broad ISDS scope and limited procedural specifications. Most 
imperative procedural aspects are left to be determined by the selected rules of arbitration. 
The second and more recent approach has a more circumscribed scope.606 A number of 
new procedural features are regulated by the treaty itself.  
The ACIA has opted for a details-enhancing approach, which allows ASEAN 
Member States to exercise more control over procedural and other aspects of arbitration. 
These detailed guidelines aim to delineate the scope of ISDS provisions, to optimise cost-
effective process, and to legitimise arbitral procedure. More importantly, they limit the 
discretion of arbitral tribunals in interpreting the scope of the ISDS and in determining 
procedures of disputes arising out of the ACIA. The complexity of the inclusion of ISDS in 
the ACIA reflects both offensive (regulatory sovereignty) and defensive aspects 
(investment-friendly environment) of procedures. Despite all this variation and level of 
detail, it is crucial to ensure that the whole ISDS regulations under the ACIA create a 
coherent and functional arbitral process. 
The ACIA was not concluded from a capital-exporting perspective, which primarily 
concerns protection of investors abroad, but rather in a more cautious manner, which 
concerns preservation of domestic regulatory autonomy. Nevertheless, the inclusion of 
ISDS in the ACIA has drawn several criticisms, which have effect on the rule-making of 
the ACIA and on the level of ISDS acceptance in the ASEAN Member States. It is 
troublesome for ASEAN Member States, to come before arbitral tribunals, especially in 
times of economic crisis or budgetary restrictions. A dispute could result in extreme costs 
for a Member State to comply with the awards and to pay legal defence costs.  
In order to prevent an unmanageable situation, the ACIA uses numerous techniques 
to set the scene before and after the initiation of arbitration. As discussed in Chapter 5.1, 
one of the most effective techniques is an explicit exemption of the ISDS from the scope of 
MFN application. ACIA Section B has created indispensable elements for the operational 
ISDS (i.e. State’s consent to arbitration, amicable or alternative dispute resolutions, scope 
of the ISDS mechanism, available arbitration forums, constitution of tribunals, selection of 
arbitrators, and awards and their recognition and enforcement). Other complementary 
issues (i.e. regional centres of arbitration, interpretation mechanism, and transparency) 
depend more on specific policies and concerns of the ASEAN Member States. As a whole, 
the ISDS under the ACIA regime is specifically tailored to reflect the “ASEAN Way”. 
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6.1.1.1 State’s Consent as Substantive Scope of ISDS 
Identifying the scope of the ISDS is clearly a key matter to be determined by the 
ACIA. Generally, the scope of ISDS depends greatly on the scope of the investment 
agreement. However, ASEAN Member States have given their consent only to specific 
types of claims. Before the initiation of a procedure, parties must be clear who could 
potentially invoke the mechanism and on which grounds, in order to protect their rights 
and benefits granted under the ACIA.   
Traditional BITs usually have a broad, open-ended formulation. 606F607 They extend 
ISDS to all kinds of disputes “related to” or “in connection with” an investment arising 
between an investor and the host State. Breaches may be alleged of the State regarding its 
own domestic law, an investment contract or even customary international law. Other 
BITs, 607F608 including the ACIA, have opted for a narrow approach. ACIA article 29 
determines the scope of consent to arbitration that ASEAN Member States have given in 
advance to ASEAN investors. The scope of ISDS envisages narrowing down the range of 
situations in which investors may resort to ISDS. Accordingly, certain types of claims are 
expressly excluded from the scope of the ISDS. The ACIA has set a three-fold substantive 
limit to investor’s access to the ISDS mechanism, with respect to subject matter, time and 
claimant’s identity. 
            (1) Ratione Materiae 
 ACIA article 32(b) emphasises that the violation of a treaty obligation must result 
in losses or damage to the investor. Disputes in the 1970s were initially limited to claims 
arising under expropriation and compensation clauses. 608F609  Subsequent treaties, such as the 
IGA, provided for ISDS in claims arising under other substantive treaty provisions. 609F610 
Under the ACIA, disputing investors may submit a claim to arbitration on numerous 
grounds, i.e. under articles 5 (National Treatment), 6 (MFN), 8 (Senior Management and 
Board of Directors), 11 (Treatment of Investment), 12 (Compensation in Cases of Strife), 
13 (Transfers) and 14 (Expropriation and Compensation) relating to the management, 
conduct, operation or sale or other disposition of a covered investment.610F611 In line with 
general practice, these enumerated grounds concern only protection obligations in the post-
                                                 
 
607 See e.g. 2009 China-Peru FTA article 139. 
608 See e.g. 2009 India-Korea FTA article 10.21. 
609 Pohl, J., Mashigo, K., Nohen, A. (2012) Dispute Settlement Provisions in IIAs: A Large Sample Survey, 
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610 IGA article X. 
611 ACIA article 32. 
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establishment phase, the pre-establishment phase or liberalisation obligations cannot be 
invoked by investors against ASEAN Member States.  
           (2) Ratione Temporis  
           The ACIA sets the time limit within which a claim may be brought before the 
arbitral tribunals.612 The claims must arise out of events which occurred, or were raised, 
after the entry into force of the ACIA. They must also take place within three years of the 
time at which the disputing investor became aware, or should reasonably have become 
aware, of a breach of an obligation under the ACIA.613 This time limitation narrows down 
the scope of the ISDS into a reasonable period of an awareness of loss or damage to the 
disputing investor or a covered investment. 
(3) Ratione Personae  
ACIA article 28(b) defines the meaning of “disputing investor”. The ACIA permits 
ISDS claims to be submitted by ASEAN investors. In addition, where an investor owns or 
controls an enterprise in the host State, the ACIA allows an enterprise to bring claims in its 
own name or allow the investor to bring claims on behalf of such an enterprise. Article 
29(2) stresses that a natural person possessing nationality or citizenship of a Member State 
may not pursue a claim against that Member State under the ISDS Section.614  
Like other traditional BITs, the ACIA does not exclude the possibility of multi-
party proceedings, it is doubtful whether the ACIA tribunal will allow this kind of 
representation. As the ICSID Convention is silent on whether “class action”-type 
arbitrations are allowed under the Convention, arbitral opinions are divided. For instance, 
the majority of the tribunal in Ambiente Ufficio v. Argentina interpreted the ICSID 
Convention in favour of a plurality of claimants jointly submitting a claim to ICSID,615 
while the dissenting arbitrator expressed “total disagreement” with the conclusion of the 
majority on this point.616 The newly negotiated EUSFTA has solved this potential problem. 
Its footnote 23(b) to article 9.16 paragraph 1 explicitly prohibits “class-action” claims. This 
rule aims to prevent fraudulent or manipulative claims.617 For more certainty, the ACIA 
should expressly exclude  
                                                 
 
612 ACIA article 29(3).  
613 ACIA article 34(1)(a). 
614 See also Schreuer, C. (2009), “Nationality of Investors: Legitimate Restrictions vs. Business Interests”, 
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“class action” as inadmissible. This exclusion would release ASEAN Member States from 
the possibility of being challenged by a class composed of an undetermined number of 
unidentified claimants.   
 
6.1.1.2 Non-Confrontational Settlement Attempts  
Generally, treaties with ISDS provisions require that disputing parties must initially 
attempt to settle their dispute amicably. The ACIA promotes amicable resolutions by 
mandating consultations and negotiations. Its article 31 sets a non-confrontational dispute 
settlement as a condition precedent, before an ASEAN investor may proceed to the 
adjudicatory stage. The non-confrontational mechanism includes consultation and 
negotiation, and other non-binding third-party procedures. These alternative dispute 
resolutions (ADR) resonate with the tradition of “ASEAN Way” of dispute settlement, 
because they deprioritise investor-State arbitration mechanism, thus reinforcing the 
function of arbitration as a measure of last resort.618 The ADR may also reduce ASEAN 
Member States’ financial liabilities arising from ISDS awards and save resources of both 
parties.  
As transparency is not required, these procedures can be totally confidential, including any 
advice or proposed solution.  
In order to make sure that an issue is truly unsolvable, ACIA article 32 sets six 
months as a “cooling-off period”, starting from the date of the receipt by a disputing State 
of a request for consultation. ACIA article 30 stipulates “conciliation” as a parallel means 
of dispute settlement which the disputing parties may begin and terminate at any time.  
The procedures for conciliation may continue even if the disputing parties decide to submit 
a claim to an arbitral tribunal and while the arbitral proceedings are in progress. As the 
conciliation is a voluntary means, the positions taken during these proceedings are without 
prejudice to the legal position of either disputing party in any further arbitral proceedings.            
In fact, there is room for improvement regarding the use of non-binding third-party 
procedures in the ACIA. The newly negotiated texts, for example, the text on ISDS for EU 
Agreements,619 and the CETA,620 contain a specific annex on mediation, detailing the 
initiation of the procedures, selection of the mediator, rules of the procedures, 
implementation of a mutually agreed solution, and general provisions on confidentiality 
and relationship to other dispute settlement procedures. If the ASEAN Member States 
                                                 
 
618 UNCTAD (2014), ISDS, p.176. 
619 EU ISDS Text, Annex I: Mediation Mechanism.  
620 CETA Annex III: Mediation Procedure, Article 33, Dispute Settlement.  
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consider the ADR as preferable means to cope with intra-ASEAN disputes, they should 
improve the ADR mechanism of the ACIA, for instance, by providing a specific annex on 
the issues.  
For the purpose of impartiality, a mediator must not act as an arbitrator in any future 
investor-State arbitration relating to the same dispute, unless agreed by the parties; and not 
serve as  
a panellist in the subsequent State-to-State proceedings involving the same matter for 
which he or she has been a mediator. 
6.1.1.3 Choice of Forum  
When a matter cannot be solved amicably within a given time, the ACIA further 
provides adjudicatory means of dispute settlement for ASEAN investors. Practice in this 
area varies amongst countries.621 Currently, most IIAs, including the ACIA, dispense with 
the duty of exhaustion of domestic remedies. An investor has a “choice of forum”, either 
international arbitration or domestic courts. Normally, submission to arbitration requires 
consent of the parties to the dispute. The ACIA ISDS contains States’ advance consent, 
thereby giving a disputing investor a choice to initiate arbitration. The institution of 
proceedings constitutes the investor’s acceptance of the offer of consent.622 An ASEAN 
investor can choose to submit a dispute to courts or administrative tribunals of the 
disputing Member State; or under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules of 
Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings; or under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules; or 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. References to these external institutions rules are 
commonly found. The ACIA also mentions specifically regional centres for arbitration in 
ASEAN; or if the disputing parties agree, to any other arbitration institution.623  
The ICSID is a self-contained system without interference of national courts. It has 
an enforcement mechanism of arbitral awards in all ICSID Convention Contracting States. 
Regarding its jurisdiction, ICSID Convention article 25 requires three main elements: (1) 
ratione materiae, a dispute directly arises out of an “investment”; (2) ratione personae, the 
investor’s country of origin and the State complained against are both parties to the 
                                                 
 
621 For instance, Canada, France, Germany and the United Kingdom rarely mention access to domestic 
remedies in their ISDS clause, while ISDS clauses in treaties concluded by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Greece 
and Korea consistently refer to domestic proceedings. See Pohl, J., Mashigo, K., Nohen, A. (2012), p.12. 
622 See generally, Dolzer, R., Schreuer, C. (2012), pp.254-263. 
623 ACIA article 33(1)(a-f) Submission of a claim. 
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Convention,624 and (3) a written consent of the parties to submit legal disputes to ICSID 
arbitration. Disputing parties must satisfy the “double keyhole” test, i.e. the claimant must 
be qualified both under the ACIA and the ICSID Convention.625 At present, only six 
ASEAN Member States are contracting parties of the Convention.626 So this Convention 
can only be used in disputes involving investors from ACIA-ICSID Parties. Instead, non-
ICSID parties may choose the ICSID Additional Facility Rules (AFR), the UNCITRAL 
Rules, or the regional arbitration Rules. The non-ICSID forums allows for more 
involvement of ASEAN Member States’ courts, such as reviews of arbitral awards at the 
seat of arbitration or enforcement of awards in the country where enforcement is sought.627 
 The ACIA also adopts a “sequencing” approach in order to coordinate ISDS and 
State-to-State mechanisms. In line with ICSID Convention article 27, ACIA article 34(3) 
excludes State’s interference with the ISDS proceedings. A home State is prohibited from 
providing any form of diplomatic protection, or bringing an international claim, once  
a dispute has been referred to investor-State arbitration. Nevertheless, diplomatic 
protection does not include informal diplomatic exchanges for the sole purpose of 
facilitating a settlement of the dispute.  
 
6.1.1.4 Constitution of Tribunals 
Once an investor chooses to initiate a claim under particular institutional rules,  
such rules will apply as default. In case that any of these rules is in conflict with  
a mandatory provision of the ACIA from which the parties cannot derogate, that provision 
prevails.628 In constituting a tribunal, ACIA article 33(4) gives disputing parties discretion 
to waive or modify applicable arbitral rules by written agreements. The agreed rules are 
binding on the relevant tribunal, and on individual arbitrators serving on such a tribunal. 
          (1) Composition of Arbitral Tribunals 
           ACIA article 35(1) follows the ICSID approach, where a three member arbitral 
panel is set as default. Each party in dispute designates one arbitrator and the parties agree 
                                                 
 
624 ICSID Convention article 25(2): the claimant is required to establish that it is a national investor of an 
ASEAN Member State who is party to the ICSID Convention on two different dates: the date at which the 
parties consented to ICSID jurisdiction and the date of the registration of the request for arbitration. 
625 See the definition of “investor” and “investment” under the ACIA in Chapter 3. 
626 ICSID members are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore.  
Thailand has signed it but not yet ratified. See List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the 
Convention, as of 18 April 2015. (Last accessed: 30 Aug 2015).  
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Documents/List%20of%20Contracting%20States%2
0and%20Other%20Signatories%20of%20the%20Convention%20-%20Latest.pdf  
627 Schreuer, C.H. et al (2009), The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 2nd Ed., p.900. 
628 See 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules article 1(3) Scope of application, Section I. Introductory rules; 
SIAC Rules article 1, 1.1 Scope of Application and Interpretation. 
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upon the chair of the tribunal.629 The ACIA also provides an option of sole arbitrator, 
particularly for small or medium-sized enterprises whose compensation or damages 
claimed are relatively low. The arbitral tribunal is constituted within 75 days from the date 
of submission of a claim. In the event that the given period has passed and in the absence 
of any other relevant arrangement, “the Appointing Authority, on the request of a disputing 
party, shall appoint, in his or her discretion, the arbitrator or arbitrators who have not been 
appointed.”630 The meaning of the “Appointing Authority” varies, depending on the forum 
of the case.631 
          (2) Place of Arbitration 
          The treaties usually contain language on the place (situs) of arbitration. The situs 
may have an impact on the applicable arbitration rules and may influence enforcement 
possibilities. According to ACIA article 36(5), the tribunal determines the place of 
arbitration in accordance with the applicable arbitration rules, provided that the place is in 
the territory of a State that is a party to the 1958 UN Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”).632 This article, 
however, opens a possibility for disputing parties to agree otherwise.633  
Presently, every ASEAN country is a contracting party to the New York 
Convention; this is a significant step by the ASEAN Governments in creating an attractive 
legal environment for foreign investments. Myanmar is the last ASEAN Member State to 
accede to the Convention (15th July 2013).634 The most urgent task for the Myanmar 
Government is to enact new arbitration legislation which incorporates the provisions of the 
New York Convention into Myanmar’s domestic laws, because its 1944 Arbitration Act 
only provides for domestic arbitration and does not provide a framework for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Theoretically, the parties are 
assured of the enforceability of the award taking place in any ASEAN Member State. 
 
                                                 
 
629 ICSID article 37(2)(b); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules article 9 set similar composition except that the two 
party-designated arbitrators, rather than the parties, choose the third arbitrator as their chair.  
630 ACIA article 35(3). 
631 ACIA article 28(a). 
632 ACIA article 36. 
633 Other treaties may require arbitration to be held in a specific State or city. For instance, NAFTA article 
1130, unless otherwise agreed, requires the place of arbitration must be in the territory of a country that is a 
party to both NAFTA and the New York Convention. 
634 List of the Contracting States (Last accessed: 30 Aug 2015) 
See http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/list-of-contracting-states  
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6.1.1.5 Selection of Arbitrators: Qualifications and Challenges 
The disputing parties’ power to select arbitrators is a major advantage of arbitration 
over litigation before domestic courts, because the selection relies on the self-interest of the 
parties as a basis of winning the case. “The choice of persons who compose the arbitral 
tribunal is vital and often the most decisive step in an arbitration. It has rightly been said 
that arbitration is only as good as the arbitrators”.635 Regardless of the applicable rules 
discussed supra, appointing the right arbitrator(s) maximises the quality of the process and 
its outcome. ACIA article 35(2) sets two types of qualifications that arbitrators must 
possess: (1) expertise and knowledge and (2) independence and impartiality.  
It is paramount that arbitrators possess certain technical or legal expertise or 
experience. The ACIA generally requires knowledge in public international law, 
international trade or international investment rules. The ACIA could have added the 
awareness of ASEAN legal instruments, with a further option to require specialised 
expertise for certain categories of cases, for instance, financial services, oil and gas. While 
the ACIA does not require specific qualifications, the disputing parties can seek to appoint 
ASEAN-wise arbitrators, if they deem appropriate. Furthermore, as ASEAN people speak 
different languages, the linguistic ability of arbitrator is imperative.636 The parties should 
also choose an arbitrator who can dedicate sufficient time to the case and be available for 
hearings and meetings. The wrong choice of arbitrators could affect the cost and time of 
proceedings.  
Along with the expertise and knowledge requirements, the integrity of the arbitrator 
is also required. The arbitrators must be, and remain, independent from the parties, and 
impartial in deciding the case. Generally, all appointed arbitrators must be independent and 
serve in their individual capacities and must not take instructions from any organisation or 
government with regard to matters in the dispute, or be affiliated with the government of 
any disputing party.637 The ACIA concerns specifically conflict of interest induced by 
nationality and permanent residence. In fact, the ACIA is one of the rare investment 
agreements which address the question of permanent residence of arbitrators.638 It requires 
that the presiding arbitrator cannot have the nationality of, or have permanent residence in, 
either the home or host States.639  
                                                 
 
635 Lalive (1989), Melanges en l’Honneur de Nicolas Valticos, Droit et Justice, Editions Pedone, p.289. 
636 ASEAN Charter article 34, English is working language of ASEAN.  
637 AANZFTA article 23, EU Draft on ISDS article 8(7).  
638 The criterion of permanent residence is indeed similar to the criteria that the ACIA uses for the definition 
of investor. Previously, ASEAN IGA article X(3) did not set the condition of the non-permanent residence.  
639 ACIA article 35(1)(b).  
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The ACIA does not contain specific provisions on the challenging process.640 Like 
common BITs, the ACIA simply prescribes the appointment procedure of the replacing 
arbitrator.641 An arbitrator must be replaced where anyone appointed resigns or becomes 
unable to act. The replacing arbitrator is appointed in the same manner as the original 
arbitrator, and has similar powers and duties. In general, an arbitrator must resign when 
he/she discovers or is discovered to have any incompatibility with arbitral functions. The 
challenging process could refer to the applicable arbitration rules under which the tribunal 
has been constituted.642  
More recent investment agreements, for example, the EU draft text on the ISDS and 
the CETA, have created a “code of conduct” of members of arbitral tribunals and 
mediators, as an annex to the agreements in case of “justifiable doubts” as to the 
impartiality or independence of arbitrators; for example, when an arbitrator has a 
significant financial or interest in the matter at stake.643 This code of conduct may be used 
to challenge arbitrators. It provides responsibilities to process, disclosure obligations, 
duties of members, independence and impartiality, obligations of former members, and 
confidentiality.  
In order to reinforce States’ participation in proceedings and to solve conflicts of 
interests of arbitrators, a mixed approach on the constitution of the tribunal has recently 
been introduced by the EU Draft on ISDS.644 The EU Commission generally follows the 
ICSID approach on appointment of arbitrators. However, this traditional approach is 
complemented with the creation of a roster of at least 15 individuals to serve as arbitrators 
in investment disputes involving the EU or EU Member States. For this purpose, each 
Party to the treaty must propose at least five individuals to serve as arbitrators and select 
one who is not a national of either party to act as chairperson of the tribunal. Therefore, 
despite the discretion of disputing parties under the traditional rules, the availability of 
potential arbitrators is limited to the proposed individuals in the roster. On this matter, the 
ACIA allows more flexibility for disputing parties, because States could not intervene in or 
have influence on the constitution of the tribunal by setting a list of arbitrators beforehand. 
                                                 
 
640 Rogers, C.A. (2005), “The Vocation of the International Arbitrator”, American University International 
Law Review, Vol. 20, Issue 5, Article 4, p.957-1020; Daele, K. (2012), Challenge and Disqualification of 
Arbitrators in International Arbitration, Series International Arbitration Law Library 24, Kluwer Law 
International; Rosenberg, C., Tupa, Fernando, “Challenges to Arbitrators: Should the Challenge Process be 
Overhauled?”, in Laird, I.A., Sabahi, B., Sourgens, F.G., Weiler, T.J. (Eds.) (2015), Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and International Law, Volume 8, New York, Juris Net LLC, pp.67-98.  
641 ACIA article 35(7).  
642 See e.g. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules article 11-13 Disclosures by and challenge of arbitrators. 
643 EU ISDS Text Annex II; CETA Annex II to Chapter 33. 
644 EU ISDS Text article 8. 
183 
 
 
 
6.1.1.6 Awards and Their Recognition and Enforcement 
The issuance of awards, followed by their recognition and enforcement, is the last 
but not least important stage in the ISDS proceedings. “The enforcement process is 
sometimes considered the weakest link in the entire chain of international dispute 
resolution”.645 More precisely, State immunity from execution in the collection of awards 
rendered in international investment arbitration is the “Achilles’ heel” of the investor-State 
arbitration system.646 At this stage, the role of ASEAN Member States is key to make the 
ISDS awards effective, because they may refuse to recognise and enforce the awards.  
            (1) Awards  
In line with the ICSID Convention and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the 
ACIA has provisions on interim and final awards, as well as the revision or annulment of 
the awards. The objective of investor-State arbitral awards differs from litigation between 
States under the WTO DSU.647 The purpose of the WTO DSU award is to make a State 
revoke non-compliant measures, or to authorise countermeasures, whereas investor-State 
arbitration focuses on recompensing the wronged foreign investors who have been 
substantially affected by the host State’s measures.  
            (a) Provisional Remedies 
 ACIA article 34(2) allows investors to seek interim relief before courts or 
administrative tribunals of the disputing Member State, without prejudice to their rights to 
arbitration. Where the situation is urgent, a national tribunal may order an interim measure 
of protection to preserve the rights of a disputing party from irreparable harm.648  
In principle, the ACIA allows the investor to seek interim relief at all times, i.e. at the 
initiating or continuing stage of action. Interim relief must be sought for the sole purpose 
of preserving the disputing investor’s rights and interests, and not involve the payment of 
damages or resolution of the substance of the matter in dispute. An interim award can be 
subject to the review procedure.649 
                                                 
 
645 Blessing, M. (1996), “The New York Convention: The Major Problem Areas”, in The New York 
Convention of 1958, ASA Special Series No.9, p.20. 
646 Gerlich, O. (2015), “State Immunity from Execution in the Collection of Awards Rendered in 
International Investment Arbitration: the Achilles’ Heel of the Investor-State Arbitration System?”, ARIA. 
Vol.26, No.1, Juris Publishing; Bjorklund, A.K. (2009), “State Immunity and the Enforcement of Investor 
State Arbitral Awards”, in Binder, C., Kriebaum, U., Reinisch, A., Wittich, S. (Eds.) (2009), International 
Investment Law in 21St Century: Essays in Honour of Chtistopher Schreuer, pp.303, 315 -317.  
647 Katia, Y.-S. (2010), Arbitration under IIA: A Guide to the Key Issues, OUP, Oxford. 
648 Tethyan Copper Company v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No.ARB/12/1, Decision on Provisional Measures, 13 
December 2012, para.118. 
649 ACIA article 41(6). 
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            (b) Final Awards 
            ACIA article 41 provides for an award having binding force for the disputing 
parties. Disputing parties are expected to comply with an award without delay. Under the 
ACIA, an award is considered final after 120 days have elapsed in the case of ICSID, or 90 
days in the case of UNCITRAL. During this period, the disputing parties may request 
review or annulment of the award, under limited circumstances. The review process is 
permitted according to agreed arbitral rules, such as the ICSID annulment process,650 and 
domestic court review at the seat of arbitration and place of enforcement for non-ICSID 
awards.  
At the end of the review period, the investor may request enforcement of the award. 
           In practice, reviews are likely to focus on fundamental standards of procedural 
fairness, and not on the substance of the decision. This concern has led to a conclusion of 
several IIAs, most by the United States, which address the potential establishment of a 
standing body to hear appeals from investor-State arbitration.651 The ACIA does not 
mention any consideration on setting up an appellate body which would be able to perform 
an  
in-depth scrutiny of the award and correct substantive errors in the interpretation and 
application of the ACIA. The ACIA remains of traditional view of final and binding award. 
           (2) Post-Award Phase  
After the issuance, the recognition and enforcement of awards is categorised into 
two tracks: ICSID and non-ICSID. While the ICSID Convention has a unique system 
of review and enforcement of arbitral award,652 non-ICSID awards are subject to the  
“New York Convention”. Pursuant to ACIA article 41(8), “a claim that is submitted for 
arbitration… shall be considered to arise out of a commercial relationship or transaction 
for purposes of Article 1 of the New York Convention”.  
            (a) Enforcement of the Awards 
As long as an award is not subject to a review process, the parties are under a legal 
obligation to comply with it. For ICSID awards, “each Contracting State shall recognise an 
award… as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations… within its territories as if  
                                                 
 
650 ICSID Convention article 52(3), Special “Ad Hoc Committee” decides on applications of annulment of an 
award. 
651 See e.g. Chile-United States FTA article 10.19(10); Annex 10-F CAFTA. UNCTAD (2014), ISDS, p.193. 
652 ICSID Convention, Article 50-52, Section 5 Interpretation, Revision and Annulment of the Award; Article 
53-55, Section 6 Recognition and Enforcement of the Award.  
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it were a final judgment of a court in that State”.653 For non-ICSID awards, the conditions 
for recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards are provided for in the New York 
Convention and in national law. ACIA article 41(9) confirms general obligation for the 
Contracting States under Article I of the New York Convention, and provides for  
a connexion of the national authority and international arbitration, by stating that “each 
Member State shall provide for the enforcement of an award in its territory”.  
Due to the private nature of arbitral awards, national courts are necessarily involved 
in the process. Footnote 15 to ACIA article 41 remarks that “the Parties understand that 
there may be domestic legal and administrative processes that need to be observed before 
an award can be complied with.” However, national law must not stipulate conditions for 
foreign arbitral awards which are substantially more onerous than those applicable to 
domestic ones.654 National rules may relate, for example, to discovery of evidence, 
estoppel or waiver, set-off or counterclaim against the award, entry of judgment clause, 
period of limitation for enforcement of an award under the Convention and interest 
incurred on the award.655 
              (b) Limit to Enforcement of Awards  
             The enforcement proceedings depend not only on national rules which differ in 
many aspects in ASEAN Member States, they also depend on national courts which retain 
power to refuse to recognise and enforce awards. A court seized with a request for the 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award cannot examine an award on its 
merits. It may, however, refuse to recognize or enforce ICSID awards on grounds of State 
immunity,656 and non-ICSID awards on grounds enumerated in New York Convention 
article V.  
            The list of grounds for refusal under the New York Convention is exclusive: the 
court may not base its refusal on any other ground. These grounds must be interpreted 
restrictively in accordance with the purpose of the New York Convention. The grounds 
may be divided into two categories. The first category (article V(1)) provides for 
procedural protection and may be invoked by the parties.657 The second category (article 
                                                 
 
653 ICSID Convention article 54(1). 
654 NYC Article III. 
655 UNCTAD (2003), Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention, Dispute 
Settlement International Commercial Arbitration, United Nations, p.23. 
656 ICSID Convention article 55: “Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law  
in force in any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State from execution.” 
657 NYC article V(1) refers to: (a) incapacity of the parties and formal invalidity of the arbitration agreement; 
(b) violation of due process; (c) excess of authority by the arbitrator; (d) infringement of the composition of 
the arbitral tribunal or of the arbitration proceedings; and (e) the award has not yet become binding or has 
been set aside or suspended. 
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V(2)) may be invoked ex officio by the court, as it serves vital interests of the forum 
country: (a) non-arbitrability of the subject-matter; and (b) violation of the public policy of 
the law of the country where recognition and enforcement is sought. Among these grounds, 
the public policy ground has increasingly been invoked by the State and has caused 
considerable controversy. The New York Convention does not define or provide guidelines 
on what shall be considered “public policy”. Hence, local courts have a significant degree 
of discretion in interpreting public policy under their own jurisdiction.  
            Due to inconsistent approaches taken by local courts, many foreign awards remain 
unenforceable, making the whole ISDS process purposeless. In the case where the ISDS is 
unsuccessful, or more precisely when a State fails to comply with the award, wronged 
investors may turn to their home State for protection. By turning an ISDS into a State-to-
State dispute mechanism, investors may mitigate the problem of sovereign immunity 
against execution of investment arbitral awards.  
To summarise, section 6.1.1 illustrates that the ACIA has adopted a detail-
enhancing approach for several core aspects of arbitral procedures. This approach may lead 
to harmonisation of regional, or even international, rules in investment arbitration.  
 
6.1.2 Specificities: the ASEAN Way of ISDS 
The ASEAN Way of ISDS is a mixed approach. The ACIA has concurrently 
attempted to insert States’ regulatory power and to preserve the disputing parties’ 
autonomy. While following a detail-enhanced approach, the ACIA has provided four 
specific features in its text. Firstly, it employs three techniques to limit a proliferation of 
claims: (1) a “forks-in-the-road” provision; (2) a preliminary objection; and (3) a 
consolidation.  Secondly, the ACIA is equipped with a mechanism of “joint decision” as 
one of “governing laws”. This mechanism reallocates interpretative power of the ACIA 
provisions between tribunals and ASEAN member States. Thirdly, the ACIA provides for 
regional arbitration centres, whose rules and institutions accommodate ASEAN-specific 
needs. Fourthly, while the ACIA follows a global movement towards transparency, the 
level of transparency required is relatively small. This emphasises that the ACIA respects 
the confidentiality of the parties, and by that, leaves more policy space for both States and 
investors. In this regard, the ACIA preserves advantages of arbitral procedures, especially 
consensus and flexibility. Section 6.1.2 argues that all these specificities of the ACIA 
reveal the “ASEAN Way” of dispute settlement. 
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6.1.2.1 Techniques for Limiting the Proliferation of Claims  
           (1) Fork-in-the-Road Clause: the “Exclusive” Approach 
Regardless of the choice of forum, once an investor decides to submit a claim 
before any forum, this investor is barred from the other forums. The investor must file  
a waiver abandoning any other parallel claim in which the investor may have sought 
damages related to the identical measures.658 The investor may not initiate international 
arbitration proceedings once bringing a case to domestic courts, and vice versa. The ACIA 
uses a technique, called the “fork-in-the-road” provision, to prevent the possibility of 
“parallel proceedings” which may result in duplication and inconsistency of awards.659  
An ASEAN investor should decide which option is best, by considering efficiency, 
location, cost, confidentiality, and the level of party control over the proceedings.  
Indeed, this “fork-in-the-road” provision is simply an indication of a non-
requirement of the exhaustion of domestic remedies. The ACIA does not define  
a chronological sequence to make both adjudicative avenues successively available.  
It allows ASEAN investors to resort directly to international arbitration (without having to 
first go through the domestic judicial system and to prove the domestic system’s 
ineffectiveness or bias). In case of monist States, domestic courts may have jurisdiction to 
rule on alleged breaches of the ACIA itself. However, most ASEAN Member States are 
dualist, where domestic courts are not obliged to take the ACIA into account when they 
decide cases.660  
(2) Preliminary Objection and Frivolous Claims 
When issues relating to jurisdiction or admissibility are raised, ACIA article 36 
mandates tribunals to hear preliminary objections separately, prior to the merits of the 
case.661 In line with ICSID Rule 41(5), this mechanism allows for expedited dismissal of 
“frivolous claims”, or parts of them, at an early stage of the proceedings, in order to ensure 
that the process will not be abused.662 The tribunal, first of all, decides whether the claim is 
“manifestly without merit”, or is “not within the jurisdiction or competence of the 
                                                 
 
658 ACIA article 34(1). 
659 “Parallel proceedings occur when the same cause of action is adjudicated in more than one forum, either 
before multiple domestic courts, domestic and international courts, or before multiple international forums. 
Parallel proceedings are problematic at both the national and international levels as they waste money and 
conflicting results undermine legal certainty.” See Shookman, J. (2010), “Too Many Forums for Investment 
Disputes? ICSID Illustrations of Parallel Proceedings and Analysis”, Journal of International Arbitration, 
Issue 4, pp.361-378. 
660 See p.32. 
661 ACIA article 36(1). 
662 “Frivolous Claims in International Adjudication: A Study of ICSID”, Rule 41(5) and of Procedures of 
Other Courts and Tribunals to Dismiss Claims Summarily, Journal International Dispute Settlement (2012) 
Vol.3, No.1, pp.137-168. 
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tribunal”. The disputing parties are given a reasonable opportunity to present their views 
and observations to the tribunal, before the tribunal renders an award to that effect.  
Tribunals may shift the costs and fees incurred in submitting or opposing the 
objection for frivolous claims to the claimants.663 In the case where the issues are 
inextricably intertwined with the merits of the case or tribunals need more evidence,  
a bifurcation of the case may not be warranted. It is observed that the ACIA requirement is 
stronger than Canada’s Model BIT (2004) which simply allows (but does not mandate) 
separate consideration of preliminary objections by respondent States. 
While the ACIA has a specific mechanism for preliminary objection, it does not 
explicitly mention corruption as a ground to hear preliminary objections. Corruption is  
a concern especially for developing countries where institutions are weak and the rate of 
corruption is high.664 Even though the ACIA covers only investment which is admitted 
according to domestic laws, it is doubtful that this requirement could prevent bribery 
occurring in the process of approval of foreign investment. In fact, “[s]uch corruption is  
an international evil; it is contrary to good morals and to an international public policy 
common to the community of nations”.665 The report on “ASEAN Integrity Community:  
A vision for transparent and accountable integration” also warns that spreading corruption 
across the Southeast Asia region threatens to derail plans for greater economic 
integration.666 Some arbitral cases refer to the concept of “international public policy”. 
However, the use of this concept does not seem very clear and consistent.667  
In order to better prevent corruption, the OECD countries have adopted the  
“Anti-Bribery Convention”, 667F668 and anti-corruption issues have been recently mentioned in 
a few IIAs. 668F669 For instance, CETA article X.17(3) provides that “[f]or greater certainty,  
an investor may not submit a claim to arbitration under this Section where the investment 
has been made through fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, corruption, or conduct 
                                                 
 
663 ACIA article 36(4).  
664 Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar figure among the highly corrupted countries, while Vietnam, Philippines, 
Thailand, Indonesia are in the middle rank. Singapore and Malaysia are the cleanest countries in terms of 
corruption. See the 2014 statistics at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/infographic/regional/asia-pacific.  
(Last accessed: 10 September 2015). 
665 Judge Lagergren’s Award in ICC Case No.1110 (1963), 10(3) Arb.Int’l 282, para.20. 
666 See Transparency International (2015), ASEAN Integrity Community: A Vision for Transparent and 
Accountable Integration, p.6. 
667 Siemens v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.ARB/02/08, Award, 6 February, 2007; Plama v. Bulgaria, ICSID 
Case No.ARB/03/24 Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005. 
668 The Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(1997). It is the first and only international anti-corruption instrument focused on the “supply side” of the 
bribery transaction, meaning investors. See more at 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm      
669 Gordon, K. (2008), IIAs: A survey of Environmental, Labour and Anti-corruption Issues, International 
Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations, OECD. 
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amounting to an abuse of process”.670 In the same vein, ASEAN States may consider 
include a non-bribery requirement in ACIA article 34 on conditions and limitations on 
submission of a claim. Alternatively, ACIA article 36 on conduct of the arbitration could 
be amended, so that tribunals are mandated to treat corruption as a jurisdictional or 
preliminary objection. Otherwise, to balance the corrupt behaviour of investors with the 
breach of international obligation of States at the merits stage would place arbitral tribunals 
in a very sensitive position.671  
(3) Consolidation 
             The ACIA has predicted the possibility of multiple proceedings and potential 
contradictory awards. Its article 37 provides consolidation proceedings for overlapping or 
related claims in a single proceeding, which may render arbitral procedures more 
reasonable and efficient. This is one of the techniques that the ACIA uses to limit the 
proliferation of claims, apart from the scope of ISDS application, the “forks-in-the-road” 
provision, and the sequencing rule, discussed supra.  
However, unlike the other techniques, consolidation is an option and not an 
obligation, and claims will only be consolidated at the discretion of the parties, “in any 
manner they deem appropriate”.672 Moreover, consolidation can be problematic in the case 
of proceedings based on different IIAs, because the obligations contained in the ACIA and 
in other IIAs may differ. The question remains to be answered, on case-by-case basis, 
whether a consolidation will be more or less beneficial to the relevant parties.  
In the case where the parties decide to consolidate claims, the ACIA leaves the 
remaining process to the parties to decide, for example, how to coordinate existing and 
new tribunals. The ACIA approach is very flexible, compared to the treaties which 
specially require a constitution of a “consolidation tribunal” with the authority to decide 
whether consolidation is appropriate and which tribunal should hear the consolidated 
case.673 In fact, it is not necessary for the ACIA to include this consolidation provision, 
given the fact that consolidation will always be possible with the consent of the disputing 
parties. 
                                                 
 
670 CETA Chapter 10 Investment, Scope of a Claim to Arbitration. 
671 Yackee, J.W. (2012), “Essay: Investment Treaties and Investor Corruption: An Emerging Defense for 
Host States?”, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol.52, p.741. 
672 ACIA article 37. 
673 See e.g. NAFTA article 1126: request of consolidation, jurisdiction of the tribunals, stay of the 
proceedings, etc. 
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6.1.2.2 Joint Decision as a Governing Law 
Traditional BITs, such as the IGA, do not usually have specific provisions on 
governing laws. Unless a BIT specifies otherwise, arbitral tribunals have the obligation to 
interpret BITs – similar to that for any other international treaty – in accordance with the 
general international law rules of treaty interpretation, which are primarily embodied in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).674 More modern BITs have provisions 
on governing laws, while continuing to provide a generous role to tribunals in their 
interpretation of treaties. In the interpretation of the protection standards of the ACIA,  
even though ASEAN Member States have delegated the task of resolving investor-State 
claims to tribunals, the interpretive authority of tribunals is not absolute.675 Arbitral 
tribunals and ASEAN Member States have shared authority.  
In order to guide arbitrators in their decision making, the ACIA specifies the 
sources of law applicable to disputes. Pursuant to ACIA article 40, tribunals decide the 
issues in dispute in accordance with five governing laws, namely: (1) the ACIA; (2) any 
other applicable agreements between the Member States; (3) the applicable rules of 
international law; (4) where applicable, any relevant domestic law of the disputing 
Member State; and (5) “a joint decision of the Member States” declaring their 
interpretation of a provision of the ACIA. Whereas the other governing laws are more 
general, the fifth one is specifically found in a minority of IIAs. Based on the ideas of the 
interpretation mechanism found in the NAFTA,676 US Model BIT,677 and Canada FIPA,678 
the ACIA has innovatively introduced its own joint decision mechanism.  
Traditionally, by virtue of general public international law, ASEAN Member States 
retain the power to clarify the proper meaning of the provisions of BITs. Even without  
an express mechanism, they may always issue an authoritative interpretation to clarify the 
meaning of a treaty’s provisions,679 both in abstracto and in concreto.680 For the drafting 
                                                 
 
674 Gardiner, R.K. (2008), Treaty Interpretation, New York, OUP, pp.20ff. 
675 UNCTAD (2011), Interpretation of IIAs: What States can do, IIAs Issues Note No.3, December 2011, p.3. 
676 NAFTA article 1311. 
677 US Model BIT (2004) (2012) article 30(3). 
678 Canada FIPA article 40(2).   
679 The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) noted “the right of giving an authoritative 
interpretation of a legal rule belongs solely to the person or body who has power to modify or suppress it.” 
Jaworzina, Advisory Opinion, 1923, PCIJ, Series B, No.8, p.37; Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission (1966), Vol.II, p.221, para.14; Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), ICJ Judgement 13 
December 1999, para.63. For arbitral awards, see, for example ADF v. United States, ICSID 
No.ARB(AF)/00/1, 9 January 2003, para.177. 
680 It has been suggested that an interpretation of IIA provisions could have retrospective effect and, by that, 
might be relevant for determining the current claim. See Voon, T., Mitchell, A. (2011), “Time to quit? 
Assessing International Investment Claims against Plain Tobacco Packaging in Australia”, Journal of 
International Economic Law, Vol.14, No.3, p.529. 
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of the ACIA, ASEAN Member States have taken a more proactive attitude by addressing 
one of the current challenges facing the IIA regime. The ACIA has introduced a joint 
interpretation mechanism into its text. This mechanism asserts the interpretative power of 
ASEAN member States in a particular case before a tribunal. In terms of the hierarchy of 
the ACIA governing laws, joint decisions issued under interpretative mechanism trump the 
others, because joint decisions are genuine and authoritative interpretations of the meaning 
of the ACIA provisions. Joint decisions may also elucidate how ASEAN Member States 
understand the relationship between the ACIA and the other governing laws. 
Alongside treaty renegotiations and amendments, the allocation of interpretive 
authority in a joint decision mechanism is one of the techniques used to reinsert a State 
element into ISDS. Once an interpretation of an ACIA provision is given, it will 
legitimately bind future cases concerning the same provision. The interpretation will shape 
the protective scope of the ACIA, and lead, to some extent, to consistency in the ACIA 
regime. Unlike old-styled BITs, interpreting the ACIA is not a monologue by arbitral 
tribunals, but a “constructive dialogue between investment tribunals and treaty parties”. 680F681  
The most obvious example of “authentic interpretation” in the area of international 
investment law is the mechanism of binding interpretation made by the NAFTA Free 
Trade Commission (FTC). 681F682 The FTC is composed of cabinet level representatives of the 
NAFTA parties or their designees.682F683 It has the power to supervise the implementation of 
the NAFTA, oversee its further elaboration, and “resolve disputes that may arise regarding 
its interpretation or application”. Pursuant to NAFTA article 1131, Chapter Eleven 
tribunals are required to apply governing law, which includes binding interpretations 
issued by the FTC. 683F684  
The ACIA does not set out the process of “joint decision”. Under the ACIA, there 
is no “standing committee”, similar to the NAFTA FTC, which is permanently vested with 
authentic interpretative power. The process of issuing a joint decision is ad hoc. ACIA 
article 42 provides that the AIA Council and the ASEAN Coordinating Committee on 
Investment (CCI) are responsible for the overall implementation of the ACIA. They must 
facilitate the avoidance and settlement of disputes arising from this agreement. However, 
                                                 
 
681 Roberts, A. (2010), “Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States”, 
American Journal of International Law, Vol.104, No.1, p.225. 
682 See Corazon, M.A., Dichosa, H., “The NAFTA Free Trade Commission and the Peer Review 
Mechanism”; Kaufmann-Kohler, G. (2011), “Interpretive Powers of the Free Trade Commission and the 
Rule of Law”, in Fifteen Years of NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration, JurisNet, LLC, p.175.  
683 NAFTA article 2001(2)(c).  
684 NAFTA article 1131, Governing Law; For example, the NAFTA FTC used the interpretation mechanism 
in interpreting the concepts of “FET” and “full protection and security” under NAFTA article 1105. FTC 
Note of Interpretation of 31 July 2001.  
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the AIA Council and the ASEAN CCI do not have any interpreting power in ISDS 
proceedings.685  
A “joint decision” is an express preliminary reference procedure between investor-
State tribunals and State Parties. Pursuant to ACIA article 40(2), when a claim is submitted 
under ACIA article 33, “the tribunal shall, on its own account or at the request of  
a disputing party, request a joint interpretation of any provision of the ACIA that is in issue 
in a dispute”.686 The Member States must submit in writing any joint decision declaring 
their interpretation to the tribunal within 60 days of the delivery of the request.687 Article 
40(3) states that in the case that all Member States declare their interpretation of  
a provision within the time limit, this joint interpretation becomes the authentic 
interpretation and has binding force on a tribunal. As a result, any decision or award issued 
by a tribunal must be consistent with that joint decision.688 
Pursuant to ACIA article 40(2), if the ten Member States fail to issue such  
a decision within the time limit, any interpretation submitted by an individual Member 
State must be forwarded to the disputing parties and the tribunal. Despite the fact that 
interpretation thus rendered could be highly persuasive for future tribunals, it is not 
considered authentic interpretation. In this case, the tribunal regains full power of 
interpretation and decides the issue on its own account.689 In other words, an interpretation 
of one or some Member States may only help the tribunal to decide a current dispute, but 
cannot help ASEAN build up the corpus of ASEAN investment law. While the ACIA does 
not specifically allow amicus curiae (non-disputing parties: individuals) in its text,690 
interpretation of ACIA provisions under ACIA article 40(2) may be comparable to  
a “Participation by a Party” under NAFTA Article 1128; where a NAFTA Party (a non-
disputing State) is allowed to make submissions to a Tribunal on a question of 
interpretation of the NAFTA agreement. 691 
The ACIA joint decision and interpretation mechanism is clearly an innovation, 
compared with the conventional consultation mechanism in the IGA.692 Nevertheless, this 
mechanism has both pros and cons. As mentioned above, it has the advantage of promoting 
                                                 
 
685 Annex 4 Report of the 2nd ACIA WG, 29-31 January 2008, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
686 ACIA article 40(2). 
687 As the ACIA sets the time limit for the submission of joint decisions, the Member States cannot abuse this 
mechanism to delay arbitral proceedings. The use of the joint decision mechanism may assure investors’ 
expectations, to a certain extent, that States will not abuse this joint interpretation mechanism in their favours 
in a particular dispute. 
688 ACIA article 40(3). 
689 ACIA article 40(2). 
690 See also p.199.  
691 Similar provisions are found in 2003 US-Chile FTA, 2003 US-Singapore FTA, 2004 CAFTA-DR FTA. 
692 IGA article XI Consultation. 
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consistency and certainty in the system. It controls the power of arbitrators and ensures that 
the ACIA provisions are interpreted in conformity with the intention of the ASEAN 
Member States to the greatest extent possible. States, as negotiators, have a unique 
perspective on how the treaty should be interpreted. 692F693 This mechanism allows States to 
retain their determinative role.  
That being said, ASEAN Member States’ involvement in the interpretation of the 
ACIA can be controversial. Hence, at least two potential limitations need to be considered, 
in order that this mechanism will not be used to undermine ASEAN investors’ legitimate 
expectations. Firstly, since ASEAN Member States play a “dual role” in investment law, 693F694 
the interpretative statements may be perceived as self-serving and determined by a desire 
to influence the tribunal’s decision in favour of States offering the interpretation, 694F695 and 
perhaps to the detriment of the other party. The question arises as to the sincerity or good 
faith of the ASEAN Member States and the equality of arms between the disputing parties.  
In a concrete case, a home State may protect its national investors and their investments, 
whereas a host State may protect its regulatory freedom and policy space. Therefore, 
States, as actual or potential respondents, should not abuse the mechanism in order to limit 
their liability in the face of existing or future claims.  
Secondly, ASEAN Member States must not issue joint decisions which resemble 
amendments of the ACIA. Interpretation of the ACIA has to be distinguished from 
amendments, which typically requires formal adoption, for instance, through domestic 
ratification of contracting States. 695F696 In principle, joint decision should be confined to 
clarifying the terms of the ACIA. This mechanism should not be intended to add new 
meaning to the ACIA provisions, or to extend or narrow the scope of the ACIA. ASEAN 
Member States should use an amendment procedure under ACIA article 46 to add new 
provisions or modify existing ACIA obligations. Notwithstanding this, the borderline 
between interpretation and amendment, in practice, may be blurred. 696F697  
                                                 
 
693 OECD (2012), Government Perspectives on Investor-State Dispute Settlement: a Progress Report, 
Freedom of Investment Roundtable 14 December 2012, Paris, p.18. http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-
policy/ISDSprogressreport.pdf (Last accessed: 10 September 2015).  
694 Roberts, A. (2010), “Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States”, 
pp.201-202. 
695 Dolzer, R., Schreuer, C. (2012), p.32. 
696 VCLT article 39 General rule regarding the amendment of treaties, article 40 Amendment of multilateral 
treaties. 
697 It must be, however, noted that such State practice may be highly controversial. In the past, international 
courts and tribunals have accepted interpretations amounting to a de facto amendment. For example, Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion (21 June 1971), para. 22. Case 
concerning the Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment of 
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Compared to complicated and time-consuming treaty renegotiation, modification or 
denunciation, “joint decision” under the ACIA may be an efficient alternative to improve 
predictability of arbitral awards. This interpretation mechanism is a tool to prevent disputes 
and to strengthen the public policy dimensions of the ACIA. Nevertheless, it is reminding 
that NAFTA, for example, is composed of only three Member States, whereas the ACIA is 
comprising ten Member States with diverse cultures and backgrounds. It is unlikely that 
this joint decision mechanism will be effectively used in practice. This mechanism, 
claimed to add more regulatory space for ASEAN Member States, may remain a paper 
tiger. Therefore, while the “joint decision” mechanism has added more value to the ACIA, 
this innovation remains to be tested in its practical application.698   
6.1.2.3 Regional Centres for Arbitration  
Apart from international institutions, the ACIA also provides a regional centre for 
arbitration. Malaysia managed to insert the Regional Centre for Arbitration at Kuala 
Lumpur (KLRCA), the first regional arbitration centre in ASEAN,699 as a choice of forum 
in the ACIA. Another regional centre, considered one of the leading international arbitral 
institutions, is the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC).700 Both institutions 
have their own rules, the 2012 KLRCA Rules701 and the 2013 SIAC Rules,702 respectively. 
These Rules were adopted on the basis of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, as revised in 
2010. The regional Rules contain provisions which guarantee a basic level of fairness to 
the parties and the process. Their structural framework typically describes the lifecycle of 
arbitration; most features are virtually common to all modern institutional rules. They are, 
however, sufficiently flexible to accord disputing parties substantial leeway to tailor the 
process according to their needs. These Rules improve some technical features of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
the International Court of Justice (13 July 2009), para. 64. UNCTAD (2011), Interpretation of IIAs: What 
States can do, IIAs Issues Note No.3, December 2011, p.5. 
698 In an arbitration proceedings, the ACIA also has specific mechanism regarding the interpretation of 
taxation measures, which also asserts the interpretative role of the ASEAN Member States. Where a taxation 
measure is a disputing issue, ACIA article 36(6) and (7) stipulate that the ASEAN host State (the disputing 
party) and the home State (the non-disputing party) must hold “consultations” to determine whether such 
measure is a taxation measure, and whether it has an effect equivalent to expropriation or nationalisation. The 
outcome of the consultation is apparently not binding; nonetheless, pursuant ACIA article 36(8), the tribunal 
must accord serious consideration to the decision of both Member States. See also p.100. 
699 The KLRCA was established in 1978 under the auspices of the Asian-African Legal Consultative 
Organisation (AALCO). See AALCC Resolution XIX (7), 1978. 
700 More details: http://www.siac.org.sg/  
701 KLRCA Arbitration Rules (revised 2012). 
702 SIAC Arbitration Rules (5th Ed.), 1 April 2013. 
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proceedings, such as rules on competence-competence,703 or correction of awards and 
additional awards.704 
            In 2010, the SIAC was the first international arbitral institution in Asia to introduce 
some innovative features, such as “expedited procedure”705 and “emergency arbitrator”.706 
In the meanwhile, the KLRCA Rules are more sensitive to the ASEAN Member States’ 
needs, and have introduced some ASEAN-specific elements, namely the KLRCA Islamic 
Model Arbitration Clause (“KLRCA i-Arbitration Rules”). As the majority of some 
ASEAN countries are Muslims,707 these specific rules, which are a modified version of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, provide for disputes arising out of commercial agreement 
which are based on Shariah (Islamic Law) principles. These regional arbitration centres 
provide institutional support as a neutral and independent venue. With the rule of law 
tradition, their national courts also offer maximum judicial support of arbitration and 
minimum intervention in the conduct of international arbitration. For example, Malaysian 
and Singaporean Governments exempt foreigners from applying for a work permit to carry 
out arbitration services, and withholding tax are not be imposed on arbitrators. 
            The KLRCA and the SIAC have proved that they are effective and reliable. These 
centres are beneficial at two levels. Firstly, they improve the reputation to the ASEAN 
Community that ASEAN has an international legal infrastructure and expertise which 
creates an investment-friendly environment. Secondly, they benefit both States and 
investors by giving them strong sense of arbitration at home, and minimising arbitration 
costs by reducing distance travel to major centres of arbitration.  
Besides the KLRCA and the SIAC, there are more national arbitration centres in 
other ASEAN Member States, for instance, Indonesia National Board of Arbitration 
(BANI), Thailand Arbitration Centre (THAC), or Vietnam International Arbitration Centre 
(VIAC), Cambodia Commercial Arbitration Centre. There are, however, scepticism 
regarding their independence and lack of experience. These centres need to upgrade their 
arbitration rules and institutions so as to meet up with the international standard, given the 
                                                 
 
703 UNCITRAL Rules article 23(1), Pleas as to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal; SIAC article 25 
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 
704 UNCITRAL Rules articles 38-39; SIAC article 29. 
705 SIAC Rule 5.1 allows the parties to conduct the arbitration in an expeditious and cost-effective manner. 
This procedure is available at any time before the constitution of the tribunal, provided that one of three 
criteria is satisfied, that is, where: (a) the aggregate amount in dispute does not exceed $5,000,000 
Singaporean Dollars; (b) the parties agree; or (c) in cases of “exceptional urgency”. See SIAC 2014 Annual 
Report.  
706 SIAC Rule 26.1 Emergency Arbitrator. 
707 Three ASEAN Member States (Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei) have Muslim-majority populations, while 
they are the minority in the other ASEAN States. 
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increasing demand of the ASEAN Economic Community for investment dispute 
resolution. 
 
6.1.2.4 Transparency in Arbitral Proceedings 
Arbitration is popular for investment dispute settlement because of the privacy  
it affords to each party. The policy of confidentiality serves to expedite arbitration, as well 
as to protect the confidentiality of information and reputation of both investors and 
States. 707F708 Confidentiality is considered to be one of the crucial features of commercial 
arbitration. The arbitration − the existence of a dispute, its documents and pleadings, and 
often its decisions − is not required to be made public, because the dispute settlement 
involves private parties, mainly on technical legal grounds, and not public policy issues.708F709 
However, there is no recognition of a duty of confidentiality in arbitration.  
For investment arbitration, most arbitration rules referred to in investment treaties 
concluded in the last century were based on international commercial arbitration. Under 
the IGA, no investor-State arbitration rules had mandated transparency or disclosure in the 
arbitral process. The disputing parties and the tribunal had significant latitude to determine 
the degree of openness of proceedings. Investment arbitrations on mega-investment 
projects have greater repercussion on public interests, because one of the disputing parties 
to the ISDS proceedings is a government. In the case that the government loses, it has to 
pay a huge amount of money to compensate the wronged investors. 709F710 Apart from 
economic concerns, investment projects often have impacts on other public concerns, such 
as environment, human rights, or social issues. 710F711 As a result, there is a tension between 
transparency for public interests and confidentiality perceived as contributing to efficient 
                                                 
 
708 See generally in OECD (2005), Transparency and Third Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement Procedures Statement, WP on International Investment No. 2005/1.  
709 UNCTAD (2005), Investor-State Disputes Arising from Investment Treaties: A Review. UNCTAD Series 
on International Investment Policies for Development. 
710 In three awards dated 18 July 2014, an UNCITRAL arbitral tribunal under the auspices of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA) ordered Russia to pay over US$50 billion in compensation for the indirect 
expropriation of OAO Yukos Oil Company. This has been the largest damages award in investment treaty 
arbitration. See Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. Russia, PCA Case No.AA 226; Yukos Universal 
Limited (Isle of Man) v. Russia, PCA Case No.AA227, Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. Russia, PCA 
Case No.AA 228. 
711 Simons, P., “Selectivity in Law-Making: Regulating Extraterritorial Environmental Harm and Human 
Rights Violations by Transnational Extractive Corporations”, in Grear, A., KotzŽ, L.J. (2015), Research 
Handbook on Human Rights and the Environment, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p.489-
497; Lester, S.,  Mercurio, B. (Eds.) (2009), “Social Issues: Labour, Environment and Human Rights” in 
Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements: Commentary and Analysis, CUP, pp.342-366; Puvimanasinghe, 
S.F., (2007), Foreign Investment, Human Rights and the Environment: A Perspective from South Asia on The 
Role of Public International Law for Development, Leiden, Martinus Nijhaoff Publishers.   
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and effective arbitration. Over the past fifteen years, the demand for greater transparency 
has become one of the biggest challenges of ISDS.    
            At present, the trend represents a shift in the underlying presumption from privacy 
toward openness in response to the key criticism that investment tribunals frequently 
decide matters of public importance behind closed doors. Transparency in ISDS also 
reflects a broader trend which recognises the importance of transparency as a tool for 
promoting and ensuring effective democratic participation, good governance, 
accountability, predictability and the rule of law.712 Arbitration process has become 
increasingly open over the past several years. 
In order to address governance and legitimacy issue of ISDS, the ACIA has 
incorporated transparency provisions, aiming at ensuring access to information in the ISDS 
proceedings. ACIA article 39 requires that “the disputing Member State may make 
publicly available all awards, and decisions produced by the tribunal”. This means that the 
publication of awards is not an obligation but depends on the parties and the arbitral rules 
that the parties have chosen.712F713 The term “award” should be read broadly to include 
interim, partial, procedural and final awards. The ACIA does not mention publication of 
other documents.  
           Publication of awards and decisions under the ACIA is subject to some exceptions 
for protected information. The confidential information is designated by the investors, law 
enforcement, the Member State’s law protecting Cabinet confidences, personal privacy or 
the financial affairs and accounts of individual customers of financial institutions, or 
essential security. The tribunal must make appropriate arrangements to protect this 
information from disclosure to the public. In practice, it is ASEAN Member State’s 
legislation on freedom of information which determines the arbitral proceeding’s 
transparency. The respondent State has a self-judging power against disclosure of 
information that it considers contrary to its essential security interests. As a result, it is 
possible that only significant extracts of the awards and decisions will be published, 
without any further detail information of the case.                
           The “Rules on Transparency” were adopted in July 2013 by the UNCITRAL.  
The new Rules came into effect on 1st April 2014. They set up a process and institutional 
framework and provide for a significant degree of openness throughout the arbitral 
                                                 
 
712 Report of the UN Secretary-General (2012), Delivering Justice: Programme of action to strengthen the 
rule of law at the national and international levels, A/66/749. 
713 UNCITRAL Rules article 34(5) requires the consent of both parties for the award to be made public; 
Amendment to Arbitration Rule 48, ICSID 2005, the ICSID Secretariat has the authority to publish 
significant extracts of decisions, even where the parties do not agree to publish an award. 
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proceedings.714 Having been carefully negotiated and widely approved,715 the new 
UNCITRAL template can serve as a model of how to conduct investor-State arbitrations 
transparently. Furthermore, the UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-
State Arbitration, which provides additional scope for the application of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, was opened for signature on 17th March 2015.716 It provides an efficient 
and flexible mechanism for States to apply the Transparency Rules to disputes arising 
under the investment agreements in force. By the 17th March 2015, ten countries had 
signed the Convention; none of them is an ASEAN Member State. 
Along with the development at ICSID and at UNCITRAL toward more robust 
transparency rules, the practice of countries, such as the United States, Canada, and the 
EU, is integrating transparency rules into their investment treaties. For example, the newly 
negotiated CETA refers to the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency regarding the 
disclosure of information to the public;717 the EU ISDS Draft Text includes the Annex III 
“Rules on public access to document, hearings and the possibility of non-disputing parties 
to make submissions”. 
           According to the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, transparency is no further  
an option but the rule. Hence, on top of arbitral decisions, a wide range of documents must 
be made available to the public, including other submissions by disputing and non-
disputing parties and third persons, as well as expert reports and witness statements.718 The 
notice of arbitration itself will be subject to automatic mandatory disclosure, but only after 
constitution of the tribunal.719 However, the rule is limited by two categories of exception: 
(1) confidential or protected information; and (2) integrity of the arbitral process.720 
            This thesis finds that the ACIA does not require as much transparency as the title 
“Transparency” of the article 39 suggests. Unlike under the other treaties mentioned in the 
preceding paragraphs, the publication of awards and decisions is the only stage to which 
                                                 
 
714 The Rules provide, inter alia, for publication by a central repository of basic information about filed 
cases; public release of key documents, including tribunal’s decisions, and statements of claim and defence; 
submission by a third persons and participation of non-disputing third parties in certain circumstances; and 
open hearings. 
715 The work has been done by delegations to UNCITRAL comprised of 55 Member States, additional 
observer States and observer organisations.  
716 The “Mauritius Convention on Transparency” had been prepared by UNCITRAL since 2013 and was 
formally adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 2014. 
717 CETA article X.33, Transparency of Proceedings. 
718 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules: Publication of information at the commencement of arbitral 
proceedings (article 2), Publication of documents (article 3), Submission by a third person (article 4), 
Submission by a non-disputing Party to the treaty (article 5).  
719 Idem, articles 2 and 3 on Publication of documents classes three categories of document: (1) mandatorily 
and automatically disclosed; (2) documents to be mandatorily disclosed once any person requests their 
disclosure from the tribunal; and (3) other documents depending on the exercise of the tribunal’s discretion. 
720 Idem, article 7 Exceptions to transparency. 
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transparency applies. The ACIA does not require transparency during the proceedings  
at all. This approach illustrates that the ACIA keeps the conventional style of arbitration, 
which advocates confidentiality, and transparency is exceptional. The ACIA gives the 
disputing parties maximum discretion on their privacy of arbitration. While the ACIA 
takes on the transparency trend, it has chosen only the elements which disputing Parties 
can control, such as publication when the proceedings have reached the end. In the light of 
the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, the deficit of public and transparency in the ACIA 
is obvious. Arguably, the ACIA does not give much regard to the transparency issue, 
because it was concluded before transparency increasingly caught global attention by the 
new UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency.  
          In order to make the ISDS more transparent throughout the proceedings, ASEAN 
Member States may consider incorporating the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency,721 or 
creating an annex on transparency, or amending ACIA article 39 on the issues that current 
transparency does not cover, especially, open hearings, submission by a third person or 
amicus curiae, and submission by a non-disputing Party to the treaty.722  
           For hearings, Chapter 11 of the NAFTA and the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules 
provide a notable departure from other existing arbitration rules, i.e. the hearings are, 
subject to limitations, open to the public.723 The disputing parties, alone or together, cannot 
veto open hearings. Given the privacy approach underlining the “ASEAN Way” of 
relations, it is however unlikely that the ACIA will set public hearings as default rule. 
           Regarding third party participation, this section refers only to amicus curiae 
intervention, 723F724 and not non-disputing party intervention which has been discussed earlier 
under the “joint decision” sub-section. 724F725 The issue of third party participation raises more 
complex concerns than open hearings and publication of awards, because it potentially 
affects the scope, complexity, length and cost of arbitration.  
Similar to the NAFTA or the CAFTA, the ACIA allows the disputing parties to 
request the tribunal to appoint one or more experts to report to the tribunal in writing on 
any factual issue concerning environmental, public health, safety or other scientific 
                                                 
 
721 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules article 1 Scope of application: the Rules provide an opt-in for the before 
-2014 treaties, and an opt-out for the after-2014 treaties.  
722 See generally OECD (2005), “Transparency and Third Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement Procedures”, OECD WP on International Investment, 2005/01, OECD Publishing. 
723 The NAFTA countries announced their intention to consent to open public hearings at all Chapter 11 
arbitrations following the 2003 and 2004 NAFTA Commission Meeting. See Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade News Release No.152, NAFTA Commission Joint Statement, 7 October 2003 and 16 
July 2004, Decade of Achievement.  
724 Literally means “friend of the court”. 
725 See 6.1.2.2, p.193. 
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matters, subject to such terms and conditions as the disputing parties may agree.726 This is 
without prejudice to the appointment of other kinds of experts where authorised by the 
applicable arbitration rules, which may allow the tribunal to call on experts on its own 
initiative. Expert’s reports will ensure that the tribunal reaches a decision with accurate, 
expert-warranted information, which will also serve to legitimise the arbitral award. 
           Apart from expert’s reports, the ACIA does not mention other third party 
participation. The text of the ACIA reflects the threshold of the “ASEAN Way”, as the 
ASEAN Member States generally do not trust NGOs or any private organisations to 
intervene in the State-related proceedings. Nevertheless, the ACIA allows the tribunal to 
permit amicus curiae participation after consulting with the disputing parties, according to 
their agreed arbitral rules. In other words, even if the ACIA does not address the matter,  
in a case that ACIA ISDS are operated under ICSID or UNCITRAL Rules, tribunals can 
always accept amicus curiae submissions under those rules.727 Indeed, ASEAN Member 
States may make their practice clearer in providing for tribunals to have the authority to 
accept and consider submissions from third parties and to allow third parties to attend 
hearings, and to a greater extent, without the need for the tribunal to obtain the consent of 
both parties.  
           Generally, most of the OECD countries share the view that, “especially insofar as 
proceedings raise important issues of public interest, it may also be desirable to allow third 
party participation, subject however to clear and specific guidelines.”728 The OECD 
guidelines suggest five criteria for the acceptance of a non-disputing party brief. Firstly, 
amicus curiae participation must assist the tribunal in assessing facts and legal issues by 
bringing a perspective to the proceedings different than that of the disputing parties. 
Secondly, the brief must address matters within the scope of the dispute. Thirdly, the 
amicus curiae must have substantive and legitimate interests in the arbitration, and ensure 
that they are independent and not backed by any of the disputing parties. Fourthly, the 
subject-matter of the arbitration must contain an element of public interests. And fifthly, 
such participation must not impose an unfair burden on the disputing parties. 
           Subject to necessary safeguards for the protection of confidential business and 
governmental information, an additional transparency is desirable in order to enhance 
                                                 
 
726 ACIA article 38, Expert Reports. 
727 ICSID AR No.37 and AFR No.41; Article 4 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, Submission by a third 
person. 
728 See Statement by the OECD Investment Committee, June 2005; OECD (2005) Report on Transparency 
and Third Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settlement Procedures, WP on International 
Investment No.1, p.1. 
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effectiveness and legitimacy of the use of ISDS under the ACIA regime. While preserving 
confidential information, the ACIA could give more access to awards and other dispute-
related documents, including parties’ submissions. The inclusion of more transparency will 
contribute to a more predictable and consistent application and interpretation of the ACIA, 
as well as to the development of ASEAN investment law. 
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Section 6.2 State-to-State Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms 
The success of investor-State dispute settlement may limit the need for State-to-
State mechanism as a matter of practice, but does not preclude it as a matter of law.  
The State-to-State mechanism remains a fall-back option, when the effort to resolve 
investment disputes through ISDS is unfruitful. In fact, any issue could be subject to the 
State-to-State mechanism. The ACIA does not create a specific State-to-State mechanism 
for the disputes arising out of the ACIA. Its article 27 wholly refers the matter to the 2004 
Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (“Vientiane Protocol” or “EDSM 
Protocol”),729 for the ‘‘interpretation and application’’ of the ACIA.  
The State-to-State mechanism under the ACIA articulates investment disputes 
under the ACIA with the overarching dispute settlement regime under the AEC.  
Its structure is based on the dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO. As a self-
contained regime, the EDSM Protocol creates a State-to-State compulsory arbitration and 
enforcement. This mechanism underlines the shift of ASEAN towards a rules-based 
organisation. Interestingly, the ASEAN regime goes beyond the WTO model. ASEAN has 
a system of referral to the ASEAN Summit, which is a political channel. This referral 
shows that in spite of the constructive effort on the use of legal mechanism, ASEAN 
remains appreciating the “ASEAN Way” of dispute resolution. Either way, the State-to-
State mechanism under the ACIA-EDSM promotes the institutional-building aspect of the 
AEC. 
  
6.2.1 General Practice 
Traditionally, an ASEAN home State may bring a diplomatic protection claim on 
behalf of its investors for a treaty violation, including cases where a recalcitrant State fails 
to honour an ISDS award.729F730 The home State would adopt the wrongful act against its 
national as a wrongful act against itself and pursue a claim on its own behalf.730F731 The State 
                                                 
 
729 The EDSM Protocol was signed by the ASEAN economic ministers at the 11th ASEAN Summit in 
Vientiane, Lao, on 29 November 2004. The EDSM applies to disputes relating to all subsequent economic 
commitments in ASEAN as well as retroactively to earlier key economic agreements. See Appendix I for the 
“covered agreements”. 
730 ACIA article 34(3). 
731 Barcelona Traction, Belgium v. Spain, Judgment, ICJ, 1970; Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Greece 
v. UK, PCIJ, 1924. 
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could pursue the case on a diplomatic basis or turn it to State-to-State arbitration.732 For the 
State-to-State DSM, ASEAN has its own legal framework specifically for economic 
dispute resolutions among ASEAN Member States. An early reference to State-to-State 
mechanism can be found in the 1987 ASEAN IGA. However, this agreement did not 
provide State-to-State arbitration, it provided only amicable settlement through diplomatic 
channel, i.e. the ASEAN Economic Ministers.733 A proper dispute settlement mechanism, 
considered the first formal use of non-consensual procedures, was prescribed in the 1996 
Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism  (“Manila Protocol”). This protocol is also 
referred by the AIA for any differences between Member States on liberalisation issues. It 
was replaced in 2004 by the “EDSM Protocol”. 
Contrary to the ISDS, the ACIA State-to-State mechanism applies to disputes on 
the interpretation or application of the treaty in general, without excluding matters that may 
arise before an investor-State tribunal.734 Consequently, the State-to-State mechanism in 
the ACIA is not only supplementary means to the ISDS, but rather concurrent means to 
deal with the issues out with the scope of the ISDS, especially liberalisation and policy 
issues. The State-to-State DSM reflects the ASEAN Member States’ attempt to 
institutionalise their relationship through the ASEAN mechanism.  
The re-emergence of State-to-State arbitration represents a milestone towards  
a third era of the ASEAN investment treaty system. The rights of both ASEAN investors 
and ASEAN Member States are recognised and valued, rather than one being reflexively 
privileged over the other. Compared to the IGA and other BITs, the ACIA represents a 
permissible and potentially progressive mechanism by which ASEAN Member States 
parties can re-engage with the system, even after the negotiation. By that, the development 
of ASEAN investment mechanism can be shaped from within, and have greater effect on 
the ASEAN Economic Community. 
 
  
                                                 
 
732 Potestà, M. (2013), “State-to-State Dispute Settlement Pursuant to Bilateral Investment Treaties: Is There 
Potential?”, in Boschiero, N. et al. (eds.), International Courts and the Development of International Law- 
Essays in Honour of Tullio Treves, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, p.766. See Article 27 ICSID Convention. 
733 IGA article IX. 
734 ACIA article 27. 
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6.2.2 Specificity: ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism 
             The EDSM is a result of the paradigm shift from the traditional ASEAN Way, 
which avoided adjudicatory means of dispute resolution, to a modernised ASEAN Way. 
The “Enhanced” DSM means that the DSM is highly judicialised, compared to the basic 
State-to-State mechanism, under the 2010 Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on DSM.735  
The heart of the EDSM is a mandatory dispute settlement process involving panels and an 
appellate body to assess disputes that cannot be settled through non-adjudicatory 
mechanisms. Similar to the ACIA ISDS, the EDSM is based solely on legal considerations, 
and will finally render binding decisions. A large part of its proceedings is depoliticised. 
However, the ASEAN Way of dispute resolution has not disappeared.  
The reference to the EDSM by the ACIA does not mean that ASEAN Member States 
prefer an adjudicatory mechanism to a non-adjudicatory one. Rather, the ASEAN Way is 
currently blending the new ingredients of internationally accepted standards with 
traditional ones, giving a unique “ASEAN way” of investment dispute resolution. The 
system envisaged by the Protocol obliges the ASEAN Member States to firstly solve the 
dispute through non-adjudicatory mechanisms, i.e. consultations, good offices, conciliation 
and mediation.736 The ASEAN Secretariat-General could also offer to be third person in 
these proceedings, giving him or her a potentially significant role in resolution of such 
disputes.737 Only in case of unresolved disputes or non-compliance with the decisions 
made under the EDSM, ASEAN Member States will return to the political and diplomatic 
channels. 
             Contrary to the ACIA ISDS, the EDSM State-to-State mechanism is a self-
contained system. The EDSM resembles to WTO DSM, in terms of the degree of 
delegation, interpretation, and enforcement.738 The ASEAN DSM Panel has followed the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) model of the WTO. The EDSM offers a set of procedures 
at the adjudicatory stage, which include proceeding before the panel, the possibility of  
                                                 
 
735 The Protocol was adopted in Hanoi, Vietnam on 8 April 2010, but not yet into force. It will apply to the 
ASEAN agreements which do not have a built-in DSM. 
736 Article 4 EDSM. 
737 Jean-Claude, P., Walter, W. (2015), Towards a Rules-Based Community: An ASEAN Legal Service, 
Cambridge, p.78 
738 Vergano, Paolo C., The ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism and its Role in a Rules-Based Community: 
Overview and Critical Comparison, Paper submitted to the Asian International Economic Law Network 
(AIELN) Inaugural Conference, 30 June 2009, http://aieln1.web.fc2.com/Vergano_panel4.pdf. (Last 
accessed: 16 September 2015).  
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a review of the panel’s findings by the Appellate Body, and procedure of compliance 
monitoring.        
 
6.2.2.1 Self-Contained State-to-State Compulsory Arbitration  
           ASEAN Member States may seek recourse to the procedure of the EDSM Protocol, 
without prejudice to the rights of ASEAN Member States to resort to other forums for  
a dispute settlement involving other ASEAN Member States. The EDSM is triggered by  
a lodging of a request for consultation. After the request, the parties could find a mutually 
agreed solution by consultation, or alternatively, the parties could agree to adjudication, 
including the subsequent implementation of the panel and Appellate body reports. These 
reports are adopted by the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM) and are binding on 
the parties. In the case of failure to implement the ruling by the losing party, the winning 
party has possibility to request compensation and apply counter measures.  
Following the WTO DSB model, the EDSM regime is, in effect, a “compulsory 
arbitration” regime. The EDSM Protocol establishes a default procedure where the 
decisions establishing an arbitral panel and adopting the awards are deemed to be made by 
the SEOM after the lapse of certain specified time periods, unless the SEOM decides by 
consensus not to do so.739 This rule is called “negative” or “reverse” consensus.740 This 
means that unless all ASEAN Member States agree otherwise, compulsory and binding 
arbitration will take place. No disputing party can unilaterally block arbitration without the 
consent of the other disputing party.  
This mandatory dispute settlement of the EDSM may be regarded as an 
improvement of the ASEAN Way of settling disputes among ASEAN Member States. The 
EDSM Protocol is the only ASEAN agreement where State-to-State compulsory arbitration 
is found. In the 2010 DSM Protocol to the ASEAN Charter, arbitration is not a default 
procedure. In order to refer the dispute to arbitration, a positive consensus must be taken 
by the ASEAN Coordinating Council (“ACC”), which comprises the Foreign Ministers of 
the ASEAN Member States.741 So each disputing State has the ability to block recourse to 
arbitration.742 In addition, the EDSM provides an appellate body for the State-to-State 
DSM, whereas the ACIA does not provide a direct appeal mechanism for its ISDS.743 After 
                                                 
 
739 See Appendix II to the EDSM Protocol on the composition of panels and panel proceedings. 
740 The rule of “negative” consensus is originally found in article 6.1 WTO DSU. 
741 ASEAN Charter article 8(1) ASEAN Coordinating Council. 
742 ASEAN DSM Protocol article 9.  
743 However, the investors can appeal the decision in case that applicable arbitral rules provide appeal 
mechanisms.  
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the EDSM panel has made a report and recommendations to SEOM, a party may notify its 
decision to appeal. Appeals, which are limited to issues of law and interpretation, go to an 
appellate body established by the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting.744  
             The next issue lies in the effective implementation and compliance by the ASEAN 
member countries.745 Under the EDSM, the disputing parties are obliged to accept the 
report unconditionally. SEOM oversees the compliance.746 Non-compliance attracts 
sanctions under the Protocol. Where the findings or recommendations are not implemented 
within a specified time, a complaining party may negotiate for compensation or may 
request authorisation from SEOM to temporarily suspend concessions or other obligations 
under the ACIA against the non-compliant States.747  
              Based on the findings of the panel or appellate body, a member State may be 
requested to take measures to bring itself into conformity with the ACIA. This is where the 
EDSM is different from the ISDS and the normal State-to-State litigations; because the 
ISDS and the normal State-to-State litigations, while awarding compensations to the 
wronged investors, cannot bring the non-compliant measures to the conformity. In this 
sense, the ASEAN EDSM has clear similarities to the WTO DSM. This shows that the 
2004 EDSM is less politicised, more legalised, and better ensures the protection of foreign 
investment in ASEAN than the general DSM (under the 2010 ASEAN DSM Protocol). 
 
6.2.2.2 Referral to ASEAN Summit: Return to Political Channel  
            On top of the WTO-inspired mechanism, the ASEAN EDSM has developed 
additional steps which turn legal disputes into international political matters under the 2010 
DSM Protocol to the ASEAN Charter. In the case where the offending party continues to 
be recalcitrant, the matter may be referred to the ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC).748 
When the ACC is unable to resolve the matter, the dispute may eventually be referred to 
the ASEAN Summit, the supreme policy-making body of ASEAN.749 Procedural 
provisions have been set out under the “Rules for Reference of Unresolved Disputes to the 
                                                 
 
744 EDSM articles 6(1), 7, 9(1), 12. 
745 Hew, D. (2005), “Towards an ASEAN Charter: Regional Economic Integration”, in Framing the ASEAN 
Charter: An ISEAS Perspective, Severino R. (ed.), pp.33-40. 
746 EDSM article 15(6). 
747 EDSM article 16(2). See also Recommendations of the High-Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic 
Integration, 7 October 2003. 
748 EDSM article 9 Reference to the ASEAN Coordinating Council. 
749 ASEAN Charter article 7(1): “The ASEAN Summit shall comprise the Heads of State or Government of 
the Member States”. 
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ASEAN Summit” or the “Rules for Reference of Non-Compliance to the ASEAN Summit” 
for a decision under ASEAN Charter articles 26 and 27(2), respectively.750  
             The political reference mechanism, as a last resort, is set up for unresolved or non-
compliance matters. Despite how advances the legal frameworks are, the “ASEAN Way” 
of dispute resolution may not easily disappear. At the beginning of the realisation of the 
AEC, ASEAN needs political will to drive legal formation at regional level. It is possible 
that investors affected by such claims may support or sponsor their home States. Therefore, 
the State-to-State DSM under the ASEAN investment regime will not only be developed 
by ASEAN Member States but also by individuals. The co-existence of investor-State and 
State-to-State DSM reflects the complex trilateral balance which the ACIA attempts to 
strike between the interests of ASEAN investors, ASEAN Member States, and the ASEAN 
Community as a whole. 
 
Conclusion to Chapter 6 
            The DSM is one of the most important elements of the ACIA. Investment arbitral 
awards may have a significant impact, at national level, on the ASEAN Member States’ 
future conduct, national budget and welfare of people; and at regional level, on the 
formation of ASEAN investment law. In designing DSM, the ACIA also has answered the 
guiding question of balancing the investors’ and States’ interests. The ACIA sets up a new 
framework that can capture the hybrid nature of the investment treaty system. The ACIA 
has created a dual-track system, the investor-State mechanism and the State-to-State 
mechanism. It also offers both non-adjudicatory and adjudicatory rights to assure ASEAN 
investors’ confidence. In fact, the investor-State arbitration is expected to be the primary 
mechanism for investment disputes. However, in theory, the State-to-State mechanism 
remains always an option. 
             While the inclusion of ISDS is currently debatable, the ACIA provides ISDS not 
only to effectively guarantee investors’ rights, and by that, to attract the investment flows, 
but also to improve the rule of law and legal certainty of the ASEAN Economic 
Community. Compared to traditional BITs, the ACIA is a well-designed and details-
enhanced agreement. It incorporates a number of important elements to improve investor-
State dispute settlement. Notably, it gives more details than previous ASEAN BITs, 
enhances transparency in the process, improves independence requirements for arbitrators, 
and provides significant institutional basis. On the contrary, no detail is given where the 
                                                 
 
750 ASEAN Charter article 26 Unresolved Disputes, article 27 Compliance. These Rules are Annexes 5 and 6 
of the 2010 ASEAN DSM Protocol. 
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ASEAN Member States decide to preserve their policy choice. Consequently, the ACIA 
gives disputing parties, to a large extent, discretion to agree on applicable arbitral rules 
which will apply to their own case. Autonomy and privacy of the parties are imminent.  
           The ACIA could have added more States’ elements to balance the autonomy and 
privacy of the disputing parties. Numbers of modification can be proposed. Firstly, public 
transparency is one of the responses to the legitimacy problem of the investor-State 
arbitration, which is mainly addressed by the 2013 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency. 
The ASEAN Member States should integrate more transparency elements by amending the 
ACIA text or by formulating annexes, for example, on third party participation. Secondly, 
the ACIA ISDS broadly refers to external institutional rules. The ASEAN Member States 
should put an effort to “ASEANise” their ISDS, particularly the non-adjudicatory 
procedures. The ACIA may adopt similar approach to the 2010 ASEAN DSM Protocol 
which contains ASEAN-specific detailed provisions governing the use of good offices, 
mediation, and conciliation.751 Thirdly, a “code of conduct” is necessary to assure the 
impartiality and independence of the members of arbitration panels and mediators. Lastly, 
regarding consistency, apart from the “joint interpretation” mechanism, the ASEAN 
Member States may consider having a roster system, setting up a Committee for the ISDS, 
and a possibility of an appellate mechanism. All of these proposals would make the ACIA 
more in consistence with the current international practice.   
             In parallel with the ISDS, the ACIA provides for State-to-State DSM. This 
mechanism does not come into play only when the ISDS attempts have failed, but also 
tackles more sensitive issues which are out of the scope of the ISDS. Being inspired by the 
WTO DSM, the EDSM is a self-contained regime, including automatic establishment of 
the panel, independent panelists and members of the Appellate Body, as well as 
compensations and retaliation against non-compliance. Contrary to the ASEAN Way of 
dispute settlement, the EDSM enhances the ACIA with some realistic and powerful 
enforcement mechanism. Despite all, in case unresolved disputes or non-compliance, the 
matters may turn into regional political problems, for which the ASEAN Charter sets up a 
system of reference to the ASEAN Summit.  
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            Despite the judicialisation of the ASEAN DSM, no case has yet been found under 
the ACIA regime. The question arises how to assessment its effectiveness. Perhaps, the 
success of a DSM can rather be measured by the scarcity of the cases.752 Many potential 
economic disputes among the ASEAN member States have been resolved without recourse 
to formal dispute settlements. The ASEAN Secretariat may well have succeeded in 
preventing foreseeable disputes, by enabling their amicable settlement between ASEAN 
Member States.753 
Problematically, the ASEAN Way may also explain this phenomenon. ASEAN 
Member States have avoided bringing disputes to adjudicatory States because of the less 
confrontational ASEAN nature, and procedural and institutional shortcomings.754 Apart 
from Singapore, and Malaysia to some extent, ASEAN Member States should enhance 
their capacity to deal with complex disputes. At the advent of the AEC, ASEAN concerns 
about the change of attitude towards a more rules-based community, ASEAN need the 
inducement of compliance and harmony, than the imposition of sanctions and involuntary 
measures of constraint.755 The first application of the ISDS or the EDSM under the ACIA 
regime is highly anticipated.  
  
                                                 
 
752 Woon, W. (Ed.). (2009). The ASEAN Charter Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: World Scientific 
Publishing; Toohey, L. (2011), “When ‘Failure’ indicates Success: Understanding trade disputes between 
ASEAN Members” in Buckley, R.P, Weixing Hu, R., Arner, D.W. (eds.), East Asian Economic Integration: 
Law, Trade and Finance, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, p.150. 
753 Sucharitkul, S. (2003), Dispute Settlement Regional Approach 6.3 ASEAN, UNCTAD, p.17. 
754 Vergano, P.R. (2009), The ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism and its Role in a Rules-Based 
Community:Overview and Critical Comparison. Paper presented at the Asian International Economic Law 
Networek (AIELN) Inaugural Conference. http://aieln1.web.fc2.com/Vergano_panel4.pdf (Last accessed: 18 
September 2015). 
755 Idem.  
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Part IV. Thesis Conclusion 
Chapter 7. ASEAN Investment Regime as 
Promising Pathway to ASEAN Economic 
Community 
This thesis on the “ASEAN Way of investment protection” has assessed the ACIA, 
which is the latest version of the intra-ASEAN investment treaties, against past and current 
investment treaty practice. It focuses on the question of balance of ASEAN investors’ and 
ASEAN Member States’ interests in the post-establishment phase. This thesis considers the 
ACIA as a third generation of the intra-ASEAN investment treaties, after the intra-ASEAN 
BITs and the IGA/AIA regime.  
The “ASEAN Way” of investment protection reflected in the ACIA has advanced 
concerns on protection of States’ interests, compared to the previous regimes. This balance 
emphasises the respect of sovereignty of States, which has been one of the principles of the 
“ASEAN Way” underlining the ASEAN structure. This thesis finds that even though the 
objectives of ACIA are to liberalise and to protect ASEAN investors and their investments, 
the ACIA recognises that ASEAN Member States need quality investments for sustainable 
development, and need more regulatory space to carry out public-purpose measures, 
especially in extraordinary circumstances.  
This thesis acknowledges that the ACIA has improved investment provisions of the 
IGA/AIA. It has enhanced the “ASEAN Way” of investment protection by including 
clearer substantive provisions and establishing more comprehensive dispute settlement 
mechanisms. With the realisation of the AEC, the ACIA will create a more competitive 
and more attractive ASEAN Investment Area, which will also restore ASEAN investors’ 
confidence after the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  
This thesis has discovered several ASEAN-specific elements in the ACIA, which 
mirror the “ASEAN Way” of investment protection. These elements illustrate the ACIA’s 
attempt to strike a balance between the sovereign right of ASEAN host States and 
protection of investors’ interests. This new balance is also in line with the general IIA 
trends towards detailed-enhanced approach. From these findings, this thesis recommends 
improvement for the intra-ASEAN investment legal framework, and may assist ASEAN 
Member States to plan their investment laws and regulations according to regional 
investment obligations. 
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Despite the fact that the ACIA has modernised the “ASEAN Way” of investment 
protection, several issues have not received much attention. These issues are perceived 
when the ACIA is assessed against the newly negotiated IIAs or on-going negotiations in 
the 2010s, especially mega-regional investment-related agreements, such as the TTP, 
TTIP, CETA, RCEP. While these IIAs are pushing for a more balancing approach, they put 
clearer rights and obligations on both investors and States, particularly on the transparency 
issue. This enhancement of transparency and sustainable development constitutes a 
challenge that ASEAN Member States should overcome in order that the ASEAN 
investment regime gains more legitimacy and is able to stand among state-of-the-art 
investment agreements.  
In addition to legal challenges, the ACIA should be addressed in terms of 
integration challenges. In accordance with the AEC Blueprint, the ACIA aims to establish 
a single market and production base, and to help transform ASEAN into the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) by the end of December 2015. Deeper investment 
integration encourages capital flows, knowledge-transfer and movement of labour which 
will eventually lead to the transformation of others pillars of the ASEAN Community, 
namely, the socio-cultural and the political-security pillars, according to the post-2015 
agenda.  
In concluding the ACIA, ASEAN Member States have used several techniques in 
asserting their roles in the interpretation of the ACIA, as well as in preserving their policy 
and regulatory spaces. More legal certainty in the interpretation resulting from the detailed 
approach in the ACIA may lessen the attractiveness of the ASEAN Investment Area and 
narrow down investors’ legitimate expectations. This is even more so as the ACIA takes 
into account the development gap among ASEAN Member States, and grants more 
flexibility, especially for CLMV countries. The development gap concern is reflected in 
the principle of special and differential treatment, which tribunals should take into account 
in the interpretation of the ACIA provisions.  
Despite all, legal certainty for ASEAN Member States also means legal certainty 
for ASEAN investors, as the latter can be assured of their particular rights and obligations. 
This thesis has demonstrated that the ACIA has created an authentic ASEAN-specific 
investment regime, which makes the ASEAN comprehensive investment regime a strong 
and promising pillar for the realisation of the AEC. 
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Section 1. The ACIA and Legal Challenges  
The ACIA has modified the “ASEAN Way of investment protection”. The previous 
IGA/AIA agreements may be categorised as IIAs in the 1990s. These ASEAN agreements 
enshrined several important but undefined treatments which were open to an extremely 
broad interpretation of investment protection at the expense of States. On the contrary,  
the ACIA recognises more public interests of ASEAN host States. The ACIA is not only  
a repackaging of the IGA/AIA regime but a real paradigm shift towards a better even 
balance of States’ and investors’ interests. In making this shift, the ACIA extends the scope 
of ASEAN investment practice to cover both direct and portfolio investments. Meanwhile, 
it provides specific details and clearer rules in order to assure certainty of interpretation by 
way of detailed provisions, footnotes, and explanatory annexes.  
 
1.1 ASEAN Specificities 
The ACIA guarantees investor’s rights in a way comparable to international 
standard practices. Most of the ACIA provisions are based on the NAFTA and 2004 US 
model BIT which have been globally accepted and adopted by significant numbers of 
investment treaties. The ACIA approach is developed on the basis of these models and the 
ASEAN background. The ACIA version of investment protection is named, by this thesis, 
the “ASEAN Way of investment protection”. The ASEAN specificities have been detected 
in the ACIA from the admission of investment phase to the dispute of settlement phase.  
The ACIA defines the terms “covered investment” and “investors” in an ASEAN 
specific way. Investments are admitted into the territory of ASEAN Member States 
according to criteria set out in the ACIA. Investments must be accepted in conformity with 
the host State’s law and, where applicable, must comply with the procedure of approval  
in writing. ACIA Annex 1 explains the procedures relating to specific approval in writing. 
This Annex calls for due process and transparency of domestic procedures.  
The ACIA extends the term “covered investment” to cover portfolio investments. 
The term “investment” also means foreign-owned ASEAN-based (FOAB) investments.  
As a consequence, the ACIA, which is an intra-ASEAN treaty, has an external dimension 
which covers non-ASEAN investors through FOAB construction. Hence, there will be 
more investment flows in the ASEAN Investment Area. This approach demonstrates the 
ASEAN Open Regionalism policy, according to which ASEAN Member States remain 
reliant on external investment flows. 
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ASEAN investors and “covered investments” admitted in ASEAN territory are 
granted substantive and procedural rights. Substantive rights are divided into absolute and 
relative rights. The three important absolute rights selected for this study are unlawful 
expropriation, FET and transfers. Provisions on unlawful expropriation are specifically 
detailed for the determination of indirect expropriation and non-discriminatory regulatory 
measures. On this matter, ACIA Annex 2 goes beyond the NAFTA/US models. Annex 2 
clarifies a vague concept of “legitimate expectation” by referring to a government’s prior 
binding written commitment. It also clarifies the term “character” of a government’s 
actions by linking this term with the objective and the proportionality of State’s measures. 
The content of FET has been controversial because of its vagueness, and tribunals 
have been required to interpret the meaning of what constitutes a “fair and equitable” 
treatment. The ACIA has attempted to solve this debated issue by proposing a very narrow 
reading of the FET standard. ACIA article 11 specifies that FET only requires each 
Member State not to deny justice in any legal or administrative proceedings in accordance 
with the principle of due process. The ACIA renounces the broad reading of FET which 
usually refers to another ambiguous concept, that of the “legitimate expectation” of 
investors. The ACIA assures the certainty of the interpretation of the FET standard. It 
enhances also the transparency of domestic laws by requiring ASEAN Member States to 
publish all laws and regulations relating to foreign investments.   
Apart from general exceptions and security exceptions which are usually found in 
modern IIAs, the ACIA expressly includes economic exceptions. ACIA article 13 
guarantees transfers of funds to all covered investments. However, as ASEAN Member 
States suffered the ASEAN Economic Crisis in 1997 and most of them are developing 
countries, the right to transfers are limited by certain circumstances, specifically listed in 
ACIA articles 13 and 16. Transfer exceptions are found in some recent economic treaties. 
Under the ACIA, these exceptions are specifically allowed for two reasons. Firstly, an 
ASEAN Member State may adopt or maintain restrictions on payments or transfers related 
to investments in the event of, or the threat of, external financial difficulties and serious 
balance-of-payments. Secondly, exceptions are allowed for ASEAN Member States which 
are in the process of economic development and may necessitate the use of restrictions to 
ensure the maintenance of a level of financial reserves. As a result, the ACIA grants States 
more space to regulate foreign investments. Nevertheless, these exceptions must be used 
according to the criteria set out in the ACIA, requiring the State to justify its necessity. 
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This thesis observes that while the ACIA perceives these absolute rights in  
a narrow way, it apprehends relative rights in a more liberal manner. The ACIA grants 
both MFN and national treatments to ASEAN investors and their investments in both pre-
establishment and post-establishment phases, while these rights sometimes disappear 
altogether in other BITs. The ACIA provides national treatment to all ASEAN investors,  
in like circumstances, without the reciprocity requirement. However, given the 
development gap among ASEAN Member States, the ACIA allows ASEAN Member 
States to reserve the application of national treatment in specific schedules, subject to 
reduction or elimination in accordance with the three phases of the Strategic Schedule of 
the AEC Blueprint. 
Any preferential treatment granted by a Member State to any investor, either 
ASEAN or non-ASEAN investor, and to its investments, under any existing or future 
agreements or arrangements, must be extended automatically on a MFN basis to all 
Member States. While other investment agreements, especially BITS of developing 
countries, include MFN, they usually set third-party exceptions to the MFN treatment. In 
contrast, the ACIA does not allow third-party exceptions but allows exception for sub-
regional arrangements between and among Member States. This aims for deeper economic 
integration for particular intra-ASEAN projects. Furthermore, while the MFN application 
to the dispute settlement mechanism is controversial in the investment treaty practice, the 
ACIA has set an example of explicit exclusion of ISDS procedures from the MFN 
application. 
In order to guarantee the effectiveness of substantive rights, the ACIA establishes 
dispute settlement mechanisms between investors-States and between ASEAN Member 
States. The inclusion of ISDS is controversial in on-going negotiations of investment 
agreements. ISDS is, however, included in the ACIA. While ISDS rules mostly refer to 
external rules and institutions such as the ICSID Conventions or UNCITRAL Rules, the 
ACIA also expressly refers to ASEAN arbitration centres and their rules. For instance, the 
Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) is a leading arbitration institution and 
has a set of innovative rules. The Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration (KLRCA) 
in Malaysia has specific rules for disputes under Islamic law. For more effective arbitral 
proceedings, the ACIA also includes new provisions, such as a fork-in-the-road provision, 
a mechanism for dealing with frivolous claims, and consolidation proceedings.  
The ACIA inserts a mechanism of joint-decision in ISDS in order to ensure that the 
ACIA provisions will be interpreted in accordance with the intention of ASEAN Member 
States. This technique preserves the role of ASEAN Member States in the interpretation of 
215 
 
 
the ACIA before a concrete case. Tribunals should defer to joint decisions of States. The 
ACIA does not opt for the establishment of an investment committee which has power of 
interpretation both in abstracto and in concreto. ASEAN Member States prefer basing the 
interpretation on the circumstances of each case. As this approach requires a joint decision 
of ten Member States, it may not be an easy tool to make the formation of the corpus of 
ASEAN investment jurisprudence.  
Finally, in the case that disputes before an ISDS remaining unresolved, the ACIA 
provides a State-to-State dispute settlement mechanism which refers a legal dispute to the 
ASEAN Summit, the highest political entity of ASEAN. This political reference is an 
ASEAN-specific way of dispute resolution, which is neither common to other BITs, nor 
resembles the European Court.  
On balance, this reading of the ACIA can be summarised as the concept of the 
“ASEAN Way of investment protection”. While the ACIA attempts to guarantee the 
maximum level of investment protection standards, it retains prerogatives for ASEAN 
Member States to regulate, in the form of exceptions and carve-outs, as well as limitations 
on the exercise of investors’ rights in the ISDS system and the containment of arbitral 
powers. The “ASEAN Way” has underlined the ASEAN structure since the beginning of 
cooperation; its principle of non-interference of domestic affairs and respect of States’ 
sovereignty has been inserted into the ACIA in order to balance regional attractiveness  
as a single market and production base with the sovereign rights of ASEAN Member 
States. These ASEAN specificities may serve as guidelines for on-going negotiation of 
IIAs, or for the interpretation of other investment treaties. 
 
1.2 Legal Challenges 
In spite of the innovations which make the ACIA more certain and more 
transparent, this thesis finds that the “ASEAN Way of investment protection” still lacks 
some key elements concerning public transparency and corruption, sustainable 
development and corporate governance. In preparation for realisation of the AEC, ASEAN 
Member States should look beyond the balance of investors’-State’s rights in the ACIA. 
States should take into account various stakeholders, especially the ASEAN peoples. This 
lack shows that the characteristics of old-version BITs persist in the ACIA, or perhaps the 
ACIA over-asserts interests of direct beneficiaries and undervalues those of indirect 
beneficiaries. This shortcoming may lower the quality of the ACIA standards. 
This thesis notes the room for development of the intra-ASEAN investment regime. 
The enhancement of these elements which are lacking forms part of the legal challenge for 
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ASEAN Member States and ASEAN investors. ASEAN Member States should emphasise 
more the balance between the economic dimension of the ACIA international investment 
regulations and the social dimension, particularly regarding the interests of investors, 
States and all other parties who may be potentially affected by the ACIA.  
Firstly, the tension between public transparency and confidentiality of arbitration is 
currently one of the biggest challenges of ISDS. Some newly negotiated agreements tend 
to refer to the 2013 UNCITRAL “Rules on Transparency” and the 2014 “Mauritius 
Convention on Transparency” in order to provide for a significant degree of openness 
throughout the arbitral proceedings. The ACIA requires public transparency merely for 
publication of awards and decisions. This thesis recommends that ASEAN Member States 
include the above mentioned transparency rules or amend the ACIA to expressly require 
more public transparency, especially for publication of documents and for amicus curiae 
participation, and for open hearings. In addition, ASEAN Member States may consider 
setting a code of conduct for arbitrators and more detailed rules on alternative dispute 
settlements. 
Secondly, in connection with the transparency issue, ASEAN Member States may 
use the ACIA as a tool to prevent corruption in their national administrative activities, 
especially in the process of approval of foreign investment. They may include an anti-
bribery provision in the ACIA as conditions and limitations on submission of a claim, so 
that tribunals are mandated to treat corruption as a jurisdictional or preliminary objection.  
Thirdly, the ACIA should address more the tension between economic growth and 
sustainable development.756 The attraction of investment flows is the most important 
objective of the ACIA. Nevertheless, a true balance of human development could not be 
reached by leaving social and environmental dimensions out of the equation.757 The Bali 
Concord III declares that in order to realise an ASEAN Community, an ASEAN Member 
State needs to strengthen its “bonds of regional solidarity”, that is by becoming more 
“politically cohesive, economically integrated and socially responsible”.758 
                                                 
 
756 Nipawan P., “The Quest of Sustainable Development in the ASEAN Investment Area”, article presented 
in the 2014 Inaugural Asian Conference on the Social Sciences and Sustainability (ACSUS), 1-3 December 
2014, Hiroshima, Japan. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2523352 (Last accessed: 16 
September 2015). See also Nowrot, K. (2014), “How to Include Environmental Protection, Human Rights 
and Sustainability in International Investment Law?”, JWIT, Vol.15, Special Issue: The Anatomy of the 
(Invisible) EU Model BIT, pp.612-644.  
757 See ASEAN Charter article 1, Purposes (9),(13);  OECD (2014), Report Towards Green Growth in 
Southeast Asia: Solutions for Policy Makers. http://www.oecd.org/dac/environment-
development/Final%20SE%20Asia%20Brochure%20low%20res.pdf (Last accessed: 16 September 2015) 
758 Bali declaration on ASEAN Community in a global community of nations (2011), singed at the 19th 
ASEAN Summit on 17th November 2011 in Bali; “Bali Concord III” Plan of Action 2013-2017, November 
2012. 
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The ACIA gives a great room for manoeuvre to ASEAN Member States to issue 
regulatory measures of public purposes, and allows them to exercise their sovereign power 
in extraordinary circumstances. However, these mechanisms may not be sufficient to 
restrain ASEAN governments to “race to the bottom”759 by lowering standards of decent 
environment, labour standards, consumer protection or public health regulations, in order 
to attract investment flows. Many types of environmental provisions may be brought to the 
attention of the ASEAN Member States negotiators; for example, the “not lowering 
environmental standard” type of clause in the MAI760 and in the Japan-Malaysia or 
Thailand-Japan FTAs. The 2014 EUSFTA may provide a useful example for “Trade and 
Investment Promoting Sustainable Development” provisions, and mechanisms and 
institutions to implement these provisions.761 
Fourthly, ASEAN Member States may consider strengthening the concept of 
corporate and social responsibility (CSR) in the ACIA. “Unlike environment and labour 
provisions, the inclusion of explicit references to CSR in investment agreements is  
a relatively recent phenomenon”.762 The imbalance occurs with reference to the main 
providers of investments. The multinational enterprises (MNEs) enjoy the granted rights 
without any obligations being imposed,763 while their activities may have repercussions on 
a wider climate of environment and society. Hence, investors should not adopt a “profit-
maximisation” approach, but a “profit-optimisation” approach which would yield long-
term benefits for the investor.764  
In conclusion, the balance between investors’ and States’ rights in the ACIA has 
rendered the current ASEAN investment regime less attractive than the previous regime. 
Also, the recommended inclusion of stronger environmental and societal protection 
provisions would make the balance of investors’-States’ interests more problematic. 
Furthermore, due to the economic and social development gaps among ASEAN Member 
States, the idea of transparency and sustainable development may be difficult to conceive.  
                                                 
 
759 Muthukumara, M., Shreyasi, J. (2006), Trade liberalization and the environment in Vietnam, World Bank 
Policy Research WP No.3879, Washington DC, World Bank. April. 
760 OECD, Preamble to the MAI and Provision on Not Lowering Standards, Drafting Group No.3 on 
Definition, Treatment and Protection of Investors and Investments, Note by the Chairman, 
DAFFE/MAI/DG3(97)5, 20 February 1997. 
761 EUSFTA Chapter 13, The Review of Impact on Sustainable Development (article 13.14), Government 
Consultations (Article 13.16), Institutional Set up and Monitoring Mechanism (article 13.15).  
762 UNEP (2011), Corporate Social Responsibility and Regional Trade and Investment Agreements, 
Several references to CSR are made in the IIAs, for instance, article 810 in the investment section of the 2009 
Canada-Peru agreement, and an annex to the 2009 US-Peru TPA. 
763 Davarnejad, L.(2008), Strengthening the Social Dimension of IIAs by integrating Codes of Conduct for 
Multinational Enterprises, OECD Global Forum on International Investment, 27-28 March 2008. 
764 Mujih, E.C. (2012), Regulating Multinationals in Developing Countries: A Conceptual and Legal 
Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, Gower Applied Research. 
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It is expected that more-balanced provisions between investment flows and 
sustainable development will be present in the next rounds of negotiation. For the moment, 
the regional legal framework is expected to create an investment-friendly legal 
environment in ASEAN. These legal lacunae may rather be perceived as cooperative 
requirements among ASEAN Member States and ASEAN investors. Overall, the dilemma 
of the ACIA’s effectiveness and its impact on AEC integration does not exist at the 
regional level. The problem lies in the implementation of regional obligations by ASEAN 
Member States.     
Section 2. The ACIA and Integration Challenges 
Despite the fact that the “ASEAN Way of investment protection” in the text of the 
ACIA has undergone significant transformation, the challenge of ASEAN integration 
remains in the implementation of the ACIA at national level. According to the AEC 
Blueprint, the ACIA serves primarily as a tool to achieve one of the AEC objectives, i.e.  
a single market and production base. By the integration of trade and investment, the single 
market and production base will be the first official move toward the realisation of the 
AEC, whereas the other objectives, namely, freedom of movement of labour, capital, 
services, are more arduous to achieve.  
The realisation for the more ambitious goals is set at 2020. To be attractive at 
regional level, ASEAN member States have put in place a three-fold connectivity strategy, 
namely, physical infrastructures (transport, ICT, energy), soft infrastructures (legal, 
institutional, capacity-building), and people-to-people connectivity (education and culture 
tourism).765 The implementation of the AEC strategy is challenged both at regional and 
domestic levels. On the one hand, ASEAN investors should be informed of the potential to 
invest in the ASEAN Investment Area. On the other hand, the ASEAN Member States 
should make an effort to implement the ACIA obligations. 
2.1 Regional Awareness of ASEAN as an Integrated Investment Area 
It is worth remembering that the ACIA has four objectives: protection, 
liberalisation, facilitation, and promotion. As discussed supra, the protection pillars of the 
ACIA may be considered successful with the entry into force of the ACIA. Meanwhile, the 
                                                 
 
 765 See interaction between ASEAN Connectivity and ASEAN Community Building in ASEAN Secretariat 
(2011), Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity, ASEAN Publications; See also Bhattacharyay, B. N. (2009), 
Infrastructure Development for ASEAN Economic Integration, ADBI WP138, Tokyo, ADB Institute; ERIA 
(2010), ASEAN Transport Strategies 2010-2015, Final Report.  
http://www.eria.org/ASEAN%20Strategic%20Transport%20Plan.pdf (Last accessed: 16 September 2015) 
219 
 
 
first use of the dispute settlement mechanism provided under the ACIA is expected.  
In practice, more tangible achievement on investment liberalisation pillar remains to be 
seen. The ACIA has opened up only five industrial sectors and services incidental to these 
sectors. These sectors are also subject to a long list of reservation of national treatment, 
and senior management and board of directors. According to the principle of gradual 
liberalisation, it will take some time for ASEAN Member States to get ready to open up 
more sectors and gradually eliminate their reservations schedules.  
While ASEAN Member States focus on liberalisation and protection provisions,  
the inclusion of promotion and facilitation provisions seems to be understated. ACIA 
article 24 emphasises that ASEAN Member States must promote investment flows by 
cooperating in “increasing awareness of ASEAN as an integrated investment area”; for 
example, encouraging the growth and development of ASEAN SMEs, enhancing industrial 
complementation and production networks among multi-national enterprises.766 ASEAN 
citizens should be informed about this enormous economic potential of the AEC. 
Particularly, young entrepreneurs from SME sectors should be promoted to reach out to 
partners in ASEAN Member States to build synergies in the region.767  
ACIA article 25 states that Member States must “endeavour to cooperate” in the 
facilitation of investments into and within ASEAN, by creating the necessary environment 
for all forms of investments; streamlining and simplifying procedures for investment 
applications and approvals; promoting dissemination of investment information, including 
investment rules, regulations, policies and procedures; establishing one-stop investment 
centres; and providing advisory services to the business community of the other Member 
States.768 This is not an obligation. Nonetheless, ASEAN Member States should provide 
public access to all the laws, regulations and administrative guidelines of general 
application that affect investments in the territory of a Member State. Moreover, ASEAN 
States should inform the ASEAN Investment Area Council769 about any new law or 
modification of laws, regulations or administrative guidelines affecting investments in the 
country. Each State should also appoint an agency responsible for investment information. 
ACIA article 26 further indicates that Member States should “endeavour to harmonise”, 
where possible, investment and industrial policies and measures; and build and strengthen 
                                                 
 
766 ACIA article 24, Promotion of Investment. 
767 ASEAN Secretariat (2014), Thinking Globally, Prospering Regionally: AEC 2015, Indonesia, ASEAN 
Publications.  
768 ACIA article 25, Facilitation of Investment. 
769 ACIA article 42, Institutional Arrangements. 
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the capacity of Member States, including human resource development, in order to 
enhance ASEAN economic integration. 770 
ASEAN Member States have large differences in language, culture, political and 
economic models. They also have no institution like the EU Commission, which has 
competence in investment issues instead of the EU Member States. These two facts 
emphasise the importance of the promotion and facilitation pillars of the ACIA. Even 
though these cooperation provisions are not legally enforceable under the ISDS 
mechanism, they are important to the contribution of an investment-friendly environment 
for both intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN investment flows into the ASEAN Investment 
Area. 
Furthermore, although ACIA institutions do not exercise investment competence 
instead of the ASEAN Member States, they should conscientiously carry out their 
functions. The ASEAN Coordinating Committee on Investment (CCI) and the ASEAN 
Investment Area Council should oversee, coordinate and review the implementation of the 
ACIA, provide policy guidance on global and regional investment matters, and report the 
up-to-date situation to the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM).771 The promotion of the 
ACIA, the facilitation of investment, and the proactive approach of the ACIA institutions, 
so combined, will make the ASEAN Investment Area countries an attractive alternative 
location for investment flows. 
 
2.2 Domestic Implementation 
The implementation of the ACIA is not an easy task because it requires ASEAN 
Member States to change domestic laws or even national constitutions. A cross-national 
empirical analysis finds that “although ASEAN countries on the whole tend to provide  
a positive macroeconomic environment, attractive to foreign investment, most of them are 
relatively poor institutionally”.771F772 This analysis also finds that, with respect to institutional 
development, the diversity within ASEAN Member States reflects great differences in their 
government effectiveness and legal environment.  
Sporadic failures in implementing certain specific ACIA obligations are not as 
concerning as the structural incapacity of ASEAN Member States, which is more 
obstructive to successful integration. Several impediments may be named: absence of 
                                                 
 
770 ACIA article 26, Enhancing ASEAN Integration. 
771 ACIA article 42, Institutional Arrangement. 
772 Buracom, P. (2014), “ASEAN Economic Performance, Institutional Effectiveness, and Foreign Direct 
Investment”, Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol.41, No.3, pp.108-126. 
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transparency and predictability in government regulations and their modalities of 
implementation, inaccessibility and lack of updated and readily available information. 
Hence, States should not push forward the AEC with only short-term solutions, such as the 
change of macroeconomic policy, or gradual elimination of restrictions on foreign 
investments. Long-term solutions are needed, including substantial structural reforms for 
greater functional harmonisation.  
Moreover, the lack of dispute settlement related legal capacity and the lack of 
budget for the operations of ASEAN-specific activities are particularly worrisome in the 
CLM countries. Therefore, improving institutional quality and reducing disparities in 
institutional performance among ASEAN Member States should be set as a priority which 
underlines ASEAN economic integration. 772F773 A national coordinating mechanism should be 
set up to avoid potential redundancies and contradiction in the process. 
The realisation of the ambitious regional goals calls for sincere and effective 
implementation of the ACIA obligations by ASEAN Member States. ASEAN Member 
States should think more in terms of regional prosperity, and not only of their domestic 
interests. In the AEC Era, the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs, which has 
characterised the “ASEAN Way” of cooperation, should be no more a convenient pretext 
for non-compliance with the ACIA obligations. 
In parallel to the legal environment, the political situation has also affected 
investment flows in the emerging markets. For example, despite favourable business 
regulations, recent political turmoil in Thailand has increased the risk of doing business 
and has agitated the expectations of some investors. In contrast, foreign investment in 
Vietnam is showing a strong recovery. Meanwhile, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are 
gaining more attention from investors, because of their low-cost labour and richness of 
natural resources.  
In preparation for the full-fledged realisation of the AEC, enhancing the capacity of 
domestic dispute settlement bodies may be a further plausible approach to balance national 
policy space and developmental goals against investment protection and liberalisation of 
the region. From now till 2020 is the transitional period for ASEAN Member States to 
reform their legal and institutional structures, including rule simplification, enhancement of 
transparency and regulatory coherence for trading and investment. It is also critical for 
them to open-up industrial sectors in the right sequence in order to avoid economic 
vulnerabilities.  
                                                 
 
773 Idem. 
222 
 
 
Additionally, ASEAN Member States should put their efforts into developing 
portfolio investment instruments, and into designing more sophisticated mechanisms and 
institutions to deal with these instruments. This may ease the implementation of the ACIA 
regarding portfolio investment flows which have newly been included in the scope of the 
ACIA. ASEAN governments should leave the most sensitive sectors till last. Once the 
economic pillar is stable, ASEAN could advance its challenges to the socio-cultural and 
political-security pillars.  
On a final note, ASEAN Member States should have more trust in the intra-
ASEAN relationship. They should not overly rely on external relations and ignore their 
closest neighbours. The new “ASEAN Way” should not be seen a display of political 
solidarity as it was in the 1960s. The realisation of the AEC in 2015 is not a final 
destination of ASEAN. Rather it is a milestone on the long journey towards the complete 
integration process of the ASEAN Community. The most important consideration is to 
include all ASEAN Member States in the process in a significant way. ASEAN should 
promote dispute settlement mechanisms, whether judicial or alternative procedures. Their 
legal and institutional infrastructure and the rule of law must be strengthened for all 
members of ASEAN. As a result, despite all diversities, the new “ASEAN Way of 
Investment Protection” may create a sustainable investment-friendly environment and 
encourage intra-ASEAN investment flows throughout the region. 
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